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Abstract 
 
England and New Zealand introduced pay-for-performance schemes in their primary health 
care systems, with incentives for general practitioners to achieve improved population-
based health outcomes, between 2001 and 2007. These schemes were part of health 
reforms to change the relationship between the state and the medical profession, giving the 
state increased influence over the quality and allocation of publicly funded health care. Two 
schemes of differing size, scope and impact were implemented. This research takes a 
comparative approach to exploring each policymaking process, utilising quasi-natural 
experimental conditions in these two Westminster governing systems to test the relevance 
of Kingdon’s multi-theoretic Multiple Streams Framework and other theoretical approaches 
to explain policy variation and change.  
The research documented and analysed the agenda-setting, alternative selection and 
implementation phases in the two policymaking processes and identified the key drivers of 
policymaking in each case study. A qualitative methodology, based upon documentary 
analysis and semi-structured interviews with 26 decision-makers, leaders and participants, 
was used to develop the two case studies, providing rich descriptive details and rare insights 
into closed policymaking approaches as seen by the participants. From this case study 
evidence, themes were drawn out and reviewed for consistency with Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams Framework as it has been interpreted and adapted by Zahariadis. The case study 
evidence and themes were considered in a framework of comparative analysis where 
patterns of similarity and difference were established. The utility of Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams Framework in interpreting the case study evidence was assessed. 
This analysis demonstrated that Kingdon’s Framework, as interpreted by Zahariadis, had 
high descriptive power for both case studies but failed to predict the patterns of non-
incremental change observed or the importance of institutional factors such as ownership 
and governance arrangements for public services, interest group structure and historical 
antecedents seen in the two policymaking processes.     
The research finds that the use of bargaining in England and not in New Zealand is the 
reason for major differences in speed, scope and outcomes of the two pay-for-performance 
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schemes. Institutional structures in the general practice sub-system are therefore the 
primary driver of policy change and variation. These acted as enablers of non-incremental 
change in the English case study, providing incentives for actors individually and collectively 
to design and rapidly to implement a large-scale pay-for-performance scheme. The 
institutional features of the general practice sub-system in New Zealand acted as a 
constraint to the development of a large-scale scheme although non-incremental change 
was achieved. Phased approaches to implementation in New Zealand were necessary and 
slowed the delivery of outcomes from the scheme.  
With respect to other drivers of policy change and variation, the role of individual actors as 
policy and institutional entrepreneurs was important in facilitating policy design in each 
country, with different types of entrepreneurs with different skills being observed at 
different stages of the process. These entrepreneurs were appointed and working within the 
bureaucracy to the direction of decision-makers in both countries. England and New 
Zealand shared ideas about the benefits of New Public Management approaches to public 
policymaking, including support for pay-for-performance approaches, and there was a 
shared positive socio-economic climate for increased investment in health services.   
The research provides evidence that Westminster governing systems are capable of 
purposeful and orderly non-incremental health policy change and that Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams Framework, which theorises policy formation in conditions of ambiguity, needs to 
be enhanced to improve its relevance for such jurisdictions. Recommendations for its 
enhancement are made.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue 
 
In the years following 2000, the governments of England1 and New Zealand each 
implemented major changes to primary health care within their health systems, investing 
new money and developing policies to achieve improved population-based health 
outcomes. They each made major changes to the governance and financing arrangements 
for their general practice services as part of a larger programme of health system reform. 
The reforms in both countries were designed, amongst other things, to give state funders 
greater influence over the medical profession’s responsibility for quality and allocation of 
publicly funded health care, increasing the clinical and financial accountability of general 
practitioners to the state 1 p.11 2. Each country introduced a pay-for-performance scheme in 
their primary health care system as part of this process of policy change. These schemes 
differed in size, scope and speed of implementation. Consequently the two schemes 
achieved differing levels of impact upon health outcomes. This provides a strong platform 
for the comparative study of these two contemporaneous, similar policymaking episodes. 2  
This research takes a comparative approach to identify the similarities and differences 
between the policymaking context, processes and the results each country achieved in their 
pay-for-performance policymaking. The purpose of the research is to gain a thorough 
understanding of how each country approached their policy problem and to document how 
the process actually worked in each case and what results were achieved. 
                                                             
1 This thesis focuses on a comparison of policymaking in England, rather than the United Kingdom, as some 
elements of difference in policymaking in health exist between the countries of the United Kingdom 
subsequent to devolution of political responsibility for the NHS to Scotland and Wales in 1998. However, 
where research which refers to the four countries of the United Kingdom is used in the thesis, the names of 
United Kingdom or Britain will be used. 
2 For the purposes of this research, pay-for-performance is taken to include both direct incentives paid to 
physicians such as general practitioners or their practices or incentives included in a performance-based 
funding approach which is directed at intermediate provider organisations. Pay-for-performance is defined 
as‘financial incentives that reward providers for the achievement of a range of payer objectives, including 
delivery efficiencies, submission of data and measures to [monitor] and improve quality and patient safety.’ 3. 
Nolte E, and McKee, M. Caring for people with chronic conditions. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008. 
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The research also draws out lessons for the practice of public policy development and 
theories about public policymaking. Policy-orientated approaches in the public policy 
literature can be grouped into five main theories about drivers of policymaking. These are, 
respectively, that the influence of institutions, interest groups, rational choice of individuals, 
ideas and socio-economic factors are the main drivers of policymaking 4. However, multi-
theoretic approaches, which theorise that a mix of these drivers explains policymaking, are 
thought to have greater utility to explain complex policymaking 4 p.167. In this research, the 
descriptive account of pay-for-performance policymaking in the two case studies is used to 
test the utility of a particular multi-theoretic approach from the public policy literature; the 
Multiple Streams Framework, hereafter, the MS Framework, of John Kingdon. Its descriptive 
and explanatory power to analyse and explain the two policymaking episodes is explored 
alongside other approaches and the variables they hypothesise to be important in 
policymaking. This analysis is then used to make suggestions for extending or enhancing the 
Framework. 
The research questions which are considered in this thesis are: 
 In what aspects and why did two similar episodes of policy formulation and 
implementation in two similar jurisdictions follow different processes and have 
different outcomes?3  
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process?  
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from the analysis which 
may enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
The setting 
The two countries  
 
This research has taken advantage of ‘experimental’ conditions which existed between 2001 
and 2007 in England and New Zealand, enabling the comparative study of these two 
                                                             
3
 Policy formulation is defined as ‘setting of objectives and means to achieve them’ and policy implementation 
as ‘policy intentions turned into action’. Outcomes are ‘action outside the political system produced by public 
decision-making’ 4. John P. Analysing Public Policy. London: Cassell, 1998. 
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contemporaneous, similar policymaking episodes. The two countries share similar political 
systems and health systems, an earlier similar pattern of health system establishment and a 
recent history of health system reform, involving the application of New Public 
Management approaches. These similarities mask some differences. Hill 5 warns that 
although institutions and policies may seem similar, differences in the systems for 
resourcing and remuneration may mean that their power or significance is varied. A brief 
description of the comparable features of the two countries, and some key differences, 
follows.  
PoIitical systems 
 
There are significant structural similarities between England and New Zealand. Both have 
similar majoritarian unitary political systems with adversarial features (in which two parties 
oppose each other vigorously on matters relating to the state and the general welfare of the 
people) 6. In these systems the central government is ultimately supreme, by contrast with 
federal states such as the United States in which sub-national units such as states share 
sovereignty with the central government and have powers which the central government 
may not unilaterally alter. The United Kingdom (and New Zealand until 1996) has a 
majoritarian parliament, giving a majority of seats to the party with a plurality of votes in 
constituencies (a ‘first past the post’ system). This ‘Westminster model’ political system in 
each country gives the Executive high autonomy 7-9. The electoral system in both countries 
generally delivers strong majority government which empowers a Cabinet to make policy 
often without constraint by the legislature 10. 
 
Marmor notes ‘the autonomy and authority of government in parliament in the United 
Kingdom...as well as its position at the apex of a nationalised health service’ enabled ideas 
to be implemented more quickly in that country than in, say, America 11 p. 334. Both England 
and New Zealand, in the decade up to 1996, were notable for a period of rapid and 
fundamental policy change, including in their health systems, despite opposition from 
interest groups and the general public. In New Zealand, this period of reform was followed 
by major institutional changes which, in 1996, saw the adoption of a mixed-member 
proportional electoral system and a series of extensions of citizens’ rights to create a 
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‘maverick rather than the pure’ Westminster model 12 p.155, reducing the autonomy and 
authority of government in parliament through the need to form and manage coalitions of 
parties to govern. This change affected the implementation of health reforms from 1996-9 
13 p.15. A coalition government also took power in the United Kingdom in 2010.  
 
The two health systems 
 
The national health systems of the two countries are similar and this has led to them often 
being assessed as being in the same categories of health system typologies 14-18. Both 
England and New Zealand have national health services in which comprehensive health 
services are universally available to all citizens. Established within a decade of each other in 
1948 and 1938 respectively, the systems share many features, especially with respect to 
their publicly owned, financed and provided hospital services. The financing of these two 
health systems is largely public: in 2000 80.9% of health expenditure in the United Kingdom 
was public and 78% in New Zealand 19 p.268. In both countries most of this public revenue is 
generated from taxation, these funds are pooled, centrally managed and allocated 
prospectively in annual budget appropriations. In this respect they are both national health 
systems in the OECD 1987 typology 20. 
However, the categorisation of the two systems typologically is somewhat misleading with 
respect to the primary health care sectors of each country. Scott’s comparative study of the 
health systems of England and New Zealand (Scott’s study covers the whole of the United 
Kingdom) highlights the role of private provision within an essentially public system and 
confirms subtle differences between each  system: while the United Kingdom’s system is 
characterized by Scott as ‘mainly public and private providers’, New Zealand’s is described 
as ‘mixed public and private providers’ 16 p.35-36, implying a greater role for private providers 
within the New Zealand system. Crampton 21 p.203 describes New Zealand’s systems as a 
‘dual public/private system for health care, involving largely publicly funded and provided 
secondary services and largely privately provided primary care services.’  
Docteur and Oxley 19 p.22 note that the extent of public versus private coverage in a system is 
indicative of the degree of government control over health spending. The English general 
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practice system had a publicly-funded and governed form with strong hierarchical features, 
of a kind which was in theory capable of periodic abrupt and dramatic change ordered from 
the top, though implementation could be delayed when information necessary to 
implement it is lacking 22 p.14. New Zealand has a complex mix of ownership and governance 
arrangements in the general practice sub-system as a result of its largely privately provided 
general practice services. It is assessed as providing minimal opportunities for public 
influence 13 22-27. Crampton suggests that New Zealand policy relating to the funding of 
general practice services has rarely conformed to organisational principles necessary for 
efficient and coherent public policy and created intractable problems of financial barriers to 
general practice services, general practitioner shortages in rural areas and lack of general 
practitioner accountability 21 p.205-6.  
Differing mechanisms for accountability in the general practice sub-system 
 
These differences in financing and provision arrangements and mechanisms for 
accountability in the general practice sub-system in each country have consequences for the 
overarching health system in each country. The need for more preventive and population-
based primary health care is common to both countries. In England there are no concerns 
about affordability of access to care but other concerns about access to services and quality 
of services in poorer areas and a concern about levels of responsiveness to patient needs 
and expectations, particularly waiting times for treatment.  
In New Zealand, high patient charges for access to general practice have deterred visits to 
the doctor when they were needed 28 29 and policymakers have few levers to encourage 
general practitioners to keep costs of consultations affordable. There are also problems with 
provision of general practice services in isolated rural areas with high health needs and with 
encouraging delivery of preventive health services by general practitioners. In each country 
different approaches have been taken to resolve these needs and to improve quality of 
services. Whereas New Zealand typically had a ‘stand-off between government and general 
practitioners’ 21 p.216 and quality initiatives emanated largely from peer-led initiatives 
generated from within the profession, England developed strong centralised initiatives 
through its hierarchical system of management of the national health service and close 
working relationship between the state and the profession. A systematic review of studies 
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of quality of clinical care in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in 2001 showed 
only four studies undertaken in New Zealand and noted the less clearly defined government 
policy on quality improvement in general practice in comparison with that of the United 
Kingdom 30.  
History of approaches to health policy problems   
 
To change the structural and institutional arrangements of a health system requires an 
effort of significant political will, usually emanating from outside the health arena in rare 
windows of opportunity 22 p.11. The periods of establishment of the national health systems 
in England and New Zealand are an example of such windows of opportunity and are 
explored in detail in Chapter Three. The period of reform beginning in the 1990s was also an 
effort of significant political will, driven by new public management and economic theory 13 
31. Significant change occurred in these two countries, when health systems were 
restructured to introduce competitive approaches to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. 
These reforms met with varied results 11 13 22 32. Because each health system has a large 
publicly-financed share of health expenditure, the governments of each country were able 
to use their substantial financing role during this recent period of reform to undertake 
system-wide strategic public policy interventions at that time, assisted by their monopsony 
powers 16 p.152. Implementation of changes did not always follow smoothly, with aspects of 
the reforms unravelling at this stage in each country 22 33.  
The parallel nature of the reform pathway between these two countries is often noted in 
the literature 16 18 22 31 34 35. This period of shared public management reform history led to 
both countries (along with Australia and the United States) being characterised by Pollitt as 
‘New Public Management-intensive jurisdictions’ 31. New Public Management (NPM) 
approaches draw on theory which supports public management reforms based upon the 
introduction of more competition, market-type models and business-like methods within 
their public sectors but also seeing a large role for private sector forms and techniques in 
the process of restructuring the public sector, favouring quasi-markets, large-scale 
contracting out and market-testing, contractual appointments and performance pay for civil 
servants  31 p.116.  
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Tuohy suggests that health care states such as England and New Zealand have been 
‘hybridizing’ from their original ideal-typical forms or ‘increasingly incorporating elements of 
other models to produce distinctive national hybrids’ in order to shift ‘lines of accountability 
in health care decision-making, the flows of information amongst decision-makers and the 
broad public legitimacy of the health care regime’ 24 p.612. The increasing power of the state 
in these relationships has occurred through greater use of information technology which 
reduces the information asymmetry between state actors and physicians 36 p.14. This phase 
has been called the ‘politics of redesign’ as states sought new combinations of resources 
and new coalitions of interest’ with the aim to ‘optimize the key performance dimensions of 
equity, cost control and quality’. In particular governments sought to ‘control professional 
power in the interest of ensuring that care of acceptable quality is broadly accessible at 
reasonable cost’ 23 p.5.   
Divergent steps in their shared history of health reforms have taken place since 1997 in 
England and 1999 in New Zealand which have led to the two systems beginning to be 
differentiated in the literature describing typologies of health systems. Docteur and Oxley 19 
p.22, notes 7 & 8 p 74 find that, in respect of the financing and delivery of hospital-based health 
care, both countries had developed features of a public contract system from 1990 in which, 
in the usual definition of such a system, public payers contract with health-care providers 
(the ‘purchaser/provider split’). Trials of mechanisms to encourage greater accountability in 
providers such as fund-holding and pay-for-performance in England and budget holding in 
New Zealand occurred with general practitioners in the 1990s. While England has continued 
to strengthen the contractual elements of its health system, from 2001 New Zealand’s 
health system re-introduced more elements of a public integrated system to hospital and 
health-related services, abandoning the purchaser/provider split introduced in 1993 for 
hospital services 25. The usual definition of a public integrated system is where both 
purchasing and provision functions are held by the same organisation, usually a 
government. The change introduced in 2001 in New Zealand is described as being ‘from a 
‘purchaser/provider’ market-oriented model introduced in 1993 to the more community-
oriented model which is currently in place’ 37 p.1, though contractual mechanisms were 
retained and strengthened within primary care.  
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Political ideology 
 
There is evidence of a partisan pattern of political preferences which has influenced the 
process of health system reform in each country. In England, health policies based on 
centralized authority are associated with Labour governments and localised solutions 
associated with Conservative governments 23 p.9. 
In New Zealand there is some evidence that a ‘normative ideal of democratic 
representation’ through locally administered health services has become a core value of the 
Labour Party since 1989, though with ultimate accountability to Ministers 38 p.172 whereas 
National governments are associated with greater willingness to support a private market 
within general practice and clinical rather than community-based governance structures, 
involving doctors in decision-making to a greater degree 27. In New Zealand in 1999 the 
Labour Party actively campaigned against market-based approaches to health care policy 39, 
distinguishing itself from the policies of the National Party which had since 1993 supported 
market mechanisms in the delivery of social services 13 p.15.  
This partisan approach to health policy should not be overstated, however. There is some 
continuity of policy direction across different administrations which provides a steady 
undercurrent, notwithstanding a pattern of policymaking and reversal in New Zealand. 
Policy ideas developed by a Labour administration have frequently been implemented by a 
successor National administration and certain concerns about health policy, such as  the 
level of co-payments for general practice services or the earning of disproportionate gains 
from public funding by medical practitioners, are shared by politicians from both parties 21 
p.203, 210. 
The policy instrument: pay-for-performance 
  
Pay-for-performance is the delivery of ‘financial incentives that reward providers for 
achievement of a range of payer objectives, including delivery efficiencies, submission of 
data and measures to [monitor] and improve quality and patient safety’3. The establishment 
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of national health systems generated financial incentives for governments to regulate the 
medical profession, bringing them into conflict with doctors who value their professional 
independence 40. Both countries implemented a pay-for-performance scheme to exert 
greater influence over general practitioners as part of policies to achieve greater quality and 
affordability of and access to primary health care. It is agreed in the academic literature that 
the way general practitioners are funded has a significant impact on the way they deliver 
care to patients 41-43. There are good theoretical reasons to believe that financial incentives 
do impact positively on the quality of health care 44. This is a common strategy in the private 
sector, having its origins in the managerial approach, which includes ‘adoption of 
performance-related payment systems, introduction of quality and outcomes culture, and 
generally increased entrepreneurship in the public sector’ 45 p.48. It is also being utilised by 
public sector funders to incentivise proactive population-based health care practice 18 p.141, 
but is recognised as being fraught with risks.  
The literature warns of many barriers to the successful implementation of financial incentive 
schemes with general practitioners, not least of which is the opposition of the medical 
profession. Other barriers include design issues such as setting the size of bonuses or 
incentives too small or funding incentives from within existing budgets, applying incentives 
to too small an area of the general practitioner’s work, paying for activities rather than 
results, paying for standards of quality which are already being met rather than for 
improvements, replacing the intrinsic motive to do a good job for patients with a financial 
one and reducing the effort in those areas not incentivized. Financial incentive schemes are 
regarded as having a high risk that they will be gamed or the benefits will be claimed 
unfairly. Implementation issues include the availability of adequate data on performance, 
the schemes incurring much more cost than predicted, difficulties in monitoring whether 
quality improvements have actually occurred and questions over timing of payments, 
treatment of set up costs for practices and publication of results 46-48.  
Since 2004, the literature on pay-for-performance in primary health care has burgeoned. An 
overview by two people involved in the design and subsequent development of research 
relating to the Quality and Outcomes Framework reports that there are now 20 systematic 
reviews, and one systematic review of systematic reviews, about whether pay-for-
performance improves the quality of healthcare 49. The authors conclude that the evidence 
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is clear that pay-for-performance can be effective but the effects can be short term and 
often not as large as payers wish, depend on the context, and can have unintended 
consequences. They conclude that it is not whether pay-for-performance should be a 
component of physician pay, but rather which type of pay-for-performance should be used, 
and in combination with which other quality improvement interventions.  
The analytical approach 
 
The policy-oriented approach 
 
The field of public policy research, and specifically the policy-orientated approach in the 
public policy literature, asks how public policies are made, from the view point of the 
actions public decision-makers produce 4 p.205, and specifically why mistakes or successes 
occur in public policies. John provides a set of overarching analytical questions about the 
key phenomena for the subject of public policy research 4 p.12: why policy varies between 
country and sector; why policy changes; which policy was more effective; what were the 
causes of policy success and failure; and which approach was more democratic and 
accountable. Most theories of policy change and variation are based upon a presumption 
about individual behaviour or a belief about a primary driver of policymaking 4 50. John sets 
out five theory-based approaches, in which the primary driving forces of policy change or 
variation are believed to be institutions, groups or networks, rational actors, socio-economic 
factors and ideas respectively. John suggests that these single-driver approaches may lead 
to partial accounts of policy making processes, concentrating on only parts of the complex 
processes. He recommends research which is multi-theoretic, or utilises features of more 
than one approach, such as Kingdon’s MS Framework.  
Kingdon’s MS Framework     
  
The MS Framework is a multi-theoretic approach to understanding policymaking. The MS 
Framework integrates several elements of theoretical explanation, using important insights 
from all the approaches 51. It seeks to explain non-incremental policy change by theorising a 
continual interplay between ideas, institutions, interests, actors and events in conditions of 
policy ambiguity 4 p.173 rather than a single dominant driver of policy change. Kingdon 
11 
 
describes three streams flowing independently, containing policy problems, policy solutions 
and political processes respectively. His MS Framework has a theory of political 
manipulation at its core 52 p.65. Kingdon’s key insight is the importance of ideas and of human 
agency (or actors) in coupling opportunities in the three streams to achieve policymaking in 
an environment of uncertainty or ambiguity 52 p.65. Key actors in his Framework, policy 
entrepreneurs, are motivated to seize chances to influence policymaking and are important 
in explaining how agendas are set and alternative policy solutions selected. In this way 
sudden or large-scale change in otherwise incremental processes might occur. Kingdon’s 
theory was a challenge to writers who believed that orderly, incremental, marginal and 
rational adjustments to policy were the norm. Kingdon’s theory has, however, been 
criticised as being too dependent upon chance and too dismissive of the role of structures, 
institutions and history upon policymaking 53.   
Why the research is important 
 
Understanding the health policymaking autonomy and capacity of these two 
states 
 
The autonomy and capacity of a state to make and implement public policy (or to exercise 
its ‘stewardship’ functions) 54 p.122 is a fundamental characteristic of statehood. ‘Autonomy’ 
for a state is defined as ‘the ability of government institutions to resist being captured by 
interest groups and to act fairly as an arbiter of social conflicts.’ ‘Capacity’ refers to the 
ability of government systems to make and implement policy and ‘springs from the 
expertise, resources and coherence of the machinery of government’ 55 p.81. Understanding 
the nature of autonomy and capacity in a particular state and how well it is able to maintain 
or extend its autonomy or capacity to develop effective public policies may assist it to 
strengthen these characteristics over time. The purpose of the pay-for-performance 
policymaking in both countries was to increase state influence over the quality and 
allocation of publicly funded care by the medical profession. This research will investigate 
how the ‘stewardship’ functions of each state were exercised in these two policymaking 
episodes and will document their results. In a comparative study of general practice 
financing in New Zealand,  England and Australia completed in 2010, the authors concluded 
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that ‘a powerful profession appears to have succeeded in securing significant autonomy and 
self determination while receiving public funding in return for relatively little specification or 
monitoring as to how that funding is used (except in England)’ 56 p.101. This strongly suggests 
that there is a deficit in the stewardship capacity for health policymaking in New Zealand by 
contrast with England. It is important to explore whether this contention remains accurate 
by testing it through the analysis of the New Zealand and England case studies of 
policymaking, because this will enable these two states to monitor and develop their health 
policymaking autonomy or capacity, based on new evidence about their current 
performance.  
The research will also identify how the different contexts within the health system in each 
country affect its policymaking autonomy and capacity and which of the two countries was 
most successful in achieving the outcomes sought. The findings from this research may also, 
therefore, enable each state to consider whether and how to change elements of this 
context to facilitate its policymaking in future.   
Improving the utility of the MS Framework to support policymaking 
 
Policymakers who wish to use evidence and theories in the policymaking literature to guide 
them in their work depend upon the relevance and accuracy of this literature. By testing and 
suggesting improvements for the relevance and accuracy of the MS Framework, it may 
become more useful to policymakers in a greater variety of jurisdictions. Kingdon’s theory 
was originally developed from evidence drawn from the pluralist processes of United States 
federal policymaking where well organised interest groups, weak political parties and 
multiple venues for decision-making create intense ambiguity, resulting in pronounced 
pressures on policymaking 52 p.67. The MS Framework is said to fit less well with Westminster 
systems with well organised political parties and centralised decision-making (or other 
European jurisdictions with corporatist consensus-based approaches to decision-making). 
Though subsequent research and revision has improved the relevance of Kingdon’s MS 
Framework over time, there is an opportunity to further explore its suitability in the context 
of two in-depth case studies of Westminster system policymaking processes in this research, 
to identify gaps in the MS Framework’s relevance for these types of jurisdiction and provide 
new lessons for policymaking in New Zealand and England.  
13 
 
The MS Framework is focused almost exclusively upon the agenda-setting or policy 
formulation stage, with limited analysis applied to the processes of policy implementation. 
It is set out at a relatively high level of description. This research will probe the processes of 
agenda-setting, alternative policy selection and implementation more deeply, to assist in 
the testing of the applicability of Kingdon’s MS Framework in these phases of policymaking.  
Finally, Kingdon’s MS Framework emphasises the key role of policy entrepreneurs in 
bringing together or ‘coupling’ elements from each stream (problem recognition, policy 
ideas and politics) where there is policy ambiguity. He defines policy entrepreneurs as 
having ‘a willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes 
money – in the hope of a future return’ 51 p.122. Subsequent scholarship has developed an 
understanding of the role of the policy entrepreneur, how it works and what motivates 
policy entrepreneurs 24 57. The opportunity arises to observe whether policy entrepreneurs 
are present in these two case studies and whether other types of public entrepreneurs may 
play important roles in policymaking. This may add to a better understanding of the 
performance of the entrepreneurial role in policy change.  
Methodological approach  
 
This research uses a comparative case study methodology in a most-similar systems design. 
The research question is why, in two similar political and health systems, did two policy 
decisions to introduce pay-for-performance in primary health care have such different 
results, including their process of design, scope and speed of implementation? This requires 
exploration of similarities between the two countries, as well as key differences, particularly 
at the level of the general practice sub-system. It will take particular account of differences 
in resourcing and remuneration (which may mean the power or significance of institutions 
or policies is varied in that sub-system). The English pay-for-performance scheme is notable 
for its large size and scope. The literature on health policy reform generally and on pay-for-
performance available in 2000 would not have predicted that such a large-scale scheme 
would have been able to be designed and implemented so readily 22 p.199 58-61. The nature of 
the scheme implemented in England offers a challenge to existing theory that such schemes 
would usually be resisted by doctors and result in small and incremental change in 
behaviour of practitioners 40 59. The pay-for-performance scheme negotiated in New 
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Zealand, though non-incremental, was small in size, scope and slow in speed of 
implementation and designed in an extended consultative process. 
The pay-for-performance policymaking in each country will be set out using evidence from 
documents and interviews with participants which describes each policymaking process in 
detail. From this descriptive study differences which may be related to differing outcomes 
will be isolated so that:  
‘If we can locate some particular feature in which otherwise very similar nations 
differ, we are entitled to suggest that it is attributable to one of the few other 
factors distinguishing them’ 62. 
 
To paraphrase this methodological approach for the purposes of this thesis, if we can locate 
some particular feature in the pay-for-performance policymaking process in which the 
otherwise very similar countries of England and New Zealand differ, such as the size and 
scope of the scheme, we are entitled to suggest that it is attributable to one of the few 
other factors distinguishing them, such as structural features of financing arrangements for 
general practice, the role of doctors in the policymaking process or the characteristics of 
general practice interest groups and look for an explanation - a set of reasons or a theory - 
which explains the differences in the pay-for-performance policymaking and the other 
factors of difference between the two countries. Castles calls this  to ‘use the anomalous to 
illuminate the familiar’ 63.  
The logic of enquiry which has been used is that of analytic induction, a ‘specific form of 
inductive analysis that begins deductively by formulating…hypotheses, and then examines a 
particular case in depth to determine if the facts of the case support the hypothesis. If it fits, 
then another case is studied and so forth, in the search for generalizations’ 64. Yin 65 also sets 
out the process by which analytic generalization can arise from case studies so that where 
two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, literal replication or validation 
may be claimed. Where contrasting results are achieved for predictable reasons, theoretical 
replication is found.  
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In this research design the dependent variable is the policy outcome and all other variables 
including institutional and structural features, network and group structure, rational choice 
explanations, ideas and socio-economic factors are examined as independent variables. 
Outline of the thesis  
 
This research is presented in three parts. The first part sets out the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks used. Chapter Two provides a review of the key theoretical 
frameworks used in analysis of the case studies. The policymaking aspect of the research is 
supported by a description of the five theoretical approaches to policymaking, with a more 
detailed description of the MS Framework for policy formulation. In Chapter Three a brief 
review of comparative theory is provided. Then a comparative analysis of the two countries’ 
public policy and health systems is presented. Chapter Four explains the methodology, 
setting out the qualitative approach to the gathering of evidence and the techniques used 
for analysis, providing a full description of the process used to complete this research. 
In Part Two the two case studies are presented. Chapter Five describes the process of design 
of the pay-for-performance scheme, the ‘Quality and Outcomes Framework’ in England. It 
concludes with a review of several independent evaluative studies of the resulting pay-for-
performance scheme and of the outcomes achieved by the scheme. Chapter Six explores 
the evidence using Kingdon’s MS Framework and assesses how well it describes or explains 
the evidence set out in Chapter Five.  
In Chapter Seven, the New Zealand case study is presented with a detailed description of 
the context and the process for design of the pay-for-performance scheme, the 
‘Performance Programme.’4 It concludes with a review of the small number of independent 
evaluative studies of the final scheme. Chapter Eight explores the New Zealand evidence 
using Kingdon’s MS Framework and assesses how well it describes or explains the evidence.  
In Part Three, Chapter Nine answers the research questions which are set out in this 
Introduction. This discussion will demonstrate why there are differences in the two health 
systems today despite significant similarities both at their point of origin and between the 
                                                             
4 The Performance Programme was originally known as the Performance Management Programme and 
changed its name in 2008 when changes to its governance structure were also made.  
16 
 
two countries’ political, economic and social systems. This Chapter discusses the impact of 
the research upon the current literature on theoretical frameworks for health policymaking. 
Chapter Ten concludes by reviewing the evidence that the research has generated, together 
with a summary of the contribution the research has made to the literature on health 
policymaking.  
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Part One 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, the theoretical literature which has been used to analyse the public 
policymaking processes observed in each case study will be set out. In the second section, a 
detailed assessment of the state of development of a leading multi-theoretic approach for 
explaining policymaking, the MS Framework, will be presented. The original MS Framework 
and current critiques and empirical work using the theory are then reviewed.   
Analysing public policy 
 
Political science and its sub-discipline of public policy is the discipline within which this 
research is undertaken. Whereas political science is concerned with the study of politics 
generally, public policy research studies ‘how the machinery of the state and political actors 
interact to produce public actions’ 4 p.2. These actions are the result of processes of policy 
formulation (including agenda-setting and consideration of policy alternatives) and they 
lead to policy outputs (‘a discrete decision or set of decisions that produces or aims to 
produce a policy outcome’) through a process of policy implementation 4 p.204. Hence, a 
policy outcome is an ‘action or non-action, occurring outside the political system, 
intentionally or unintentionally produced by public decision-making’ 4 p.205 5. This research is 
primarily concerned with the processes of policy formulation (or the setting of a policy 
agenda, the selection of alternatives and design of the chosen policy option) but also 
                                                             
5 To clarify the meaning of the terms used in this thesis, the descriptions of the processes of agenda setting, 
alternative-selection, decision-making and implementation are those used by Kingdon, who draws in turn 
upon Simon as follows: agenda-setting is ‘directing attention’, alternative selection is ‘discovering or designing 
possible courses of action’ and authoritative choice is ‘selecting a particular course of action’. Implementation 
is ‘the implementation of the superiors’ decisions’. These definitions are set out on pages 3 and 31 of  51. 
Kingdon JW. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Update Edition, with an Epilogue on Health Care 2nd 
ed. London: Longmans, 2010.    
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considers the implications for policy implementation and the types of outputs and outcomes 
achieved by the policy. 
These definitions imply that policymaking is a planned, sequential and ultimately cyclical 
process: problem identification and conceptualisation is followed by the setting of a 
policymaking agenda, the subsequent process of consideration of alternatives, agreement of 
the selected option, formal decision-making relating to the detail of the selected alternative 
and its implementation, then its evaluation and review. However, such a description fails to 
convey what can be a much more complex process. Sabatier 50 notes that many complex 
elements need to be taken into account, including the multiplicity of actors involved, the 
length of time which is relevant to understanding the particular policy, the need to 
contextualise it within the sub-system which will influence its development and 
implementation, the often highly technical subject matter and the role of many subtle 
influences such as actors’ values and motives, resources and power. In summary, Sabatier 
suggests that understanding the policy process requires’ knowledge of the goals and 
perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country involving possibly very technical 
scientific and legal issues over periods of a decade or more while most of these actors are 
actively seeking to propagate their specific ‘spin’ on events 50 p.4.  
The particular sectoral frame of reference for this research, or the ‘field of decision-making 
concerned with a certain type of public problem’ 4 p.205 is health policy. Kingdon notes that 
health sector policy making can be characterised as ‘being more ideological in content and 
more partisan in its politics’ than policymaking in other sectors 51 p.250.    
Five explanatory approaches, which seek to explain the causes of rather than simply 
describing policymaking, policy variation between sectors or countries and policy change, 
are set out below.   
Recent theoretical approaches to the policymaking process  
 
John sets out five theory-based approaches to how policy is made and implemented 4 p.15-19  
which can offer testable hypotheses about why policies differ between policy sectors and 
countries and why some policies are stable and others change. These approaches 
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hypothesise that there is a major driver for policymaking: institutions, groups, rational 
actors, ideas or socio-economic forces, defined in the following ways:  
 Institutions or political organisations such as parliament, legal systems and 
bureaucracies  and the rules, norms and strategies they adopt 
 Groups and networks whether formal or informal, within and outside political 
institutions 
 Rational choice theory or the preferences and bargaining of individual actors, 
where their choices are structured by institutional or socio-economic factors   
 Ideas about solutions to policy problems  
 Socio-economic factors such as cost pressures, and rising consumer 
expectations. 
 
Institutional approaches   
 
Taking an institutional approach highlights the important role which political organisations, 
laws and rules play in shaping or constraining policymaking processes. Institutions provide 
the structure within which individuals and organisations interact and the incentives actors 
have in making choices about policy 50 p.309. Institutions adapt to their political environment 
and reflect past decisions, state traditions and culture. The New Institutionalists broaden 
the definition of institutions to include the ‘shared concepts used by humans in repetitive 
situations organised by rules, norms and strategies’ 4 p.40.  
Differences between political systems can seem to have a significant effect on the way in 
which policy is made and what policy can be made. For instance, as discussed in the 
previous Chapter, Westminster systems are generally characterised by stronger party 
discipline and a more autonomous Executive, especially where they are unitary political 
systems and majoritarian electoral systems. In these states, such as England and New 
Zealand (until 1996), there are fewer checks on central government policymaking than in 
federal systems or in those with separation of powers. Sabatier offers a contrast with the 
‘features of American pluralism (multiple venues, majoritarian rule, weak political parties, 
politicised bureaucracies)’ which create a different policymaking context 50 p.11.  
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Rather than constituting an inertial force, the institutional form of the two-party democracy 
may facilitate change, especially where the political system is adversarial. Hall suggests that 
in Britain this dynamic tension gives parties ‘a structural interest in product differentiation 
and incentive to initiate changes’ to garner electoral support 66 p.24. The political party 
provides an institutional channel for new ideas to be translated into policy by coming 
‘through the legislative process relatively unscathed’ 66 p.24. 
Immergut has described the comparative advantage of majority parliamentarianism in 
Sweden which enabled it to introduce health insurance programs in the face of medical 
opposition more easily than states with more complex political processes and more ‘veto 
points’. This led her  to conclude that the medical profession has less impact on health 
policy than is generally believed and that where it does this is because of opportunities 
presented by particular political systems rather than differences in medical organisations 40 
p.413. 
The partisan and adversarial pattern of policymaking in the Westminster system of 
government is facilitated by its few veto points but also makes it ‘difficult to inure any policy 
framework against subsequent reversal’ 67 p.12, providing incentives to politicians to move 
quickly to both enact and implement policy. However, there is also an incentive for interest 
groups in such systems to make partisan alliances in the knowledge that the policy could 
quickly be reversed by the next administration. Politicians need to choose an approach 
which best guarantees the longevity of their policymaking. Tuohy’s model of four types of 
choices for policy change  recognises that the enactment of reforms in Westminster systems 
is more likely to be ‘big-bang’ or large scale and fast-paced, fundamentally reshaping 
relationships and institutional frameworks quickly and in a single comprehensive sweep. It is 
important for politicians to make ‘choices of scale and pace of change [to be] attempted and 
choices of policy design with footholds for potential allies’ 23 p.42 to maximise the chance of 
effective policy change. It should be noted that Tuohy’s model of types of change in health 
systems is referring to non-incremental change in the usual sense of a dramatic shift in 
policy goals, often accompanied by a shift in the balance of influence across state, medical 
and private financial actors, the mix of governance mechanisms (hierarchy, markets and 
peer control), the legitimating ideas about entitlement to health care and the appropriate 
function of the state as payer, employer or regulator in those systems 67 p.11.  
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Although institutions may seem similar, differences in rules and regulations at the sub-
system level, such as for resourcing and remuneration 5 may mean that there are significant 
differences in the way these institutions provide a structure for individuals and 
organisations to interact and the incentives actors have in making choices. It is of great 
interest when similar jurisdictions, such as England and New Zealand, display divergence in 
patterns of policymaking as this allows exploration of whether the same institutions are 
producing different outcomes over time or political actors are adjusting their strategies with 
respect to institutional structures to achieve change. Divergence in similar systems suggests 
that ‘the persistence of cross-national differences despite common challenges and 
pressures’ may relate primarily to differences in intermediate institutions, such as policy 
networks or corporatist arrangements 66 pps.5-6,16-17.  
Group-based approaches 
 
Group or network approaches consider that policy change arises from the interaction of 
institutional arrangements and groups or networks 50 p.298 and that it is collective action or 
relationships between actors more so than the role of the institution or individual actor 
which drives policy change. The literature focuses on the nature of the distribution of power 
amongst groups and whether power is concentrated or shared 50 p.303. ‘Group or network’ in 
this research refers to a variety of forms of groups: interest groups and their formal 
organisations, a wider policy community of specialists including academics, think tank 
members and analysts from interest groups and looser and broader-based networks formed 
around issues. Whether groups are fragmented or integrated and whether they have strong 
neo-corporatised relationships with state decision makers (such as relationships involving 
closed, shared processes of policy development) or whether access to decision-makers is 
dispersed amongst groups or less formal issue-based networks is said to make a difference 
to policy making processes and outcomes 52.   
Immergut argues against this, finding that although the characteristics of the medical 
profession as a pressure group with ‘insurmountable veto powers’ are a key to the relative 
power they hold, it is really institutional features which block or ‘veto’ state actors rather 
than the success of the profession’s interest-based policy preferences which count 40 p.413. 
Dowding, using a health policy example, concurs that the state can ‘ride roughshod over any 
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policy community’ to establish a policy framework, though it may rely upon the interest 
group to elaborate the details of its implementation. He acknowledges that the way in 
which interest groups respond to policy proposals will be conditioned by previous policy 
decisions 68 p.144.  
Adam suggests that the distribution of power and type of interaction within networks is 
affected by the national context and that majoritarian unitary democracies have networks 
where power is concentrated and interaction patterns competitive. Further, the more 
centralised the state and interest group structures, the greater the likelihood of negotiation 
of binding agreements between them which usually results in incremental change (or 
replacement of one policy instrument with another) 61 p.139, 145. Where there is asymmetry 
between the state and interest groups, either unilateral state action or self-regulatory 
interest group behaviour is more likely and in an environment such as this there is the 
greater possibility of more fundamental policy change (or ‘serial shifts’ which are defined as 
new ideological paradigms). 
Observing patterns of new strategic alliances between state actors and others within 
Westminster systems, Tuohy asserts that such ‘strategic alliances between policy-makers 
and entrepreneurial actors will be critical to the course of change regardless of scale or 
pace’ of policy change 23 p.42. These alliances can be with national organisations with formal 
relationships with the state, such as the British Medical Association (BMA) in England, or 
organisations formed around a particular set of policy preferences with a goal to champion 
policy change.   
The characteristics of the network, such as whether communication between members is 
facilitated by its structure, whether there is a dense web of connections or more loosely 
organised interactions and whether relationships within the network have grown trusting 
over time and facilitate the exchange of ideas may affect the way policy issues are 
processed. But while networks in a polity, like institutions, may provide the context for 
policymaking and may either frustrate or facilitate the process, John suggests that they in 
themselves are not drivers of policy change, but that this lies in components of networks 
such as the resources, legitimacy and bargaining strategies of actors such as organisations, 
interest groups or individual leaders within networks 4 p.86. 
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Rational choice approaches 
 
Rational choice theory takes the approach that the preferences of individual actors are the 
foundation for political action and inaction 4 p.116. Rational choice methods, including 
bargaining and game theory, focus upon modelling the expression of individual preferences 
and choices based upon assumptions about the behaviours which will be observed. The 
basic theoretical assumption is that individuals act opportunistically in their self interest, 
maximising their own utility, rather than the interests of others. Rational choice theorists 
acknowledge that institutions and structures affect actors’ choices by determining 
incentives 69 p.54 which constrain some behaviours and encourage others. Dowding lists the 
four resources which impact upon bargaining: information, legitimate authority, 
unconditional incentives to alter others’ incentive structures and conditional incentives to 
alter others’ incentive structures 70 p.143.  
Institutional rational choice theory models the results of actors’ preferences and choices 
and how these are affected by structural variables in institutional arrangements. Ostrom has 
set out a conceptual map of an ‘action arena’ composed of actors and an ‘action situation’ 
of participants, their roles, allowable actions, potential outcomes and the level of control 
each participant has over choice, information and the costs and benefits assigned to actions 
and outcomes. Ostrom suggests that differing structural variables in institutional 
arrangements within an ‘action arena’ will produce differing patterns of interactions and 
outcomes 71 p.27. These can operate at the operational (individual day-to-day decision-
making), collective choice (policy decision-making) or constitutional choice levels (who 
participates in decision-making and by what rules). An assumption of self-interest is not 
essential to the theory as there is increasing evidence that ‘in certain situations people’s 
normative commitments frequently lead them to act in ways that are contrary to their 
narrowly defined self interest’ 72 p.101. People  may have limits in their capacity to receive, 
store, transmit and act upon information and their ‘bounded rationality’ may cause them to 
‘satisfice’ or achieve some basic level of utility rather than ‘maximise’ it 69 p.52. Dowding 
explains that utility maximisation is not necessarily the same as self interest and suggests 
that the channelling of self-serving behaviour of participants is the key normative 
policymaking or political task. Even rent-seeking behaviour by interest groups can be socially 
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optimal 73 p.455 and ‘the recommendation of the careful rational choice scholar is to use its 
methods to try to reach generalised conclusions about the damaging and beneficial features 
of different aspects of the modern state.’ Other literature acknowledges the role of ‘norms 
of behaviour’ such as ‘reciprocity’ which may limit opportunistic behaviour 50 p.300. Self-
interest assumptions can be excluded from modelling techniques in this approach, in a 
process called ‘altruistic rational choice.’  
Ostrom also indentifies the role of entrepreneurial actors as leaders who are ‘focused 
primarily on problem-solving and putting together heterogeneous processes in 
complementary and effective ways ‘as important in solving collective action problems in the 
public sphere’ 74.   
Theorists such as Crouch 75, Tuohy and Ostrom have used both historical institutionalist and 
rational choice approaches in combination to explore collective action problems 67 from an 
institutional and individual actor perspective. When doing so, historical institutionalists have 
strongly challenged the strict assumption of utility maximising in rational choice theory 66 p.7, 
regarding institutional structures as reflecting, containing and moderating these expressions 
of individual utility maximisation. Preference formation including the goals of actors can be 
shaped by the institutional context and is not to be assumed. ‘New ideas can cause groups 
to rethink their interests...the way in which various policies are ‘packaged’ can facilitate the 
formation of certain coalitions and hinder others...leadership can play a key role in this 
process’ 66 pps.8-9. 
Crouch states that the New Institutionalists have re-established a role for political science in 
explaining that rational maximising actors are constrained by ‘patterns, norms and rules’ but 
warns that actors are not in an ‘iron cage of institutions which they cannot change’. He 
seeks a theory of action which ‘retains all the insights of neo-institutionalism concerning the 
nature of human action, while also being able to account for innovation’. His contribution is 
‘the institutional entrepreneur’, an actor determined to seek change by recombining 
elements of institutions in unusual ways at opportune moments in order to produce change. 
75 p.3, 19,23-4 Crouch suggests their primary target for change is governance mechanisms. By 
‘governance’ he means not only the formal and explicit mechanisms usually called 
‘government’ but the informal and implicit mechanisms which sustain institutions and 
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maintain conformity. He also suggests that conditions of institutional heterogeneity 
facilitate innovation by ‘presenting actors with alternative strategies when existing paths 
seem blocked and by making it possible for them to make new combinations among 
elements of previous paths‘. In empirical applications of this theory, entrepreneurial effort 
towards ‘recombinant governance’, which disposes of some kinds of behaviour from the 
past and retains other forms in new governance compounds, should be sought.  
Tuohy has also found that entrepreneurial actors were key to health reforms in England 
over the period from 1990 to 2010. Entrepreneurial providers, purchasers and NHS policy-
makers took advantage of an environment of change to create new organisational roles for 
general practitioners such as fund-holding. New political allegiances to champion or oppose 
these were also formed. The combined impact of demonstration effects of entrepreneurial 
schemes and direct political advocacy drove reform processes forward 23 p.14 to the extent 
that significant shifts in influence amongst health providers, especially general practitioners, 
and within the state hierarchy, especially entrepreneurial managers and central evaluation 
and monitoring bodies, was able to occur 23 p.39.  
Tuohy recommends examining variation in the dimensions of political uncertainty and 
heterogeneity of institutional forms or policy frameworks  over time and across nations to 
help in understanding the variation in degree and kind of institutional entrepreneurialism 
found, and the power bases from which it may emerge (state authority, private capital or 
professional expertise) 67 p.4. 
Ideas 
 
John contends that the role of ideas and their advocacy by actors is a causal factor over and 
above the effects on policy of political institutions and interests 4 p.145. Ideas which become 
part of political party ideology and characterise partisan politics, especially in adversarial 
Westminster political systems, may be strong drivers of policy change and structure policy 
outputs 27 p.490. However, John sees ideas and interests as existing in a symbiosis ‘which is at 
the heart of change and stability in public policy’ 4 p.166.  
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Socio-economic drivers 
 
Socio-economic approaches, which have been highly influential in explaining public 
policymaking, are assessed by John as assisting in identifying sets of constraints on action 
that impact on policy choices 4 p.114, rather than as theorising driving forces of change in 
their own right.    
Multi-theoretic approaches  
   
This leads John to conclude that approaches which may be multi-theoretic and which can 
explain both constraining forces (institutions and patterns of interest group relationships) 
and driving forces (ideas and individual actors) have greater explanatory power for public 
policymaking than single-approach theories. That is, the interplay between ideas and 
interests amongst actors is the driving force for policy change, structured by the 
constraining forces of institutions, patterns of interest group or network relationships and 
socio-economic structures.  
John and Sabatier both specifically focus on theories which integrate a number of elements 
(multi-theoretic in character). Three major multi-theoretic approaches to policy making 
have been developed:  the MS Framework 51, the Policy Advocacy Coalition Framework 76 
and the Punctuated Equilibrium Model 77. All integrate more than one approach to public 
policy and synthesise many insights into a coherent framework, and have both elements of 
explanation and description. The Advocacy Coalition Framework explains policy change by 
placing emphasis on the policy community as the source of policy change. The Punctuated 
Equilibrium Framework identifies a pattern in which opponents of contemporary policy 
settings manage, at intervals, to change policy image and enable policy debate to shift to 
different venues. The MS Framework considers a wider range of drivers of policy cahgne and 
variation and is regarded as the closest to ‘an adequate theory of public policy’ by John. 
That is the reason for selecting the Multiple Streams Framework for this research. Thurber 
describes it as ‘an interactive model of identifiable forces driving the agenda-setting 
process’ 51 p.vii. It is set out in some detail below. It is the intention of this research into pay-
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for-performance policymaking to test the relevance and adequacy of this theory for the 
selected two case studies. 
Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies was first published in 1984 and focused 
on the processes in public policy agenda-setting, studying the ‘list of subjects to which 
government officials and those around them are paying serious attention’ 51 p.1-3. His 
empirical research was done in the United States. Kingdon challenged the prevailing view 
that policymaking was usually rational, comprehensive, and followed clear stages and 
avoided sharp, substantial and sudden patterns of change. He also challenged the prevailing 
view that planned, top-down policymaking processes could achieve non-incremental change 
by providing strong evidence of discontinuity and non-incrementalism, especially in the 
agenda-setting phase. His theory accommodates the notion that at the alternative 
generation stage, familiar ideas and approaches may be drawn upon but he considers that 
agenda-setting is more likely to depend upon chance and the receptivity of the climate 
(which entrepreneurial actors can manipulate) than on existing policy settings.  
He developed the MS Framework to describe the dynamics of policy change in conditions of 
ambiguity, using a theory of political manipulation. He hypothesised that ideas, actors, 
institutions, socio-economic circumstances and political interests all interact in this process. 
The most important features he found were the elements of chance and creativity as 
hypothesised in the Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice 78. These elements 
strongly reflected the patterns in data he collected in extensive empirical research into 
policymaking in the transport and health policy arenas over a period of four years, including 
247 in-depth but conversational elite interviews with top decision-makers. But there were 
identifiable patterns within this process. His research led him to conclude that the process 
of policymaking closely resembled the ‘organized anarchy’ described by Cohen.  
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The key features of the MS Framework 
 
Ambiguity, fluid participation and unclear technology  
 
Specifically, three characteristics of the Garbage Can Model borrowed from Cohen are at 
the core of Kingdon’s theory 51 p.84: 
– problematic (or ambiguous) preferences, which are ‘discovered through action rather 
than actions being determined by them’, 
–  fluid participation (individuals drifting in and out of decision-making according to the 
time and effort required) and 
–  unclear technology (or failure of individuals to understand how the general processes 
of the organisation really work). 
 
The ambiguity of preferences and fluidity of participation was often exacerbated by 
temporal constraints and together these circumstances militated, according to his evidence, 
against rational, measured, incremental policymaking. Instead he often observed dramatic 
non-incremental policy change. This seemed to be facilitated by opportunistic policy actors 
he called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ looking for a window of opportunity or ‘policy window’. 
Policy entrepreneurs are ‘people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their 
pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay 
attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and 
solutions to politics.’ Their actions increase the chances of a policy making it to a decision 
agenda. Out of 23 case studies his subjects found entrepreneurs to be very or somewhat 
important in 15, and most observers viewed them as ‘central figures in the drama’ 51 p. 180. 
Although he concentrates his research upon the first two processes, he describes four 
processes, using a sequential model of policymaking: 
1. The setting of the agenda 
2. The specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made 
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3. An authoritative choice among those specified alternatives (ie. a vote or 
presidential decision) 
4. The implementation of the decision 
 
The features of ambiguity, fluidity and unclear technology are most noticeable in the 
agenda-setting phase. His theory covers ‘why the agenda is composed as it is at any one 
point in time and how and why it changes from one time to another.’ Kingdon sees the two 
processes of agenda-setting and specification of alternatives as different and following 
different processes, with different actors key to each stage 51 p.19.  
Agenda-setting  
 
His famous metaphor of the ‘policy primeval soup’ describes the way in which policy ideas 
and proposals developed by specialists in a policy community float for selection and are 
then tested for technical feasibility, fit with dominant values and the current national mood, 
budgetary workability and the political support or opposition they might experience. He 
describes three streams flowing independently of one another, each with a life of their own: 
 policy problems (or public matters requiring attention) 
 policy solutions (proposals for change developed out of knowledge or interest 
among specialists in that policy field, and often promoted by policy entrepreneurs 
who try to put ideas on political agendas and keep them there), and 
 political processes (such as election results, changes in public opinion).   
 
A process of ‘coupling’, often achieved by policy entrepreneurs, is defined by Kingdon as 
critical. The framework sets out the relative importance of various actors at different stages 
of the policymaking process, as assessed through the field research. This finds the President 
and elected officials (and their appointed officials) to be of greatest importance in agenda-
setting.  
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Alternative selection  
 
Civil servants and interest groups, including provider groups such as medical professionals, 
are more important in alternative selection or development of the legislation that is 
emerging 51 p.50. In this phase, policymaking is more likely to be characterised by incremental 
processes. Interest or provider groups and the nature of the policy community are 
important. Interest groups are considered to be more likely to constrain or adapt rather 
than promote policy ideas. Political influence and internal cohesion are resources held by 
the policy community which are important to the process. These can, if mobilised, have 
considerable electoral effect. Academics and researchers, while less important than other 
actors in general, can have a significant influence in policymaking over the longer term. The 
impact of academic literature on a particular subject in the alternative selection phase is 
cited by Kingdon. For instance, he found in his research that the influence of literature on 
market failure in health ‘markedly affected the thinking of people in the health policy 
community’, providing the rationale for policy proposals for more market-type mechanisms 
or more regulation 51 p.55. Media actors were considered least important, primarily reporting 
policy work already under way than having a role in agenda-setting, and perhaps magnifying 
it. Election-related actors (campaigners, political parties) had similar levels of assessed 
importance, but significantly more so for health-related issues than the transport case 
studies showed. Their impact is on agenda-setting. Public opinion was found to have a 
similar level of impact upon agenda-setting as political parties do in Kingdon’s research, 
being important in six of his 23 case studies. 
Decision-making and implementation 
 
Kingdon is not entirely silent on the decision-making or implementation phases of the 
process, citing the civil servant actors as critical to the implementation phase and 
acknowledging that this is a process which can generate feedback leading to innovation and 
further policy change. He cites the longevity and technical expertise of civil servants and 
their well-developed relationships with other key players, particularly those within interest 
groups, as being key resources of relevance to this phase of the process 51 p.31. To summarise 
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the process, a policy community of specialists in a particular policy area (bureaucrats, 
political staff, interest group analysts, academics and researchers) generates proposals and 
ideas. Depending on what is happening in the political stream and what problems are 
identified for attention, a window may open briefly for the policy, political and problems 
streams to come together in an opportunity to place an idea on a ‘decision agenda’. The 
window may open in a policy area because of ‘spill-over’ from another policy area or from a 
previous window opening in the same area (and ‘establishing a principle’). The advocates for 
a proposal or idea, who Kingdon calls policy entrepreneurs, must perceive that this window 
is open and seize the opportunity to move their idea onto this decision agenda or be faced 
with a long wait for the next similar window to open. In this process, timing and perceptual 
acuity is critical. Policy entrepreneurs can be in or outside government, seeking ‘policies of 
which they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement in the 
form of job security or career promotion’ 51 p.122. The incentives which drive this behaviour 
could be to promote their personal interests or advance their personal values or just 
because they ‘like the game’. The game is to couple solutions to problems at moments of 
political opportunity. To do so requires the ability to shape and sell the policy idea, building 
acceptance for it through persuasion in the policy stream and bargaining in the political 
stream. Supporting the policy through the processes of assessment of technical feasibility, 
values alignment and hurdles of cost and public and political acceptance requires coalition- 
and consensus-building and negotiation skills. Factors such as the sense of a national mood, 
the attitudes of interest groups and the events within the government itself (such as 
turnover of personnel or indeed a change of administration), will influence the chance of 
acceptance in the political stream. The personal qualities of the entrepreneur are likely to 
be personal standing or a claim to be heard, being ‘well connected’ or highly skilled at 
negotiation and being persistent, ever vigilant and ready to take advantage of opportunities. 
Critiques of Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
Schlager 79 p.297 describes the MS Framework as attempting to explain why policy-makers 
adopt some policies and not others, rather than explaining patterns of policy adoptions. She 
sees the individual as described in the MS Framework as a boundedly rational person 
interacting in institutional settings characterised by parallel and serial information 
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processing, ‘satisficing’ given conditions of uncertainty, complexity and weak selective 
preferences. Schlager finds that the theory pays less attention to collective processes of 
individuals coming together to achieve a shared end, instead emphasising the critical role of 
certain individuals or policy entrepreneurs and the conditions that support broad-based 
collective action leading to policy change (through coupling activities). It pays very limited 
attention to collective action or institutional arrangements (pointing to individual 
entrepreneurs instead) although later work by Zahariadis refines this aspect of the MS 
Framework to some extent (and this is explored more fully below).  
Mucciaroni 53 p.482 finds that Kingdon’s MS Framework ‘captures much of the complexity, 
fluidity and unpredictability of agenda-setting and highlights the important role of chance, 
innovation and human agency in policymaking’ but criticises the theory as overly 
indeterminate because it is specified at too high a level, preventing the development of 
testable hypotheses. He also suggests that the exclusive focus on situational and temporal 
factors to the neglect of structural or institutional factors is inappropriate. Because the level 
of abstraction of the theory creates difficulty in finding testable hypotheses, this reduces its 
ability to predict the conditions under which agenda change may occur. Mucciaroni suggests 
the need for ‘a classification scheme of problems and solutions that are logically related to 
political and institutional variables so that middle-level propositions or hypotheses can be 
derived.’ If the theory also ignores or pays too little attention to the unchanging or change-
resistant elements of political life as well as the chance occurrences, it may fail to explain all 
the reasons ‘why certain items reach (or fail to reach) the agenda ever or at all.’ These are 
structures and institutions such as political, social or economic factors which set ‘taken-for-
granted ‘rules of the game’ as well as having specific organisational forms’ 53 p.464-466.     
The structural characteristics and decision-making processes of political institutions, which 
Mucciaroni says are largely resilient to the turnover of individuals, ‘help determine whether 
solutions reach the agenda, if they are blocked from doing so and how they might be 
modified’. These characteristics include ‘pre-existing institutional capacity’ that may 
underpin the efforts of reformers, such as the ‘missions’ of relevant agencies and their 
congruence with the reforms or institutional actors such as key leaders who are willing and 
able to back the reforms.  
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Mucciaroni sets out differences in Westminster systems or European corporatist systems of 
decision-making which are more centralised and integrated, the number of participants is 
limited and their participation is highly structured and predictable. To have utility for these 
settings, Kingdon’s theory must also be able to explain policymaking in these conditions and 
Mucciaroni suggests its picture of agenda-setting is not so credible in these jurisdictions. 
John 4 echoes the criticism that Kingdon’s MS Framework is more suited to the United 
States’ political process than to unitary Western European states and needs some correction 
to be more applicable to these more integrated policymaking systems. 
There is a lack of recognition of the importance of historical antecedents and patterns or 
cycles in Kingdon’s work and this reduces its utility. Mucciaroni regards these factors not as 
determinants of future policy but factors which ‘make certain outcomes more likely and 
others less so’ 53 p.470. Agenda items may therefore be rooted in past conditions, events and 
choices or may cluster with other similar items during a particular historical phase. If we can 
see that items are historically grounded we may see ‘how the problems became the way 
they are and why people came to think of them as problematic’ and this requires showing 
how problems evolved over time, with reference to previous choices and events.  
John’s primary concern is that the separation of factors affecting policy formulation 
(agenda-setting and issues-selection) from policy implementation is inappropriate. These 
processes are almost fused in reality and ‘it is the interaction of different types of actors 
over both policy definition and implementation which is the correct way to conceptualize 
policy’. He invites Kingdon to ‘deconstruct all the key features of the political system, such 
as the implementation process’ 4 p.176. 
Enhancement of the model by Zahariadis 
 
Zahariadis 52 has used Kingdon’s theory extensively in his own research and has reviewed 
the critiques of Kingdon’s work as well as empirical research conducted using the 
Framework. He has interpreted and clarified Kingdon’s theory. He summarises it as a lens 
which ‘explains how policies are made by national governments under conditions of 
ambiguity’ according to a thesis of political manipulation 52 p.65. He has facilitated empirical 
analysis of cases of policymaking using the theory by setting out the five key structural 
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elements in model form and adding key features or inputs as sub-elements. The elements 
are the problem stream, politics stream, policy stream, policy window and policy 
entrepreneurs. They culminate in a policy output. Together with their sub-elements, some 
of which Zahariadis postulated as a result of his own research using Kingdon’s MS 
Framework, they are set out together in diagrammatic form below in Figure 1 52 p.71 and 
explained further in the following section. 
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Figure 1: The Multiple Streams Framework 
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Problems 
 
Problems, according to Kingdon, ‘are various conditions that policymakers and citizens want 
addressed’ such as rising medical costs 50 p.70. Zahariadis expands upon this to contend that 
they are discovered through ‘indicators’ such as the cost of a programme which is used to 
assess the existence and magnitude of the condition. Indicators may be being monitored 
routinely or through special studies. Whether conditions become a problem depends on 
perception and interpretation of any change in that condition shown by the indicator. This 
will be guided by beliefs and values associated with the condition. A ‘focusing event’, such 
as a serious episode of medical harm, may trigger a condition, such as concern about health 
care service quality, becoming a problem, especially if exacerbated by media attention or 
the work of policy entrepreneurs. ‘Feedback’ from programmes is another major source of 
policy makers finding out about conditions. It could be good feedback which may lead to a 
programme being replicated (‘spill-over’’) or poor feedback, which may trigger a new 
policymaking process to change the programme. The ‘load ‘, or number of difficult problems 
faced by an administration, will influence whether a condition gets onto a policy agenda.  
Where policy originates in the problem stream it is more likely to be subject to rational 
policymaking processes in that solutions can be consequential on problem identification. 
These approaches cannot be assumed but are uncovered through evidence 52 p.75.  
Politics 
 
‘National mood’, pressure-group campaigns or attitudes of interest groups to policies, and 
administrative or legislative turnover are the key elements affecting the politics stream 
according to Zahariadis. Governments will take soundings of public opinion through polling 
and may promote or dim the prospects of issues accordingly. They may also be concerned to 
address concerns expressed by interest groups, especially if a majority of groups feel the 
same about an issue. When there is political change such as a change of government there 
is considerable potential for dealing with problems because the new administration may 
have different ideas from the previous one and be keen to implement them. ‘Party 
ideology’, such as items in electoral manifestos, affects how they will deal with each 
problem.  
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Policies 
 
Kingdon described a ‘soup’ of ideas competing to win acceptance in policy communities of 
bureaucrats, academics and researchers. Zahariadis has deconstructed this high level 
description by differentiating between two major subjects for analysis, the policy itself and 
the policy community around it, which he renames the ‘network’6. Each can be analysed 
according to aspects of ‘technical feasibility’ and ‘value acceptability’, and the network can 
be analysed according to its level of integration. Only a few ideas are selected for placing on 
the agenda and this is influenced by their technical feasibility (how easy they are to 
implement) and their congruence with values of policymakers. However, the type of 
network of specialists and specifically its level of ‘integration’ (or linkages amongst 
participants) is also important to the chances of success in getting items onto the agenda 
and selected from competing alternatives. This is influenced by the ‘size’ of the network, the 
nature of participants’ ‘mode’ of political exchange, the network’s degree of ‘administrative 
capacity’ and the nature of ‘access’ to key decision-makers within the network or to those 
seeking membership of the network from outside it. Briefly, he suggests 80 pps.73-75 that 
networks can be examined according to where they sit on a continuum of ‘integration’ from: 
More integrated – smaller in size, having a consensual mode, higher capacity and 
more restricted access to membership, to  
Less integrated – larger in size, have a competitive mode, lower administrative 
capacity and less restricted access. 
Zahariadis further contends that issues and ideas have different trajectories for rising to the 
top of the soup for selection. Drawing on a typology for the trajectory of alternatives by 
Durant and Diehl, he suggests that more integrated networks will tend to follow an 
‘emergent to convergent’ pattern in which longer periods of consensus-based debate occurs 
followed by rapid acceptance and uptake of policy ideas. Less integrated networks will tend 
to follow a pattern of sudden break-through of ideas, perhaps without attracting much 
                                                             
6
 Policy community and policy network or network are used interchangeably in this thesis, depending usually 
on the preferred term used by another researcher when the concept is being discussed in relation to their 
work. For instance John prefers ‘network’, Kingdon uses ‘policy community’ and Zahariadis uses both.    
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support, followed by gradual steps which soften resistance and move the policy idea 
towards more broad-based acceptance.   
Policy windows 
 
Policy windows, the fleeting ‘opportunities for advocates of proposals to push their pet 
solutions, or to push attention to their special problems’ 51 p.165, will present ‘coupling’ 
opportunities arising, in the terminology of Zahariadis, as a consequence of a ‘compelling 
event’ or because a ‘doctrinal’ reason exists such as a new administration wishing to make a 
change in policy. The coupling of problems and solutions depends on the ‘decision-making 
style’ of the administration in power at the time, with more cautious styles requiring more 
information. 
Policy entrepreneurs 
 
In the MS Framework, policy entrepreneurs are key actors who utilise techniques of political 
manipulation to gain traction for a policy idea in conditions of ambiguity, enabling non-
incremental change. The logic of political manipulation sets this lens apart from others 
which employ rationality (such as rational choice) or persuasion 52 p.69. Driven perhaps by 
self-interest, a policy entrepreneur’s chance of success is affected by factors found by 
Zahariadis to include the level of ‘access’ they have to policymakers, the greater the 
‘resources’ (time, money and energy) they have at their disposal and their skill at using 
manipulative ‘strategies’, such as ‘framing’ (or putting the case for the policy with a set of 
meanings suitable to a particular audience), ‘salami tactics’ (or feeding out the policy ideas 
bit by bit) to couple the three streams.   
This set of structural elements and their sub-elements will provide the criteria for analysis of 
the two case studies, which are the subject of this research.  
Response to Kingdon’s critics 
 
Zahariadis responds to criticism by supporting the multi-theoretic approach, especially the 
way in which it endorses the role given to ideas as drivers of policymaking processes, its 
acknowledgement that broader political events can influence policy development within a 
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small policy community (‘spill-over’) and the way in which it is able to integrate the roles of 
both actors and institutions.     
He considers that the theory is suitable for application to all stages of the policy formation 
process, not just agenda-setting. In particular he agrees that the extension of the theory to 
the implementation phase with appropriate revisions and qualifications and to different 
polities and venues (such as the sub-national or international domains) is useful. He 
suggests that research could identify whether there are some types of decisions which are 
more likely to need garbage cans than others (such as when the issue represents a major 
challenge to existing values and norms and ambiguity is thereby increased). In general he is 
a strong supporter of the MS Framework as a device to show how political systems make 
sense of an ambiguous world.  
Zahariadis agrees that Kingdon has underplayed both institutional dynamics and the 
importance of history in the MS Framework and that these are important sub-elements in 
the Policy stream. His empirical work has explored these elements of the policymaking 
process more fully. Zahariadis has developed the MS Framework to provide an explanation 
of how the structure and characteristics of policy networks (which are called policy 
communities in Kingdon’s MS Framework) influence the trajectory of ideas in the policy 
stream 80 p.91 and how long time periods may be relevant. His picture of the dimensions of 
the network set out earlier – its size, mode of political exchange, capacity and access  –
identifies what he has found to be important influences on the way in which ideas evolve in 
the Policy stream. He draws on the policy network theories of Marsh and Rhodes, especially 
the concept of power-dependence 81, to describe how the mode of exchange or pattern of 
interaction between participants in the policy network may be quite asymmetrical but 
‘forces interdependent participants to exchange one resource for another without the 
ability of any one member to single-handedly impose his or her will on the rest’ 80 p.75. 
Network mode can be placed on a continuum. Consensus-based modes have a higher 
degree of integration of the network and contacts are more frequent and more formalized, 
characterised by bargaining or ‘sounding out’ and compromise. Competitive modes have 
more infrequent and chaotic contacts between participants and adversarial relationships 
are more likely. In competitive modes, zero-sum approaches are taken in which the consent 
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of most but not necessarily all participants is gained but subsequent opposition may slow or 
undermine the policy ideas thus implemented.     
Linking his work to that of the historical institutionalists, Zahariadis contends that previous 
policymaking episodes and their outcomes can be shown to affect contemporary debates 
and ultimately policy choice by narrowing options and steering debate towards certain 
clusters of solutions. The ‘range of solutions likely to receive a hearing is bounded by history 
and biased by network structures’ 80 p. 92. Helpfully he shows this process at work in two 
European jurisdictions, Britain and Germany, thus extending the use of the Framework 
beyond the United States into a Westminster-style jurisdiction.  
In these case studies, he demonstrates that the more integrated networks are more likely to 
follow a trajectory of incremental and emergent development of a policy idea or ‘rapid 
propulsion to salience of a persistently softened idea’ 80 p.73 whereas a less integrated 
network will display initial ‘quantum’ changes which evolve into a more gradualist pathway. 
Size of the network is a factor. Where there are few restrictions to entry, a large and varied 
membership can develop. Competitive modes of discourse typically dominate large 
networks and will result in many contending ideas and more adversarial relationships. In 
this context, the use of zero-sum games by decision-makers to resolve differences between 
groups is common. By contrast, in a more integrated and usually smaller network with 
restrictions on access to membership but good access to decision-makers, common 
interests and a search for unanimity amongst the players places a premium on consensus 
building, intense bargaining and accommodating amendments to policy. Ideas slowly evolve 
through these processes to a point where they can rapidly be implemented with widespread 
support.  
The variables of value acceptability and technical feasibility apply to the policy as well as to 
the policy community. While the policy may in theory be technically feasible it may not 
actually be feasible to implement it in the policy community because of its structure or 
capacity or a lack of suitable administrative tools. Such tools could be requisite contractual 
or financing arrangements or appropriate information management infrastructure. 
However, Zahariadis has not explored the critique that political institutions and other 
institutional or structural factors (such as structural characteristics and decision-making 
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processes of political institutions), which are largely resilient to the turnover of individuals, 
is a major driver of policy action or inaction.  
Empirical work on policy entrepreneurs 
 
Kingdon’s MS Framework has inspired much further research on the role of actors such as 
entrepreneurs in the policymaking process. There is a growing body of writing which 
describes generic public sector entrepreneurs, policy entrepreneurs and institutional 
entrepreneurs as key facilitators or leaders of public policy problem-solving processes. 
Common to the theory is the existence of heterogeneity and uncertainty (or Kingdon’s 
‘ambiguity’) in the policymaking environment. 
In this literature, much attention has been paid to Kingdon’s contention that the driver of 
policymaking is the policy entrepreneur who couples elements in the three streams when 
windows of opportunity arise. Mintrom 82 agrees that the policy entrepreneurship model is 
beginning to increase understanding of how innovative ideas get articulated on to political 
and legislative agendas. Drawing heavily on Kingdon he defines policy entrepreneurs as 
performing three functions: 
1. Discovering unfulfilled needs and suggesting innovative means to satisfy them 
2. Bearing reputational risks in uncertain situations 
3. Resolving collective action problems by assembling and coordinating networks to 
undertake change 82 p.422. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs differ from the activities of advocates within coalitions because they 
‘seek to change radically current ways of doing things’ usually over brief periods of time, 
and may seek to manipulate institutional arrangements or generate a sense of crisis within a 
coalition to do so 82 p.425. Drawing the findings from the empirical work together he sets out 
four central elements shared by all policy entrepreneurs to some extent 83: 
1. Social acuity – making good use of policy networks and understanding and 
responding to the ideas, motives and concerns of others in a policy context 
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2. Defining problems – such as presenting evidence to suggest risk of crisis, drawing 
in others outside the policy area and highlighting failures of current policy  
3. Building teams – tight-knit with different knowledge and skills, offering mutual 
support in pursuit of change 
4. Leading by example – such as demonstrating the workability of a policy proposal 
through pilot projects. 
 
He then offers implications for the work of Lindblom, Kingdon, March and Olsen, 
Baumgartner and Jones and Sabatier. The empirical work enhances the detail about the role 
of policy entrepreneurs in Kingdon’s MS Framework. Mintrom considers that this is useful 
for researchers using New Institutionalist approaches in that it shows how deep knowledge 
of relevant procedures and local norms within institutions (which he calls ‘insider 
sensibilities’) can significantly increase the ability of actors to instigate change. He suggests 
that further directions for studies include closer studies of the motivation and strategies 
used by policy entrepreneurs and more study of the interaction between policy 
entrepreneurs and their specific policy contexts. Mintrom specifically recommends ‘cross-
national investigations of the means by which popular policy ideas get translated into policy 
settings in specific jurisdictions’ as holding considerable promise for ‘insights into the roles 
played by policy entrepreneurs in promoting policy change and the transnational diffusion 
of policy innovations’ 83 p.662. These could include historical studies and contemporary 
studies.      
In a study of policy entrepreneurs in the United States, Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 84 
compared ‘relatively comprehensive’ policy innovation in a health sector setting in six 
states, finding considerable variation in policy substance but similarities in process. They 
studied the factors which made these states receptive to their ‘home grown’ policy 
innovations 84 p.724, p.734. They concluded that ‘skilled and committed leadership’ was the 
shared factor and, importantly that this arose through the collaboration of policy 
entrepreneurs and prominent ‘investors’ of political capital. They found that key 
institutional factors in major reform such as the resources, structure and culture of the 
health policy community in each state were critical ingredients in the innovation process 84 
p.739. The study challenges the paradigmatic view of the policy entrepreneur as a ‘singular 
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leader...with a blueprint for action’ and finds that innovation was achieved through an 
‘internal team process’ of policy design’ melding technical and political analysis. Using a 
market analogy they describe it as ‘not so much the brilliant salesmanship of someone 
offering a finished product as it is a group assignment for product development...more like 
internal innovation within a large corporation than market entry by a start-up firm’ 84 p.746.  
Institutional entrepreneurs 
 
The ‘institutional’ entrepreneur model is a more recent concept in the literature. These are 
actors who are important in a process of policy change which requires a change in 
institutional structures or norms and they seek to change institutions rather than policies, 
looking for opportune moments to innovate and introduce new forms of governance. They 
are described in the literature as having a primary role of boundary-spanning activities, 
carrying out public mandates by combining the authority of the state with their specialised 
knowledge and/or other private resources such as capital or technology  67 p.3. Crouch 
describes the activities of institutional entrepreneurs as ‘exploring the transferable, 
concealed and dormant institutional resources of their societies’ 75 p.157. In doing so they are 
helping to forge new institutional arrangements, to ‘scale-up innovations’ for national 
utilisation, which, it is suggested by Tuohy, may assist in reconfiguring control over key 
political and economic resources 23 67 75. If their ‘endowment’ is expertise, they must operate 
within the norms of a knowledge-based community 67 p.7. The risks they take relate to 
engaging their endowments of knowledge with current political encumbents (which may 
place them at risk with successor administrations). Crouch emphasises the recombinant 
features of his model, in which ‘an actor becomes dissatisfied with the substantive returns 
being received from an existing path...has access to an alternative set of practices being 
used in an adjacent field [and] once the price is paid for transferring these practices in to the 
first field, the actor can change the path.’ He hypothesises that institutional heterogeneity 
facilitates such innovation by presenting actors with alternative paths (‘to carry out this kind 
of analysis we must have an approach that can perceive two or more, or fragments of 
several...institutional forms coexisting within one political economy’) 75 p.150.      
Tuohy has taken this concept, relating it to Kingdon’s work, in her analysis of health policy 
case studies, including in Britain, between 1990 and 2010. In these studies, health service 
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redesign occurred in the context of market-oriented reforms, which focused on the key 
performance dimensions of equity, cost control and quality. The reforms had both ‘favoured 
and been accelerated by the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs’ 67 p.2-4. Institutional 
fragmentation, heterogeneity (and looseness of coupling of resources in the environment to 
permit reconfiguration) and political uncertainty (created for instance by periods of major 
policy change) provided favourable conditions for institutional entrepreneurs. In such 
conditions, entrepreneurs were able to ‘exploit latent...opportunities...to develop new and 
innovative organisational structures’ in the same way Kingdon describes ‘softening up’ to 
prepare the ground for acceptance of new policy ideas 67 p.5. She reinforces the elements of 
risk and recombination as critical to the definition of entrepreneurship. Agents who operate 
at ‘the interstices of the public and private sectors’ will often have a public mandate but 
may also be motivated by psychological satisfaction, a social purpose or belief in the 
inherent value of their product. Careers and reputation are at risk and may be advanced or 
retarded. Professional standing and influence may be lost or gained. Where, in a health 
policy environment, entrepreneurs act from a base of professional knowledge they must 
‘exercise their professional discretion in tension with the objectives of public authorities’ 67 
p.9. 
These patterns of institutional entrepreneurial activity are also seen in the 1993-9 period of 
reform in New Zealand. The new Independent Practitioners’ Associations and other primary 
care network organisations formed in New Zealand during those years reflect the activities 
of actors who can be seen to be institutional entrepreneurs who imported ideas from the 
United States to meet a need for new institutional frameworks within the general practice 
community. So too are examples of actors who built health organisations with strong 
community-based governance arrangements and those who helped to establish services by 
and for Māori and Pacific communities in New Zealand during these years. 
Research questions arising from the policymaking literature 
 
Kingdon’s MS Framework has been identified as a useful multi-theoretic approach to the 
analysis of policymaking and has given inspiration to much further research on the role of 
policy entrepreneurs and other public entrepreneurs. The MS Framework has inspired less 
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research into the institutional drivers of policymaking and limited research in Westminster-
type political systems.   
In this research the approach taken will be to describe the process of policymaking in two 
matched case studies in two Westminster-type political systems and then consider how well 
Kingdon’s MS Framework, as enhanced by Zahariadis’ Model of its elements and sub-
elements set out in Figure 1, enables these two processes of policymaking to be analysed, 
with reference to the following specific research questions: 
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process? 
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from the analysis, which 
may enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
To consider the second question, the policy outcome will be treated as the dependent 
variable and other variables including institutions, group structure and resources, ideas, 
rational actors and socio-economic factors will be considered. Such an approach presents a 
major challenge in determining the relative influence between the independent variables. It 
is intended that the strong comparative framework for the research will assist in 
highlighting a small number of differences between two similar case studies which enable 
the focusing of analysis upon a small number of variables. This process will be used to 
signpost opportunities for further research.  
 
Summary 
 
This Chapter has set out the theoretical frameworks in the policymaking literature used in 
this research and has established the research questions which will be answered. In the next 
Chapter, the relevant literature on comparative policymaking will be set out. The policy 
context in the two countries will be set out and compared. This will include a specific 
analysis of the similarities and differences between the national health systems of England 
and New Zealand, with a particular focus on institutional features such as financing 
arrangements and on the relationship between the state and medical interest groups and 
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policy communities. Issues in the historical development of these two systems which have 
implications for these differences are described.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
 
Introduction  
 
This Chapter briefly reviews writing on comparative approaches to research on 
policymaking. Then, a section sets out a comparison of England and New Zealand with 
respect to their current health systems and recent health reforms, with particular reference 
to the similarities and differences between their general practice services. The history of 
development of the general practice sub-system of their national health services is also set 
out in some detail because the history of earlier policymaking and its solutions may affect 
current contemporary policymaking (as discussed in Chapter Two). Consideration of the way 
which policy solutions and policy communities evolve over time enables patterns of 
variation to be studied across time as well as between countries, so strengthening the 
comparative approach for policy analysis.      
Comparative analysis 
 
Freeman 32 p.ix suggests that ‘comparative analysis is the closest social science can get to 
experimentation and the methodological paradigms of ‘real’ (natural) science’ through 
which theory-building can occur. Hypotheses can be generated and tested where a set of 
countries are examined to show why A is more like B and less like C, or where A and B are 
alike in all respects but for one or two variables. Przeworski and Teune set out two common 
research designs based upon comparative social system analysis: the ‘most similar’ or 
‘concomitant variation’ strategies and ‘most different’ strategies 85 p.32-33.    
According to the logic of the ‘most similar’ strategies, if some important differences are 
found among these otherwise similar countries then ‘the number of factors attributed to 
these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those 
differences alone...Common systemic characteristics are conceived as controlled for and 
inter-systemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables.’ Statements of explanatory 
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variables can be formulated at the sub-systemic level such as each country’s general 
practice sector.  
Marmor identifies three purposes of comparative analysis. First, such analysis can provide 
the ‘gift of perspective’ by illuminating or clarifying national arrangements through 
comparative study, without addressing causal explanation. Secondly, it can  generate causal 
explanations, or an understanding of why policies develop as they do. Thirdly, it can  be 
quasi-experiment which enables generalisations to be drawn to show ‘Why some policies 
seem promising and doable, promising but impossible or doable but not promising’ 11 p.339. 
Kingdon confirms that his comparative approach ‘opens up new areas for theory-building by 
observing contrasts’ 51 p.249. 
Despite the value of cross-country comparative analysis of health care systems, researchers 
agree that this  is fraught with risks 16 36 because of the diversity of system configuration, the 
added complexity of the variety of ways in which these functions inter-relate and the 
evidence of differing performance levels between health systems in different countries.  
This research takes an approach to the comparison of these two policymaking episodes 
which documents the key similarities and differences between the two political and health 
systems and the general practice sub-systems in each country at a relatively high level to 
look for possible reasons for the difference in the dependent variable, the policy outcome. 
In doing so it seeks to establish that the findings are not due to chance. In testing the utility 
of Kingdon’s Framework in these two relatively well matched systems, any similar findings 
strengthen, through replication, the  degree of confidence that these possible reasons for 
difference are not due to chance.  
Another finding which can be tested is the contest between the two approaches: the 
‘national styles approach’, (the view that national styles determine policy outputs) or the 
alternative view: the ‘policy sector approach’ ( that the nature of the problem is 
fundamentally connected to the kind of politics and outcomes that emerge) 86 p.469. In an 
example of the latter, Marmor has utilised the policy sector approach to show that 
physicians have a unique type of economic power which results in doctors’ preferences, 
regardless of what country they are in, determining the design of payment systems for their 
services 87. Immergut directly challenges this analysis, finding that ‘in contrast to scholars 
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who explain medical influence in terms of the singular characteristics of the medical 
profession...[it is] the properties of distinct political systems which make them vulnerable to 
medical influence’ 40 p.391. The two case studies which are the subject of this research, will 
shed light on this debate and may provide some initial findings which lead to further 
exploration of one or other of these positions.   
It is necessary to set out a comparative picture of England and New Zealand, the two 
countries which provide the case studies for this research, as they are described in the 
comparative literature.      
A comparison of the English and New Zealand general practice sub-
systems  
 
Analysts using the OECD typology of health systems 20 have noted that diversities both 
among and within health systems reduce the utility of its set of ideal types 14 16 88. The OECD 
model is still useful for paradigmatic cases such as the United Kingdom 89 p.74. However, 
systems are composed of a number of sectors – public and private, or hospital-based and 
ambulatory, for example – superimposed one on the other 32 p.7. The general practice sub-
systems of England and New Zealand differ substantially though the two countries have 
national health systems with many other features in common. 
General practice services in both countries are delivered by independent medical 
practitioners but the approach to funding these services differs markedly in the two 
countries. In England the National Health Service Act of 1946 made consultation costs free 
to patients at the point of care and all patients were registered with a general practice. 
General practitioners were, until 2004, directly contracted to provide services and paid from 
a mixture of capitation, fee-for-service payments, allowances and infrastructural funding in 
the general practice contract with the National Health Service. In New Zealand the General 
Medical Services scheme introduced in 1941 provided a universal subsidy for general 
practitioner services (the patient health benefit), though general practitioners ultimately 
retained the right to charge patients 56 p.27. There was no contract for service between an 
individual general practitioner and a public funder for the services delivered to patients 
under these provisions and patient registers were voluntary and incomplete in New Zealand 
in 2000.   
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Funding arrangements in general practice in England 
 
Following the introduction of the National Health Service in 1948, general practitioners 
were contracted by the state to provide services to their ‘list’ of patients. In many respects 
general practitioners had a great deal of freedom about where and how they organised 
their work and what care they delivered, largely owning their premises. Ham describes a key 
change to their contractual conditions in 1966 to include reimbursement of expenses of 
practice staff and opportunities to invest in premises and equipment 103. The core of the 
contractual provisions for general practices was an allowance to cover practice expenses, to 
which weighted capitation funding for patients was added and, in many cases, fees for the 
delivery of particular services. Though general practitioners were independent contractors 
to the NHS, they were entirely dependent upon the NHS for the income to maintain 
themselves and their practices, which included access to pension schemes and other terms 
and conditions of employment. Further changes occurred with the introduction of the 
Primary Care Act of 1997 which offered Personal Medical Services contracts to practices on 
a voluntary basis.  
Funding arrangements in general practice in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand although the Social Security Act of 1938 legislated for a universal tax-payer-
funded primary and secondary medical care scheme, including prescriptions, with capitated 
payments for general practitioners and no provision for private billing of patients for 
medical care 21 p.202-3, this was amended in 1941 to provide a patient health benefit which 
was essentially a subsidy scheme for general practitioner services. The subsidy for visits to a 
general practitioner, originally covering about 75 percent of the total fee, dropped to an 
average of 20-30 percent of the total fee by 1986. The Royal New Zealand College of 
General Practitioners estimated that prior to the reforms of 2001, the patient health benefit 
share of the income of general practices was as low as 30 percent 90 and other public 
funding took this to 40 percent 28. Together with government funding, patient co-payments 
and private insurance reimbursement of general practices fees, general practice services 
funding has several small pools. No funder established monopsonistic influence.  
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Eligibility for the patient health benefit also changed over time. By 2000, the subsidy was no 
longer universal but targeted for age, income levels and frequency of health service use and 
only half of New Zealanders were eligible for it 21 p.212. There is much analysis which shows 
that the New Zealand primary health care sector, as an example of a sub-system with 
extensive out-of-pocket payments, creates barriers to access for some sectors of the 
population 21 91-93. Attempts were made by the government at different times to establish 
limits to the amounts which patients had to pay to see a general practitioner. These 
included offering higher subsidies for consultations for children in 1985 or, in 1996, seeking 
to make these free. They included offering higher subsidies for practices willing to collect 
data and participate in quality assurance programs in 1990 21 p.203. General practitioner 
representatives resisted many of these changes and used the courts in New Zealand to 
challenge government policy initiatives such as a proposal to introduce contracts for funding 
of general practice services in exchange for higher levels of subsidy 94 p.161 13 p.203. Crampton 
summarises the key health policy objectives for general practice funding since 1938 as to 
obtain zero or very low cost universal primary care services, increase service in rural areas, 
increase primary care use by low income patients, encourage general practitioners to offer 
health promotion, to lower primary care medical costs and to increase the level of control of 
patients and communities over provision of primary medical care 21 p.206. However, there 
were few levers for governments to use with general practitioners to achieve these 
objectives.  
By 1993, the problems of ‘fragmented funding, and provision, barriers to access, the mix of 
primary care subsidies, wrong price signals and unfairness related to user part-charges and 
lack of consumer choice and control’ led to the inclusion, in the Health and Disability 
Services Act 1993, of a key policy instrument, a contract between the state and general 
practitioners, which was intended to ‘revolutionise the relationship between general 
practitioners and government...the requirement of all...general practitioners to have a 
contract with a Regional Health Authority [which] provided levers, for the first time, for 
government to exert influence over the location and the range and quality of services of 
general practitioners as well as subsidy levels and control of ‘demand-driven’ expenditure’ 
through capped budgets 21 p.204-5. These were still incomplete or indirect contractual 
mechanisms 56 p.34 and many general practices continued to receive most of their income 
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through fee subsidies until 2001. Even after 1993, contracts were negotiated between 
regional funders and primary care organisations, rather than with general practitioners 
directly. However, these contracts became more prescriptive over time and included 
contracts for specific types of services such as budget management of pharmaceutical 
prescribing, to deal with a perceived problem of over use of some services 21 p.11.  
A growing number of new types of primary care provision had been occurring since the 
1970s, with a small number of non-profit general practices sponsored by the Department of 
Health and trade unions. Employing salaried staff under different funding, regulatory and 
service provisions and typically located in low-income communities, they formed close links 
to these communities and utilised a team-based approach to delivering primary health care. 
Approximately 3 per cent of general practitioners worked in these practices 26. After 1993, a 
number of alternative providers of primary care services, including services run by and for 
Māori communities, were funded by the new Regional Health Authorities.  
Different governance or decision-making models for general practice services 
 
Tuohy has developed a typology of health decision-making systems 22  in which the balance 
of influence amongst types of actors (the state, private finance  and the medical profession) 
and the mix of instruments of social control (state authority, the market and collegial 
systems) differ and result in differing opportunity for major policy change. There are three 
ideal types of decision-making systems: hierarchical corporatist (in which authority flows 
vertically from the top down), a market-based system (in which authority flows laterally 
amongst private interests within a market environment) and a system in which professional 
collegial frameworks guide decision-making.   Tuohy shows  that the ownership and 
governance arrangements in England led to a ‘hierarchical corporatist’ model of decision-
making. The bureaucracy and the medical profession, both specialists and general 
practitioners, established strong hierarchical organisational forms and a track record of 
partnership to support the interdependent relationship between the state and doctors. In 
the 1990s it evolved to incorporate features of markets. Applying Tuohy’s decision-making 
model to primary care in New Zealand from 1938, the governance arrangements can be 
seen to be dominated by the profession, exhibiting a ‘professional/collegial’ model of 
decision-making with strong horizontal organisational forms and limited partnerships with 
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the state. Following the Health and Disability Services Act of 1993, it had evolved to 
incorporate features of markets, along with new organisational forms suited to the new 
market opportunities in primary care provision, which arose in response to new public 
funding opportunities. It settled into a ‘market collegial’ admixture of decision-making 
styles. This is explored more fully below. 
Shared history of New Public Management-based health reforms 
during 1990s 
 
Both England and New Zealand developed shared concerns in the 1980s about rising costs 
of health care. Both countries also identified inequities in both access to high quality health 
care and in differing life expectancy and health outcomes for different groups within their 
population. During the early part of this reform period, initial strategies focused on the 
introduction of general management approaches, tightening budgets and consideration of 
rationing of access to services, driven primarily by socio-economic forces generating a need 
for cost containment.      
Reform evolved in England and New Zealand in the 1990s by strengthening the hand of third 
party payers through more active forms of purchasing and the introduction of competition 
in quasi-markets within health systems 22 pp. 19, 26 34 54 p13-14. Public choice theory identified 
interest-group rent-seeking as a particular policy problem and generated strategies to 
contain this influence, also called ‘producer capture’ in New Zealand 95. Episodes of health 
policymaking which deliberately excluded the medical profession in order to minimise 
perceived conflicts of interest in policy development occurred in both countries, such as the 
1990 NHS and Community Care Act 22 p.70 in England and the 1993 Health and Disability 
Services Act in New Zealand 21 96. These active purchasing strategies can be summarised as 
use of performance measurement, contracting, market-type mechanisms and customer 
orientation to manage public or publicly funded services. In England the widespread use of 
performance indicators had commenced from 1983, focused on hospital services and 
designed to monitor the performance of the new Regional Health Authorities 6.  
In New Zealand this focus was introduced in 1989 with contractual frameworks which 
specified targets, plans, funding levels and defined obligations of both parties between the 
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14 Area Health Boards and the Minister of Health 97 p.281. Both England and New Zealand 
implemented bold system-level reforms in which the pace and scope of change within each 
system has been called ‘big bang’ reform, to reduce inefficiencies in health expenditure and 
to increase accountability amongst providers for the quality and effectiveness of health care 
22 98 99. The extent of the convergence, or shared policymaking approaches, in health system 
reform and neo-liberal social and economic reforms taken by the two countries is often 
commented upon in the literature 34 100. Tuohy comments that in Britain ‘sweeping change 
in the public politics governing the [health] decision-making system [was] enacted and 
implemented. More modest versions of the British reforms took place in Sweden and New 
Zealand’ 22 p.4. In 2004 the OECD noted that ‘while most countries have focused on the 
hospital sector, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand have experimented with using 
primary care doctors as purchasers’ 19 p.57. Both countries adopted contractual frameworks, 
in particular budget-holding, as the preferred method to encourage general practitioners to 
adopt funder goals such as for greater efficiencies, improved coordination or care and 
improved quality and responsiveness of care. It is in this context that some small-scale local 
fund-holding, pay-for-performance and budget-holding initiatives began to be trialled in 
both countries 99 101, but in general practice settings which had widely different 
accountability relationships between state funders and the general practice profession.  
New Public Management and general practice 
 
England 
 
From 1991 England had expanded market-type mechanisms within its health system within 
a fundamentally hierarchical framework of ownership and governance. The English general 
practice sub-system had a singular picture of ownership and governance for general practice 
services and the reforms sought to introduce some diversity. Innovative elements and types 
of delivery to improve the responsiveness of the services for patients and increase local 
influence in planning and service delivery approaches were introduced. In England a new 
contract based on capitation was introduced in 1990 (without the consent of the BMA) and 
included provisions for incentives to deliver immunisation and cervical cytology services as 
part of population health campaigns. In 1991, fund-holding for general practices over a 
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certain size was introduced by which practices could hold budgets for secondary care 
services. By 1997, 50% of the population was covered by fund-holding practices 16 p 113. 
Differences grew between forms of general practice. Fund-holding arrangements, multi-
funds (groups of general practice fund-holders that formed independent general practice-
led organisations to manage their purchasing), general practice commissioning groups 
(general practices working together to purchase local health services in collaboration with 
the local health authority for a defined population) and total purchasing pilots (groups of 
general practice fund-holders who took responsibility for the total health care purchasing 
budget for a defined population) co-existed 102.   
In 1997, following the National Health Service (Primary Care) Act, a new form of contract, 
the Personal Medical Services contract was established for general practitioners willing to 
opt out of the General Medical Services contract. The Act supported the development of 
primary care organisations, encouraging increased collaboration amongst practices 103 p.89. 
The intention of this new form of contract was to reflect particular local needs and offered 
individual or groups of practices an opportunity to negotiate novel or site-specific 
arrangements for provision of primary care to solve a problem of quality deficit, overcome 
perceived disincentives in the general contract, focus on locally-determined priorities or 
obtain the additional resources which accompanied Personal Medical Services status 104. 
Almost 20% of practices held one of these contracts by 2003 covering 30% of patients 105 
p.17. The pattern of purchasing general practice services in the English system therefore has a 
more active character and a larger number of practices engaged in innovative approaches to 
accountability for funding.  Evaluations of the Personal Medical Services contract show that 
it improved quality of care through encouraging an environment of stronger internal 
leadership and management within practices 104.   
The new government elected in 1997 then introduced a more strongly centralized 
framework of controls, including controls of service quality. Primary Care Groups, which 
were geographically-based statutory primary care organisations, were formed and 
developed into Primary Care Trusts with a defined range of functions for service purchasing, 
development and management.  
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Tuohy describes an environment in England, resembling developments in New Zealand, in 
which general practice fund-holding ‘galvanised institutional entrepreneurialism to a 
surprising degree’ 67 p.13-14. Institutional entrepreneurs took advantage of the opportunity 
created by rapid change to set in motion a diversity of models. This created allegiances 
amongst providers to differing forms of contracts and governance arrangements. Particular 
differences arose between groups of fund-holding practices who favoured the opportunity 
to reinvest surpluses from the purchasing budgets in their own practices and groups of 
practices who ‘objected on ideological grounds’ to features of fund-holding in England such 
as its non-universal application. Overarching associations representing both movements 
were formed and became politically active in support of their models. Such divergent 
ideological camps, each with its own strong alignment with the respective main political 
parties, had long been a feature of the New Zealand general practice sub-system, in this 
case divided over preferences for independent private ownership and community-governed 
models of practice respectively.   
New Zealand 
 
In 1993 in New Zealand, New Public Management approaches were introduced into the 
health system through legislation to establish a public contracted system or 
‘purchaser/provider split’. In these arrangements, purchasing organisations could use 
contracts to enhance their influence and leverage over providers within a market-type 
primary care landscape. This included ‘contracting arrangements which specify more 
accountable relationships between doctors...and funders...to limit autonomy...through the 
regulation of both payment mechanisms and fee levels’ 106 p.65-7. Contracts under this 
legislation were made available on a voluntary basis to general practitioners 13 p.205. This 
encouraged the development of Independent Practitioners’ Associations and other primary 
care network organisations within the primary care sub-system. These were consortia of 
practices utilising a corporatized structural form to represent them in negotiations with 
purchasers for new forms of funding such as budget-holding contracts. They were 
encouraged to pursue novel approaches, both in ownership and governance structures and 
new funding and quality improvement initiatives. New Māori-based services were also 
funded during this period, which resulted in ‘an explosion in the number of Māori health 
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providers and...sought to increase Māori involvement in all levels in the health sector 13 p.62. 
The country had an increasingly diverse set of primary care delivery approaches. A 
heterogeneous picture of ownership and governance arrangements, including both profit-
making and non-profit-making forms, began to develop within general practice services, 
within a dual system of funding for primary care and hospital based services. By 1999, 15 
percent of practices received capitated funding 13 p.213. However, most general practices 
continued to receive their income as fees-for-service even after the primary health care 
reforms took effect 91 p.8.  
The policymaking process for purchasing primary care services was increasingly 
decentralised during this period, occurring in diverse ways with pockets of innovation arising 
through negotiations between regional funders and their local consortia, including 
Independent Practitioners’ Associations.     
Table 1: General practice systems: England and New Zealand – key features and changes 
during reform period 
 
England – pre-1990 New Zealand – pre 1990 
Services comprehensive, free at point 
of use, universal 
Services comprehensive, subject to co-
payments, universal  
Singular governance and ownership 
structure. All GPs self employed, with 
individual contracts with NHS, 
supported by public funding for 
premises, infrastructure, pension 
provisions etc. BMA has sole 
bargaining rights for all GPs 
Hybrid forms of ownership and 
governance: some GPs self employed in 
privately owned practices, some GPs in 
non-profit owned practices, small 
number in special areas employed by 
state. No contracts for general medical 
services between GPs and state 
Contracts for government funding: 
- Base salary for practice costs 
   -     Capitation based on number of 
patients (50 percent of income) 
   - Fees for certain procedures 
Income from fees-for-service from 
patients and government subsidies  
 (Patient co-payments and subsidy for 
targeted patients (‘health benefit’) 
Gatekeepers to specialist services Gatekeepers to specialist services 
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All patients enrol with a GP Most patients register with a GP – free 
choice of GP 
Public funding by single demand-
driven centrally set prospective 
budget (Department of Health) 
Public funding by multiple demand-
driven centrally set and administered 
prospective budgets (Ministry of Health, 
ACC, other) 
1990– 1997 1990 – 1999 
More explicit GP contract-for-service GP funding transferred to contract-
based with primary care organisations 
over time. 
However, GPs still largely received 
income on fee-for-service basis.  
Health purchasing authorities formed to 
identify local needs and trial new 
services.  
Māori and community-oriented services 
established. 
Corporate or meso health organisations 
formed (IPAs and others) to negotiate 
contracts for services on behalf of 
individual practices in many areas. 
A process for reviewing the 
reasonableness of fee increases 
introduced. 
 Funding for primary and secondary care 
integrated in regional purchaser 
budgets 
 Increased focus on public health 
GP fund-holding for community 
nursing, outpatient, diagnostics and 
secondary care services  from 1993 
Some GP budget management 
agreements for pharmaceuticals and 
laboratory testing negotiated between 
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regional purchasers and general 
practice organisations 
 ‘Free’ GP care for under-six-year-olds 
implemented  
Competitive internal market for health 
services encouraged 
Competitive public/private market for 
health services encouraged 
 Attempt to define core services 
Patient’s Charter Focus on patients’ needs/preferences 
National, centralized quality initiatives 
(National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, Commission for Health 
Improvement) 
IPA-initiated Guidelines production  
Guidelines Group established 
Post 1997 Post 1999 
PMS contracts available for meeting 
local needs  
 
Intermediate organisations of Primary 
Care Groups assumed commissioning 
for all secondary services, replacing 
budget-holding  
Intermediate organisations (PHOs) 
established to commission and manage 
primary care services 
Integrated purchaser/provider function 
for health services established in 21 
regions 
 Primary care funding moves to 
capitation basis through contracts 
between DHBs and PHOs  (but GPs still 
received income on fee for service basis 
initially) 
 GP fees review structure re-established 
to manage excessive fee increases  
 All patients required to enroll in a PHO 
via a GP 
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 Expanded amount and basis of 
entitlement for health benefits  
Focus on public health services and 
importance of prevention and 
population- based health services   
Focus on public health services and 
importance of prevention and 
population- based health services 
 
Historical legacies - the development of two national health 
systems 
 
This section considers the history of national health system establishment and whether 
there are historical drivers for institutional forms which the two countries now exhibit. The 
publicly-financed national health systems in England and New Zealand arose in the 
immediate pre- and post-World War Two period when both countries elected Labour 
parties with large majorities (this occurred first in New Zealand in 1935 and in 1945 in 
England), products of  ‘extraordinary mobilization of political authority and will’ 22 p.7. In 
these decades there was a climate of growing support for collectivist approaches to social 
and economic challenges. There was also both rising public demand and need for health 
services. At this time medical professional interests were well organised and sought 
opportunities to be part of health policy development 107.  
The English story  
 
The literature provides several descriptions and analyses of this story of national health 
service establishment 22 103 108. In England, ten years later than in New Zealand, a Labour 
government was elected with skilled and determined politicians of working class origin and 
a mandate for major social change, financed on a collectivist basis. It was able to build upon 
a shared sense, developed over several years by both state actors and health professionals, 
of the need for a state-sponsored plan for a comprehensive range of health services, to be 
free at point of use 22 p.38 108. Public opinion was supportive of a report by William Beveridge 
published in 1942 during the Second World War which recommended the establishment of 
a national health service amongst other widespread reforms to the system of social welfare.  
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The incoming government proposed a capitated, free and universal service, though initially 
sought to employ doctors on salaries. The English BMA fought its major battle to avoid 
implementation of a salaried general practice service. The decision was to engage general 
practitioners as independent contractors to the Department for Health. But in the process 
of the larger battle over terms of employment, the Secretary of State, Aneurin Bevan, 
established the principle that treatment would be free at the point of delivery throughout 
the health system and that payment would be on a capitation basis rather than fee-for-
service. Bevan dealt separately with the interests of general practitioners and specialists 
during the negotiations. By dividing the profession through offering improved conditions to 
specialists, the Secretary was able to win agreement to the proposed legislation from the 
profession overall, carried on the votes of satisfied specialists despite the concerns of 
general practitioners.  
Doctors, as in New Zealand, retained their clinical autonomy, including the right to 
prescribe medicines and treat as they saw fit. But in England a system of single-payer state-
sponsored ‘hierarchical corporatism’ ensued 22, otherwise described as the ‘politics of the 
double bed’ 109, in which the bureaucracy and the medical profession, both specialists and 
general practitioners, established strong organisational forms and a track record of 
partnership to support the interdependent relationship between the state and doctors. 
Doctors were formally represented and held effective veto rights at each level of the new 
hierarchy. Once the legislation was enacted, doctors implemented it readily.  A key 
institutional characteristic of the sub-system was the dependence of all general 
practitioners on the contract negotiated between their representatives and the 
Department of Health as their sole source of income. This reinforced and encouraged the 
development of a close working relationship between the department and the general 
practice profession. It supported the development of a strongly democratic  representative 
forum for general practitioners which provided the mandate to their bargaining agent, the 
BMA, to represent them in regular contract negotiations. Over the subsequent fifty years 
this relationship contributed a strongly centralizing and unifying influence within the 
general practice profession.   
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The New Zealand story 
 
The difficult birth of the general practice element of the national health service between 
1935 and 1948 is also set out by a number of writers 94 107 110-116. While widely understood in 
New Zealand, it is less well known than the English story outside this country. It is therefore 
provided here in some additional detail. In 1935, New Zealand’s Labour party had been 
elected in a landslide victory. The idea of a free universal health service, although it had 
been Labour Party policy since 1919, broke relatively new public policy ground and was not 
widely socialised amongst political and medical stakeholders at the time. The new 
government began a three year process of consultation with stakeholders and exploratory 
research, including seeking advice from the British Medical Association (BMA) in England 
(which represented New Zealand doctors), to determine how it would be implemented.  
The medical profession rapidly emerged as a powerful stakeholder in the policy process. 
Doctors were, by 1935, amongst the highest paid professionals in the land. On average their 
salaries were equal only to those of the top civil servants at that time112. Ninety-two percent 
of doctors were members of the BMA in New Zealand in 1927 110 p.360 and were at the time 
organised into regional and provincial Divisions, each with its own executive and standing 
committee. Business was ‘conducted in a painstakingly democratic way, and only in very 
difficult situations is any Committee of Council given authority to act without approval of 
the Divisions’107.  
With Labour’s election in 1935, and faced with a proposal for a universal capitated tax-payer 
funded free health care system, doctors resolved to oppose this on a variety of grounds. The 
profession’s objections were primarily directed at the universal character of the scheme and 
the payment method of capitation. Arguments recorded in Lovell-Smith’s history of the 
dispute 107 included: 
 that it was unnecessary to introduce financial support except to the poorest patients 
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 curative treatment services were operating successfully throughout New Zealand at 
the time. The greater need was for public health and preventive services and the 
state should concentrate its effort and resource upon this area of need 
 free treatment would result in over use of services by patients 
 capitated funding arrangements would place fiscal risk unfairly with doctors 
 capitation may encourage doctors to enrol and then under-service large patient lists 
 fear of state control of medical practice and socialized medicine.  
Instead, the profession’s negotiators, led by Dr Jamieson, proposed a tiered system of 
benefits, ensuring that the poor who had previously received free treatment at the 
discretion of the profession could in future be funded by the state, with successively 
reducing state subsidies of the costs of those patients of better means. Hanson 111 considers 
that the profession was opposed to the scheme not only on economic grounds  but from an 
‘inherent and deep conservatism’ and fear of state control of their work. She quotes the 
leader of negotiations, Dr Jamieson, in his letter to the Minister for Health, Peter Fraser, in 
1938: ‘We regard with no less apprehension the inevitable danger of infringement of the 
liberties of the profession as a body…Under the universal system suggested, the tendency 
would be for the activities of the professional organisations to be merged in greater or 
lesser degree in the bureaucratic control of the State.’  
There were other mechanisms at work too. Fougere contends that the profession had a less 
hierarchical structure in New Zealand than in England at that time. In New Zealand  ‘the 
division of labour within medicine could not and did not advance very far’ 117 p.79. Leaders of 
the profession were more likely to be general practitioners with additional training or 
specialist practitioners. For instance, three quarters of the Committee selected to negotiate 
with the government about general practice services were specialist practitioners (general 
practitioners who also had a specialism in an area of medicine). There were clear interests 
for specialists on the committee in sustaining their particularly lucrative practice with 
wealthy patients. This explains to some extent the negotiators’ determination to retain fee-
for-service and the right to charge a co-payment as part of the policy framework for the new 
national health service. However, this structural feature did mean that the profession was 
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unified in a way not seen in England where specialists had separate streams of 
representation to government. In England, ministers were able to exploit the different 
interests between these two tiers of medicine, whereas in New Zealand a remarkable 
degree of unity and unanimity persisted amongst the profession for the long years of 
dispute with the government, eventually bringing a significant victory by changing the 
method of payment originally proposed and allowing the right to charge patients additional 
payments.  
The Social Security Bill in early 1938 set out very high level promises for free health care for 
all and generous remuneration to doctors, based on capitation, not salaried service. Though 
it was designed by a medical colleague, Dr McMillan, a Labour Member of Parliament, 828 
of 913 doctors opposed the proposed legislation. In particular they objected to its 
universality in a referendum conducted by the BMA (there were 945 doctors in the country 
at the time). The proposed legislation was publicly announced and formed the basis of the 
health manifesto for Labour in the general election it faced that year. Labour was re-elected, 
its share of the vote increasing to 56%. The government implemented the Act in April 1939 
regardless of the overwhelming opposition of doctors. The Prime Minister, Michael Savage, 
was particularly determined to achieve free health care for all, died in 1940. His Minister of 
Health, Peter Fraser, was known for greater readiness to compromise. Following protracted 
negotiation, the general practice service provision initially provided, in 1941, for a contract 
for patients to present to their doctor whereby the doctor could charge his costs to the new 
Social Security Fund (into which citizens had been contributing a share of their tax payments 
since 1938). It was based upon a generous capitated payment and allowances for travel and 
other procedures. The proposed legislation was confined to payment arrangements and 
made no attempt to limit clinical freedom, making contracts voluntary. General 
practitioners overwhelmingly boycotted the offers of government contracts for their 
services and continued to charge patients in full for their services. 
By then widespread Friendly Society enrolment by citizens seeking affordable health care 
had ceased and income for general practitioners, which had been primarily guaranteed by 
Friendly Society income and rapidly rising, dropped sharply by 1941 110 p.180 as a result. 
Patients began sending their invoices for treatment to the government. Faced with declining 
support and a further election in 1941, the government tabled a further Bill offering, this 
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time, a very generous fee-for-service payment arrangement, but prohibiting co-payments 
and effectively making the new arrangements compulsory. This was passed without the 
support of the BMA. Patients could then claim a refund of their fees from the Ministry.  
Some doctors commenced the practice of receiving ‘token’ payments from patients in 
addition to their basic fee, which was of dubious legality, but endorsed by the Ministry. 
Incomes soared again, surpassing those of specialists 107 p.156. However, the profession had 
lost its unity on the issue of payment processes and a proliferation of methods of payment 
existed. 
Finally in 1949, following a review of the operation of the service, and shortly before the 
Labour government faced yet another election, legislation was enacted to settle upon the 
mechanism of a direct fee-for-service claim on the Social Security Fund by the doctor and 
the provisions prohibiting co-payments were repealed. This was ‘a victory for the medical 
profession and demonstrated the strength of its bargaining power…[and] effectively 
sounded the death knell of the free general practitioner service aimed at and legislated for 
in 1938’ 111 p.124-5. The implementation of the Social Security Act which established New 
Zealand’s national health system in 1938 resulted in the state’s responsibility being 
‘tempered by compromises between the government of the day and an organised and 
assertive medical profession’ 34 p.227. 
 
An historical institutionalist analysis 
 
These two historical episodes can be seen to add support for Immergut’s historical 
institutionalist thesis 118 that medical influence can be weakened (or enhanced) by veto 
points in political systems. Looking at the establishment period of these two national health 
systems commencing in 1935 and 1945 respectively, in a comparative analysis, the 
dependent variable can be taken as the resulting ownership and governance arrangements 
for general practice in each country at the end of that period in 1949. Many independent 
variables driving policy change at the time can be said to be held constant in these two 
episodes. These include institutional drivers (the similar political systems and electoral 
dynamics associated with popular and successful parties representing working people), 
network factors (the resources and beliefs of the medical interest group, the BMA, in both 
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countries), ideas (especially the powerful policy ideas expressed in the manifestos of the 
political parties for social welfare reform and free health care, which captured the support 
of the electorate in both countries) and the similar socio-economic circumstances 
supporting social reconstruction, which accompanied the end of a major depression in New 
Zealand and the war in England.  
In both countries, legislation was achieved quickly, sweeping the policy into adoption on the 
basis of widespread public support despite misgivings of the medical profession. This 
legislation was implemented successfully in England though the medical profession retained 
considerable clinical autonomy in their role within the NHS. But the New Zealand 
administration encountered continuing opposition to the implementation of the legislation 
by general practitioners. Although some provisions of the legislation were successfully 
implemented, the intent to implement the core policy of free general practice services failed 
as a result not only of the sustained boycott of contracts by general practitioners but also 
the pressure of successive elections (every three years) between 1938 and 1949. In 
particular, the different electoral prospects faced by the administration in 1941 and 1949 
can be seen to be key ‘veto points’ which then placed pressure on the government to make 
a series of compromises. Faced with declining political support and needing to resolve 
concerns about its flagship health policy quickly in 1949, it can be seen that the Labour 
Party’s threat of electoral defeat was at least as significant a driver as the prolonged medical 
campaign of resistance to the outlawing of co-payments, and drove the series of legislative 
compromises which resulted in the dual ownership and governance arrangements for 
general practice in New Zealand. Over time, these would lead to the fundamentally different 
policy problems and options for policymaking which faced the two countries in the modern 
case studies.   
Summary 
 
This chapter and the preceding chapter have set out  
 explanatory models for analyzing policy making and change  
 a comparative approach 
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 an analysis of similarities and differences in the health systems and their public 
management approach in the two countries  
 a comparison of the history of the two countries establishment of their health 
systems and health system reform efforts of both countries in the 1980s and 1990s  
 
In the chapters which follow, the methodology for the research will be set out, then the 
process of design of each pay-for-performance policy will be described: who was involved, 
what was done, how it was done and how the results were implemented. Each case study 
will be tested against Kingdon’s MS Framework for public policymaking.  Then an analysis of 
the fit between the evidence and the theoretical models and explanations will be set out.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
In this Chapter the research methods used to undertake this study are described. The 
processes for management of risks and ensuring rigour are set out.  
Subject selection 
 
My curiosity about early reports of the pay-for-performance scheme introduced in England 
in 2004 led me to the subject of my research. As I investigated the development of the two 
pay-for-performance schemes, I became particularly interested in assessing how these two 
cases, on the face of it, seemed to defy well-documented theory that if government policy-
makers involved interest groups such as the medical profession in policy development, their 
work would achieve little meaningful change despite protracted periods of negotiation 58 59.  
Case study approach  
 
Stake 119 sets out three types of case study: the intrinsic case study, chosen for an interest in 
the particular case; the instrumental case study, chosen because it can provide insight into 
an issue or redraw a generalisation; and the collective case study, an instrumental study 
extended to several cases, which are chosen because analysing them will lead to better 
understanding and perhaps better theorization about a large number of cases. I chose the 
collective case study approach because there were two well-matched cases available for 
study which, through comparative analysis, I expected would lead to better understanding 
of pay-for-performance policymaking. 
The comparative analysis undertaken required a process of ‘pattern matching’ of 
independent and dependent variables to seek ‘literal’ replication (the same result in each 
case) or ‘theoretical replication’, where contrasting results are achieved for predictable 
reasons, that is if the same result failed to occur in a second case, due to predictably 
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different circumstances 65 p.140. The pattern matching technique used to demonstrate results 
was that of rival explanation (or pattern matching for independent variables). In this 
approach, alternative reasons for the results are sought and the analysis is required to 
demonstrate which reason predicts the outcome most accurately.   
Explanation-building in a multiple-case study seeks to build a general explanation that fits all 
cases although the cases themselves will vary in their details. This research used an iterative 
process of explanation building. The study of the English case was undertaken first and 
revealed the importance of statements or propositions which were then tested against 
other details in that case (the relative importance of central frameworks for quality and 
service standards for instance), then against the New Zealand case study. Entertaining 
plausible or rival explanations and showing how they cannot be supported is an objective of 
this approach. Castles describes explanation-building as a process whereby ‘If we can locate 
some particular feature in which otherwise very similar nations differ, we are entitled to 
suggest that it is attributable to one of the few other factors distinguishing them’ 62 p.5. It is 
then possible to develop an explanation – a set of reasons or a theory which makes sense of 
empirically-observed regularities, that is, the similarities or differences revealed. The 
process of comparison provides a logic by which empirical generalisations which require 
theoretical examination can be isolated. In choosing the cases, an ‘ideal-typical method’ has 
been chosen with a ‘most-similar’ case for detailed comparison 36 p.18.  
Sampling  
 
The unit of analysis I chose was the process of policy design of the pay-for-performance 
component of primary health care policy changes in each country. By this I mean the 
processes of agenda-setting and alternative selection leading to policy formulation and 
authoritative decision 51 p.2-3. This was a time-limited period of three years in England and 
five years in New Zealand. However, I also considered evidence relating to the subsequent 
implementation phase for each policy, the ten-year preceding period of health policy 
making and the developments relating to each pay-for-performance policy as they occurred 
over the subsequent period to 2014. This enabled me to utilise information from 
evaluations of the effects of the two schemes which were published during that period and 
also to reflect on subsequent changes to the schemes which were made during that period.  
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I made a deliberate or purposeful rather than random choice of the pay-for-performance 
policymaking to be studied in order to ensure the maximum theoretical value for the cases 
studied. Purposeful sampling of information-rich cases was chosen to give the maximum 
opportunity to study processes, relationships and systems. I felt that depth of 
understanding through study of two cases would answer more questions than breadth of 
enquiry. The risks of such an approach, such as a difficulty in ability to generalize from the 
cases across time and space, and the risk of selection errors, were identified, but I have 
chosen to trade these for the greater potential for new knowledge to be uncovered from 
detailed study of both cases. The thickness of description gained for both contexts would, it 
was hoped, allow readers to make reasoned judgement about the degree of transferability 
of the findings of these case studies.   
In selecting my sample, I had prior knowledge of the nature of variation in policymaking in 
England and New Zealand from my reading of reports of these two pay-for-performance 
schemes. I then undertook some parallel literature review and informal discussion with key 
agents involved in both case studies at an early point in my preparation of this research 
proposal and identified a range of possible avenues for further study. As set out above, 
there are risks in this sampling strategy and there needs to be great care to ensure fit 
between two different contexts (or generalizability). Institutions and policies may seem 
similar but differences, such as in the system of resourcing and remuneration, may mean 
their power or significancevary. However, by clearly describing each system I expect to allow 
readers to be able to assess the comparability of the two cases and to make their own 
judgements about the degree of fit between the two cases or contexts. Notwithstanding the 
risk, transferability of findings, which is the hoped for outcome of basic research, depends 
on comparison and validation from multiple cases.  
 
Logical/scientific paradigm 
 
Having defined what the study is about, the epistemological paradigm I used is a 
logical/scientific one which sees truth as demonstrable and confirmable through 
experiment or quasi-experiment. This is the way I acquire knowledge, however it is also the 
preferred paradigm for the end-users of this research, namely policymakers and the medical 
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profession. The comparative method employed for the analysis of the qualitative and other data 
collected for this research within its discipline of  social science is well matched with and closely 
resembles the methodological processes employed within the natural sciences 32 , enabling 
rigorous analysis of the qualitative data collected, including  perceptions and insights of  actors, 
their behavior, beliefs, values and intentions.  
 
The importance of the data from interviews with actors and the behaviour of individual 
actors, their beliefs, values and intentions for this research is unquestionable and forms 
much of the evidence collected. In this instance, to answer the questions which will arise in 
this study I needed to explore how decisions were made and this involved qualitative 
research to document actors’ perceptions and motivations. Much of the data gathered was 
subjective, non-quantifiable information:  
‘Talking to actors and undertaking surveys of key stakeholders…may be the only 
ways to gather information on the political interests and resources of relevant actors 
or to gather historical and contextual information’ 55 p.196. 
 
 
Qualitative approach 
 
Although the primary data collected and analysed in this research was qualitative, several 
additional data sources, including documentary evidence, media reports, commentary on 
and evaluations of the two schemes, information from informants and historical analyses 
were utilized to strengthen the rigour of the research.  Qualitative methodology is better 
able to capture the perceptions and intentions of participants and to document processes 
and power relationships between the government policy-makers and the medical 
profession. It also utilises techniques which allow the researcher to stay open to information 
arising during the course of the research and to shape its direction. It offered the 
opportunity for an emergent design which remained flexible even though broad 
contingencies were planned for, once data collection had started. This is important because 
although I developed some working hypotheses as the foundation of initial data collection, 
it was only once the field work commenced that findings and leads began to offer meaning, 
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and shape the direction of further enquiry. A key limitation of interview data is that they 
concern what people say not what they actually do or necessarily think. However, I took the 
approach where possible to strengthen the reliability of the qualitative method by using 
techniques such as careful recording of interview material and full transcription and 
constant data triangulation. This involved cross-checking key information from one 
informant against that from another and checking back with some informants to confirm 
recorded information (or cross-examination and respondent validation) throughout the 
period of study.  
 
 
Rigour and risks 
 
My standard for judging utility of the research is similar to that of the traditional scientific 
school of research which espouses rigour, validity, reliability and the ability to generalise 
findings to similar contexts as the core tests of quality 120p.104. There are, however, 
equivalent tests of the credibility of research or unique tests of rigour which have come to 
be accepted for qualitative and naturalistic enquiry. Guba and Lincoln 120 pp.103-4 set out four 
tests of rigour for qualitative research: truth value (confidence in the findings); applicability 
(degree to which one set of findings has applicability in other contexts/other subjects); 
consistency (would the findings be repeated/is the study design replicable?) and neutrality 
(are findings independent of bias, motives of the inquirer?) 120 p.103-4. I will take each of these 
in turn and explain how the research design was constructed to meet these tests. 
Truth value 
 
This is essentially demonstrating credibility by minimizing invalidating factors in research 
design. These include the distortions which may arise through the presence of the 
researcher in the field work (which may evoke reactive responses from participants) and 
losing objectivity as a researcher in the field. They also include the presence of bias in either 
participants or the researcher or simply sloppy data collection. The primary technique I used 
for managing these risks was structural corroboration, involving triangulation (or use of 
multiple data sources or measurement processes) and cross-examination (which exposes 
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the frame of reference or bias in a participant’s commentary). I also used techniques for 
managing elite interviews 7, drawing on the literature, including Dexter and Fontana, for 
advice. Having taken these steps, I then tested the credibility of the resulting data and 
interpretations with the sources to seek their views (member checking). Having taken these 
steps, I then tested the credibility of the resulting data and interpretations with the sources 
to seek their views. This involved providing all participants with a copy of the draft 
description of the policymaking process about which they had been interviewed and seeking 
confirmation of the accuracy of their recorded contribution and any other comment which 
they wished to make about accuracy. In the view of Guba and Lincoln, having taken these 
steps to ensure credibility of data and interpretation, a naturalistic method of enquiry is ‘no 
more open to threats of internal validity than scientific inquiry and perhaps less so’ 120 p.114.  
 
Applicability 
 
This is defined as confidence that the findings in the research can be equally well applied to 
another similar setting. The primary foundation of applicability is a high level of internal 
validity. Having attained this, Guba and Lincoln recommend that the researcher strives for a 
degree of fit between the context and its working hypothesis and the next context to which 
the hypothesis is to be applied. I have therefore taken great care to set out the similarities 
and differences in context, process and outcomes in the two case studies to allow the 
reader to assess this internal validity for themselves. I have provided the ‘thick description’ 
of the naturalistic case study approach so that both contexts can be intimately understood 
and the degree of compatibility, and thus generalisability, between them assessed by the 
reader 120 p.327.  
Consistency 
 
This is the question of replicability, a much more difficult test for naturalistic research to 
meet. Guba and Lincoln comment that a first principle must be the demonstration of 
                                                             
7
 I drew on the literature including Dexter, L.A (1997) Elite and Specialised Interviewing, Northwestern 
University Press and Fontana, A and Frey, J (2005) The Interview in Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research London Sage     
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internal validity of the research, however, they also suggest that ‘overlap methods’ (or 
comparable results from two or more different approaches) may bolster the case for 
consistency. They also recommend audit of the data and findings by an independent party 
120 p.121. I made my data and findings available for supervisors to scrutinize in a process of 
audit to achieve consistency. 
Neutrality 
 
Also called ‘objectivity’, it is as difficult a test for scientific as for naturalistic study to meet. 
No researcher can avoid the subjectivity of his or her approach, as it is his or her 
individualised approach to the research problem. Provided that the data are factual and 
confirmable, the responsibility lies with the researcher to ensure that their subjectivity is 
managed professionally. In considering how to meet this test through my research design I 
must first of all acknowledge that I am, as the researcher, interviewer and analyst, the key 
instrument in this research design. It is essential to understand and expose how my own 
preoccupations, values, existing knowledge and circumstances might influence the process 
of research and even the findings. It is inevitable that I have had an effect on the subject of 
my research, primarily through exercising my judgement skills. This is no less a risk for me 
had I chosen a quantitative approach, though measurement-based analytical techniques are 
more readily replicable than judgement-based ones. However, I expect my skill, competence 
and the rigour of the research processes I utilised in this study (their truth value) to be 
subject to intensely critical review by my peers, especially my supervisors.  
Although the focus of my study led me to the choice of qualitative methodological 
techniques as the primary data gathering strategy, there was a quantitative dimension to 
the research. Prior to the commencement of interviews I had access to analysis of 
quantitative evidence set out in the growing evaluative literature on the English pay-for-
performance scheme in particular.  
The analysis of quantitative data provided a valuable objective measure of the 
achievements and outcomes of each scheme. New evaluation reports were being published 
regularly throughout the research and these were closely analysed so that an overview of 
the achievements and outcomes of each scheme was drawn.  
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Documentary analysis 
 
Detailed policy documents which described the operation of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework and how it should be implemented were available to me from the date of their 
publication on the internet in 2003/4. Although I repeatedly sought access to policy papers 
generated by the English Department of Health and by evaluators of the negotiation process 
used for the General Medical Services contract, both by direct request to authors of the 
material and through the Freedom of Information Act, I was refused access to these 
documents. A body of material was made available by members of the negotiating team 
from the BMA, including PowerPoint presentations, which they used to describe their 
experience of the negotiations at conferences and tours. I had access to material generated 
by commentators on the Quality and Outcomes framework (and on the Performance 
Programme) for conference presentations in New Zealand. I also had material collected by 
the New Zealand General Practice Leaders Study Tour of England and Scotland in October 
2006 which was undertaken to investigate the potential application of the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework in New Zealand. I obtained access to some media coverage of the 
impact of the Quality and Outcomes Framework in the English press during my annual visits 
to England between 2006 and 2012, though this was not a systematic process of media 
monitoring. I read the reports and took notes of issues and opinion which they contained, in 
general using this to give me background for the political context in which the results of the 
scheme were being debated.  
In New Zealand I had ready access from 2007 to a variety of government documents not 
otherwise in the public realm. These included the report of the Referred Services 
Management Advisory Group from 2007 and the Cabinet paper of 2005 which 
recommended establishment of the Performance Programme (then called the Performance 
Management Programme) and background documents such as the reports of the University 
of Otago Wellington School of Medicine and Health Sciences on the review of the proposed 
performance indicators for Primary Health Organisations and the final set of recommended 
indicators of 2004 and 2005. Many documents in the public realm such as the Labour Party 
Manifesto on Health and the New Zealand Health Strategy and Primary Health Care Strategy 
publications were also readily available to me. Although there was little coverage of the 
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Performance Programme in the general media, it was covered regularly in the medical press 
and I monitored this coverage throughout the period from 2007 to 2010.  
Reading and note-taking from this documentary material was undertaken between 2007 
and 2009, prior to the conduct of the first interviews following Ethics approval in England 
and in New Zealand. However, I continued to collect and analyse documentary material 
relating to the two pay-for-performance schemes and primary health care policy in each 
country from published and grey literature sources from 2009 to 2014. Material derived 
from interviews was assessed in the light of the documentary evidence of the process of 
decision-making, where it was available.  
Semi-structured interviews 
 
I undertook in-depth interviews of the key participants or stakeholders in the decision-
making and design process in each initiative, utilising a semi-structured, open-ended 
interview format. This interview technique allowed me to understand the participant’s 
world as he or she saw it and their explanations for what happened and why it happened. 
The purpose of the study was explained in very neutral and open-ended terms as seeking to 
answer the question of ‘how did the design and implementation of pay-for-performance 
schemes in England between 2001-3 [or New Zealand between 2001-6]...meet best practice 
standards of policy design and implementation and if not why not?’ The underlying 
intention I stated was ‘to test and verify theory of policy development and develop 
emergent themes and hypotheses.’ I interviewed twelve people connected with the English 
scheme and fourteen people connected with the New Zealand scheme. I pursued lines of 
enquiry arising from these interviews through the programme of interviews until saturation 
of content occurred and nothing new about the key issues was being learned from 
successive interviews of subjects.      
I invited all participants publicly identified by their managing organisations in the design of 
each scheme to be interviewed. My definition of participation was expressed as ‘all persons 
with responsibility for negotiating the terms and conditions of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (or Performance Programme) on behalf of your organisation.’ Where the names 
of those participants were not in the public domain I requested their managing organisation 
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to contact and seek agreement from them on my behalf to be interviewed by me. Where 
the response was positive the organisation provided me with contact details so I could 
proceed to communicate and make arrangements directly with them. Where participants 
were publicly identified I wrote directly to them seeking a one hour interview at their 
chosen venue. I sent out full documentation on the purposes of the research to each person 
I contacted, detailing possible risks and benefits to them, clear advice about what 
safeguards I could offer about confidentiality and security of information provided to me 
and a consent form making explicit their decision about being interviewed by me, being 
recorded during the interview, processes for using quotes from them and for vetting 
transcripts of the interview. An opportunity for withdrawal from the study was set out for 
each person, which could be exercised by them for any reason at any stage up to a given 
date. Participants whose names were in the public domain were identified by a review of 
the public documentary records about the design of the scheme, which in many cases sets 
out the list of participants in these schemes.  
Areas identified for exploration with participants in the interviews were: 
 their role in the process of policy design and/or implementation 
 their perception of the approach taken by the participants to problem definition and 
problem solving 
 their perception of the power dynamic within the process of design – who held it; 
how was it demonstrated; with what result 
 their views about why this dynamic existed 
 their perception of who benefitted from the process and why  
 what issues caused agreement/disagreement and how was disagreement resolved? 
 what pressures affected the process 
 their views on how the process affected the result 
 what the expectations/concerns of stakeholders about the outcome of the process 
were 
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 to what extent did the outcome reflect the expectations/concerns of different 
stakeholders? 
 
I completed 11 audio-taped interviews and one non-audio-taped interview of participants in 
the English case study, eight of which were face-to-face and four of which were by 
telephone. The set of interviews was commenced during a visit to England in September 
2009 when five interviews were completed. It continued with a further four interviews 
during a visit to England in March 2010 and again in March 2011 when three interviews 
were completed. I made immediate brief notes of my initial impressions of some of these 
interviews, documenting my major insights about the participant and their role in the policy 
design process. I then personally transcribed the audio tapes of the interviews shortly after 
their completion. All participants were offered the opportunity to review the transcripts and 
this was provided when requested. I completed 14 audio-taped interviews of participants in 
the New Zealand case study, 13 of which were face-to-face and one by telephone, 
completed between November 2010 and January 2014. I followed a similar process of 
capturing immediate impressions and fully transcribing the tapes shortly afterwards. 
I used an ethical framework for the study that was strongly protective of the participant’s 
confidentiality,  submitting my research proposal to and receiving approval from both the Ethics 
Committee of Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand and the National Research Ethics 
Service in the United Kingdom in 2009.  Strategies to ensure reflexivity – self-questioning and 
self-understanding – were developed by me to support the credibility and transparency of 
my work. My strategies included extensive use of the language of participants wherever 
possible. Finally respondent validation, or checking the transcriptions with participants 
where they requested this, and going back to all participants to check information and 
interpretation, was used.   
Analysis 
 
The data for this research was contained primarily in the transcripts of 26 interviews. 
Initially each interview transcript was treated as a data set. This data was analysed through 
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repeated reading and note-taking of themes. This phase of the research delivered the 
greatest quantity of raw information, traversing matters of trivia to highly significant 
comments and was the most challenging analytical component of the research. As noted by 
Patton 64, there are no formulas for determining significance and no straightforward tests 
can be applied for reliability. It is up to the researcher to use the full extent of their intellect 
to make sense of the data. I read and re-read the transcripts repeatedly and at many 
different stages of the research, checking for confirmation of interpretation over time and 
seeking new insights as new themes were uncovered.   
The data corpus (or all data collected for a particular case study) was then collected and 
analysed separately in the first instance. This was undertaken using the process of thematic 
analysis or identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within the data 121 p.79. I took a 
realist approach, reporting the experiences, meanings and the reality of participants 121 p.81. I 
used my judgement to identify themes which were in the data and represented something 
in relation to the research questions. This was an inductive approach, which built upon 
themes I had anticipated finding from preliminary analysis of documents. I was looking for a 
patterned response at some level, including prevalence of themes and strength of themes, 
according to the role of the participant. Prevalence was judged by frequency of occurrence 
but there were some instances where a smaller number of participants may have 
commented upon a theme but deeply or insightfully. To facilitate pattern or theme analysis, 
a variety of techniques was used. Initially all participant responses were set out in a table to 
see if there were patterns of similarities and differences, particularly by role (such as 
‘doctor’, or ‘politician’ or ‘civil servant’).  
By way of an example, the data showed how general practitioners who were engaged in the 
policy design process saw their role and responsibility differently from that of other 
respondents, including how they characterized their personal obligations as participants in 
the process, to whom or what they owed their allegiance and how they reflected this in the 
nature of their engagement or their contribution to the process. Data which provides 
answers to these same questions was then similarly identified and coded for academic 
members of the policy communities, politicians and staff of the government departments 
engaged in the process.  
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An important feature of this process was seeking corroborative evidence from all 
participants for the presence and outcomes of key goals or intentions as expressed by 
politicians or other state actors. Added to this table was any corroborating evidence from 
documentary material such as media reports. This enabled comparison of individual and 
reported records of the process. Finally media commentary on the schemes was collected 
both from the period during which the negotiations occurred. Each case study was treated 
holistically and within its own context and justice done to that case before any attempt at 
case comparison was made. All data, including interview transcripts, documents, records 
and media reports has been assembled into a comprehensive case record.  
In writing the narrative of each case study and as a mechanism to enhance authenticity I 
sought to create a rich thematic description of the entire data corpus for each case study, 
using the participants’ own words, fully anonymised, and the actual data reported by them 
and quoting from reported and documentary material, rather than my own constructs for 
the information in the data. I tried self-consciously to ‘get out of the way of the data’ as 
much as possible. This not only assisted me in the evaluation of the evidence, but sets out 
detailed information for others to assess. Each case study reports in detail an under-
researched area, namely health policymaking ‘behind the scenes’.   
In the next stage, however, that of case comparison, it was my task to compare the two 
narratives including their contextual, structural and historical considerations which aligned 
or set the two cases apart (such as electoral system; history of relations between 
government and medical profession; party political electoral promises; existing system for 
doctors remuneration etc.) A simple table of these considerations of similarities and 
differences is included in Chapter Nine.  
Having set out what happened in each case as a narrative and compared the two cases, I 
then used the elements and sub-elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework to display the 
evidence and to assess the extent to which the MS Framework explained and predicted 
details in each case study. Next I began a process of challenging the utility of the MS 
Framework and testing the utility of other literature on causes of policy change and 
variation. I chose the methodological approach to treat the policy outcome as the 
dependent variable and examine the effect on it of institutions, group structure and 
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resources, rational choices of actors, socio-economic issues and ideas in my analysis of the 
case study narratives.  
I used analytic induction in a fluid process of moving between theory and data 64 120 to test 
the accuracy and predictive validity of the theoretical frameworks and models of policy 
development and began to formulate new insights into the nature and efficacy of these 
models 122. Using these frameworks, interpretation commenced and the process of 
extraction of meaning, especially as it illuminated aspects of my comparison of the two 
cases studied was completed. This was a process in which thematic analysis continued in a 
‘back and forth’ mode, and in which reference to the literature became increasingly 
important. My expectations of the relevance of particular literature changed markedly 
during the process of thematic analysis and writing up, from one which was focused on 
Kingdon’s MS Framework to one focused on historical institutionalist and rational choice 
explanations for the two policymaking outcomes. Where, through the research, information 
emerged which indicated the value of further data gathering or even consideration of the 
features of other pay-for-performance policymaking processes such as the need for further 
interviews or even inclusion of other policy design processes, I followed that lead.  
This process of qualitative interpretation (elucidating meaning from the data or narrative 
through subjecting it to my own understanding and perspective) involved searching for 
causes, consequences and relationships, identifying which things appeared to lead to other 
things and which processes led to certain outcomes. Establishing cause was guided by the 
classic rules of temporal precedence (A precedes B); constant conjugation (when A always 
B) and contiguity of influence (a plausible mechanism links A and B). I clearly qualified these 
findings as my own tentative interpretation of these patterns in the case studies.   
The findings from these phases were then subject to the test of substantive significance. 
Lacking statistical testing in this methodology, I needed to show that there is solid, coherent 
and consistent evidence to support any findings (this is where triangulation offers additional 
strength to findings) and that these findings increase and deepen understanding and are 
consistent with other knowledge in this field. My supervisors were a primary source of peer 
review for the validation of this phase of work.  
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Limitations 
 
There are limitations which apply to this research. Firstly, the research largely reflects the 
interpretation of events by elites, leaders and entrepreneurs who participated in the 
policymaking process rather than the views of general practitioners who were not active 
participants in the policymaking process. Secondly, the events described by participants had 
taken place at least seven years prior to the interviews for this research so inevitably the 
passage of time  affected the recall of these events by participants. This also gives some 
time for reflection from a distance. 
Some participants who played key roles in the setting of the goals of the policymaking 
process declined to be interviewed for the case study of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework and I was unable to obtain access to documentary evidence relevant to that 
case study despite making repeated formal requests for this. I was also unable to obtain 
working papers for the Referred Services Expert Advisory Group in New Zealand. In both 
cases these additional documentary sources would have enabled more accurate tracing of 
the minuted decision-making processes in each policymaking episode.     
Participants shared with  me their understanding of the goals, objectives and conduct of the 
policymaking process as they interpreted and experienced them. My own judgements about 
the relative importance of the information I collected added a further interpretive layer. The 
corroborative processes which I undertook, in particular by offering the opportunity to all 
participants to read and comment upon the Chapter which described the case study of 
policymaking in which they were participants were important safeguards against bias and 
partiality. This process was undertaken by the majority of participants and resulted in minor 
changes to the text in the description of both case studies. 
 Summary 
  
In this Chapter the methodology for the conduct of this research has been described. The 
risks of this methodology and the strategies for managing these have been set out. In the 
next Chapter, the first case study of the design of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, in 
England is described, the barriers and enablers of the policymaking process are discussed 
and commentary of evaluators of the Quality and Outcomes Framework is presented.   
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Part Two 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ENGLAND: CONTEXT AND THE QUALITY AND OUTCOMES 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 Introduction 
 
The first case study is set out in this chapter, beginning here with a picture of the context in 
which the English pay-for-performance policy initiative was commenced, followed by a 
description of the process of policymaking around pay-for-performance itself. This draws 
upon an analysis of documentary records, media reports and published commentary on the 
implementation of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (hereafter referred to as the QOF) 
and the transcripts of 12 semi-structured interviews with participants in and observers of 
the design process. Where participants’ comments are included in the text, these are usually 
anonymous but are highlighted through the use of quotation marks. Where a participant 
has consented to have their comments attributed, names are used.   
Next, a set of the major barriers and enablers which affected key goals of the policymaking 
process is set out as described by participants. These are drawn from clearly-patterned 
content from interview transcripts, such as their prevalence in records of interviews with 
participants or the strength and intensity of expression by a small number of participants, or 
because they were clearly identified with a particular type of participant or type of belief.  
Finally, the commentary of evaluators of the scheme is presented, providing an independent 
assessment of its successes and failures.     
Background 
 
In the years leading up to their election in 1997, the Labour Party in England set out health 
policy proposals to improve collaboration between the hospital and primary care sectors 
and to tie funding of services to best practice as validated by clinical audit (or ‘getting 
patients a better service more quickly’) 123 p.148-9. They also promised to change features 
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such as fund-holding that they perceived as encouraging a two-tier system of health care. 
Half the practices in England had become fund-holding practices (others not wishing to take 
up or being too small for this new form of local health purchasing  arrangement) and these 
practices were able to obtain better services more quickly for their patients, unlike non-fund 
holding practices. Following election, the Labour  government supported the introduction of 
new forms of primary care contracts, the Personal Medical Services contracts, established in 
legislation by the preceding government, which enabled doctors to develop a wider range of 
primary care services and to respond to local needs-based issues. Labour then implemented 
a number of primary care health policy initiatives designed to replace competition with 
collaboration and partnership. It established Primary Care Groups and then Primary Care 
Trusts. The Groups were general practitioner-led advisory bodies in the first instance, 
evolving to Trusts which both commissioned care and provided community services.They 
had a strong population-based and health-promotion-oriented purpose and a clear mandate 
to ensure good clinical governance of medical practice.  
In the three years which followed, the focus of national health policy development was on a 
strongly centralised set of initiatives to improve standards, to reduce waiting times and to 
establish targets to reduce health inequalities. Tuohy 23 p.39 characterises this period as one 
in which the purchaser/provider split introduced by the previous Conservative government 
became entrenched and in which the features of a single payer model, with the state as 
purchaser and auditor and in which providers have greater independence, were enhanced. 
In this process the role of general practitioners was strengthened in the health system as a 
whole as were the instruments of collective professional control of medical practice. Her 
assessment is that contracting rather than rule specification played a much greater role but 
the dominant role of the state remained little changed.  
The NHS Plan 2000 
 
In 2000 the Labour government published its second major policy plan for health services, 
the NHS Plan 124. This began the process for the introduction of a new national pay-for-
performance programme for general practitioners contracted to the NHS as part of a new 
General Medical Services contract implemented in 2004. The new and somewhat narrower 
focus on choice which dominated the NHS Plan was enunciated by the Prime Minister, Rt. 
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Hon. Tony Blair, as ‘all about trying to introduce systems where the money spent was linked 
to performance and where the service user was in the driving seat’ 125. New investment had 
been publicly and dramatically announced by the Prime Minister on 16 January 2000 in an 
interview on BBC Television’s Breakfast with Frost. In that interview he promised to bring 
expenditure on Britain’s NHS up to the European Union average of 8 per cent of GDP 126 p.69 
from the then levels of 5.7 per cent. However, as a quid pro quo for this huge new 
investment, the Prime Minister also set out five challenges: ‘partnerships, performance, 
professions, patient care and prevention’ 127. Reforms would include ‘using incentives to 
kick-start the modernization…to increase the quality of health care and to see the customer 
driving progress throughout the NHS’ 126 p.44.  
The NHS Plan, while primarily focused on improving access through reducing waiting times 
and increasing resources and targets for improved service performance, also contained a 
commitment to reduce health inequalities. The newly elected Labour government had 
established a Minister for Public Health and commissioned a report on health inequalities. It 
had announced ‘that it would put reducing health inequalities at the heart of tackling the 
root causes of ill health to create a fairer society and to reduce the costs associated with ill 
health’ 128. 
The undertaking echoed the commitment in the Spending Review which preceded the 
publication of the NHS Plan in 2000, to narrow the gap between socio-economic groups and 
between the most deprived areas and the rest of the country 128 p.5. Both documents 
recognized the central role of primary care and in particular the general practitioner in the 
identification and management of risks of ill health which underpin differentials in life 
expectancy.  
The Plan clearly shows that the concept of pay-for-performance was central to the policy 
strategy to improve the quality and effectiveness of primary care services in Britain. To 
implement the NHS Plan, ‘a complete redesign of the terms and conditions for working in 
the NHS was required’ according to the newly appointed Junior Minister who was put in 
charge of negotiation of the new General Medical Services contract at the time, John Hutton 
(afterwards referred to as the Junior Minister when quoted). The Personal Medical Services 
contract already provided a model of the type of contract which could be expanded 
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gradually to cover most general practitioners. This new form of contract paid general 
practitioners ‘on the basis of meeting set quality standards and the particular local needs of 
their population’ 124 p.75 and had the following benefits : 
 Services could be developed for specific populations such as minority ethnic 
communities 
 Doctors and nurses could be attracted to deprived areas 
 Services to patients could be improved. 
 
The benefits were exemplified using a case study of a Personal Medical Services contract in 
the high-need area of Pennywell, Sunderland, which had resulted in the establishment of a 
local primary care service offering ‘minor operations, drop-in sessions, health promotion, 
asthma control and breast screening clinics’ 124 p.76. This type of contract and a new General 
Medical Services contract would be amalgamated into a single contractual framework.  
A challenge to centralism  
 
The Prime Minister acknowledged the continuity of effort of his reforms with those of the 
previous government ‘breaking down centralized and monolithic structures, about focusing 
on the developing tastes of consumers, about ending old demarcations in professions…’ 125 
p.262.  Simon Stevens, the health policy adviser to the Prime Minister from 2001, described 
the method of implementing the reforms as a process of ‘constructive discomfort’ which 
was intended to put some pressure on the ‘relationship between the British state and 
medical profession for most of the post war period, with the medical profession taking 
responsibility for the quality and allocation of publicly-funded care, in return for 
professional autonomy and the absence of intrusive state regulation’ 2. In his analysis he 
identifies three strategies which underpinned the process: providing support for providers, 
top-down imposition of standards and targets and applying countervailing pressure on 
providers from strategies such as competition between different suppliers. This set of 
strategies, where it impacted upon primary care, included enhanced patient choice of 
provider ‘be they public, private or not-for-profit…Private diagnostics and primary care out 
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of hours services are next.’ It also included aligned provider incentives (‘GP’s new contracts 
will allow them to earn around a third more, linked to markers of quality’).  
The NHS Plan of 2000 had been developed following close and extensive discussion 
between the Prime Minister, his Ministers and political and academic advisers during 1999 
and 2000 125 p.265. The Plan was also informed by the work of five Modernisation Action 
Teams which brought together a wide range of clinicians, patients, members of the public, 
academics and voluntary sector participants in a new process of informing policymaking. 
The over-arching strategy for NHS reform which drove the Plan included a commitment to 
spend more money on health care by contrast with the ‘overly effective cost containment 
since 1948’ 2 p.37. It reflected the need to narrow the gap between expectations of (primarily 
middle class) tax payers and health system performance (particularly on waiting times for 
treatment) so that they did not begin to ‘buy their way out and the NHS would spiral down 
to become a residualist safety net.’ There was recognition that if working conditions and 
support for health professionals were improved, they could be relied upon to ‘do the right 
thing’ by patients. Government, acting as proxy for consumers, would set targets and 
national standards for the quality and outcomes of health services, publicise these, and 
where necessary intervene to ensure performance improved. 
The Prime Minister echoes these expectations for the new contract in his autobiography: 
‘We were opening up all the contracts of the professionals for re-negotiation, breaching 
new ground with the private sector, changing the way the service worked to make it far 
more user friendly’ 125 p.282. The Prime Minister wanted improved support for providers and 
plurality of supply. ‘GPs had a complete monopoly. Competition, even in the event of a 
hopeless service, was literally banned…Health care systems in which there was mixed 
public/private provision, or which at least demanded some individual commitment and gave 
some individual choice, did best…surely it must be possible to combine equity and 
efficiency’125 p.215, 319.  
The Prime Minister expressed his personal support for pay reform and provider incentives in 
several forums during 2000 and 2001. He was actively involved in the design of the NHS 
Plan, describing a period where he and the Secretary of State ‘settled back down to the 
detail of the NHS Plan. We were having scores of meetings on it, several a week…’ 125 p.282. In 
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the NHS Plan published in July 2000 it was heralded with the words, ‘There will be a big 
extension of quality based contracts for GPs in general and single-handed practices in 
particular’ 127. At his speech to the Labour Party Conference in 2001 the Prime Minister 
claimed that ‘Without reform, more money and pay won’t succeed’ 126 p.69. The strategy of 
pay-for-performance was therefore championed at the highest level of the core executive. 
A new Executive team 
 
A strongly motivated team of health ministers had been appointed who were determined to 
make a difference. The Secretary of State for Health appointed in 1999 was a ‘modernizer’ 
by contrast to his ‘traditionalist’ predecessor 103 and was, in Blair’s words ‘fully simpatico 
with the direction of change’ 125 p.264. He is reported by a participant commenting on the set 
of contract negotiations as being ‘hugely driven’ to secure additional resources for health 
and to use these to drive through the vision for health set out in the NHS Plan. 
According to a participant, the new team were said to share the belief that to some extent 
their first term in government had been wasted because of wariness about making 
substantial change. This team was seen as a high-performing, close-knit group of 
progressives in the Party, strongly led by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Another participant comments: ‘It was a time when the Secretary of State for Health was…a 
very command and control Minister with hands on. It was a time when there was a huge 
amount of strife in general practice, demands for pay rises, dissatisfaction, a lot of people 
unhappy with out-of-hours commitment, concerns about quality, managed care creeping 
over the horizon from the US, quality issues particularly at the lower end of general practice 
and the failure of the health authorities to performance manage general practitioners and a 
general mood they needed to.’ 
The Junior Minister, John Hutton, was a friend and shared ‘Newcastle connections’ with the 
Secretary of State 129. It was the Junior Minister’s task to manage the re-negotiation of three 
NHS contracts: the General Medical Services Contract, the Consultants Contract and the 
contract for other NHS staff (called the Agenda for Change). These contract negotiations 
were seen by him as a key part of the implementation of the NHS strategy as a whole. He 
reports that ‘alongside the general practice negotiations the consultants’ negotiations were 
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going on at the same time...it was very much part of this ‘we want to work differently in the 
NHS’ so we...had a complete redesign of the whole contractual terms and conditions for 
working in the NHS’.   
The New General Medical Services contract  
 
The story of the negotiation of the QOF of the new contract is set out below. The focus is on 
the negotiation of the QOF because this was the part of the contract negotiations which was 
based on practice-based pay-for-performance processes and is matched to the pay-for-
performance component of the policy changes in New Zealand, the Performance 
Programme. There were many elements within the contract negotiations, such as the 
initiatives to simplify the funding arrangements for general practice, improve working 
conditions and recruitment for general practitioners, emphasise teamwork in primary health 
care, change out-of-hours service requirements and re-distribute core funding for practices 
according to health needs. These will be referred to where they provide context and insight 
into why and how the teams from the government side and the BMA negotiated the QOF. 
Who was involved, what they did and how they did it in the negotiations to establish the 
Framework will be set out.  
The research for this case study has provided a rare opportunity to observe the micro 
policymaking process which resulted from this strategic policy initiative through the eyes of 
some of its participants. It is not common to obtain insight into such processes. Marsh, 
Richards and Smith contend that the culture of present-day policymaking in England is 
representative rather than participatory, reinforced by a political tradition which they 
suggest is ‘elitist, secretive and closed’ 100 p.28, however, in this research, participants have 
openly shared their insights and their story.  
Who was involved 
 
A participant recalls the reaction from 10 Downing Street when, on a day in the middle of 
the 2001 election campaign, the BMA: 
‘chose…to give…an ultimatum that said if they didn’t get a new GP contract they 
would contemplate downing tools and stopping serving NHS patients, resigning from 
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the NHS…[Downing Street ] believed…given there was this independent system of 
pay review bodies that a substantial earnings uplift was legitimate and so one way or 
another [they would find themselves in a position where they] were likely to have to 
pay more for GP services. So then the question…was…to use this opportunity to 
pivot to a ‘something for something’ deal in which rather than simply seeing 
increased pay [it was possible to] get something in return for it. That was the 
intellectual genesis of the new contract and the QOF.’ 
 
And also that: 
‘[The Prime Minister was] in the middle of the election campaign when the BMA put 
out their statement…and [with a small group of others, the Prime Minister] talked 
about it: [they] progressed the thought subsequently. Part of [the] thinking as well 
was that it would make sense to perhaps have more of an arms-length negotiation 
rather than it being direct between the BMA and the Department of Health and so [it 
was then] decided…that the negotiations would be fronted by the NHS 
Confederation - the Employers’ organisation.’  
 
The NHS Confederation is a membership body for organisations that commission and 
provide NHS services. 
The Government team 
 
It was usual practice for Ministers and their departmental officials to conduct the 
negotiation of terms and conditions for NHS staff directly with the BMA. Although Ministers 
in this instance decided to out-source the actual negotiations to the NHS Confederation, this 
was not intended to contract out the decision-making. The BMA was not consulted about 
this departure from time-honoured practice. They were advised of the decision to use the 
Confederation as negotiators by the office of the Secretary of State for Health only hours 
before its announcement at the NHS Confederation Conference in July 2001.  
One participant, John Chisholm, Chair of the BMA’s General Practitioners Committee, 
initially wondered if the decision to outsource the negotiations was, by depriving the BMA 
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of the direct bargaining relationship with Ministers, ‘punishment for the insubordination’ of 
the campaign run by the BMA for better working conditions during the 2001 election. 
Following the changes in relationships between unions and government during the 1990s, 
the BMA was one of the last trade unions to have continued access to the highest levels of 
government. The relationship between the medical profession and the state was one of 
mutual dependency, described by Klein as the ‘politics of the double bed’ 109, in which the 
profession ran the NHS and rationed its scarce resources but was entirely dependent upon 
the state, as a monopoly employer, for income and resources. The BMA would reasonably 
have feared that this special relationship was now over for them.  
Ministers chose Mr Mike Farrar as the Chairman for the Confederation team of negotiators. 
Mike Farrar had a successful record in leadership roles in the Department of Health. As head 
of General Medical Services Primary Care division between 1994 and 2000, he had led much 
of the major change initiated by the new Labour government in its first term. The formation 
of Primary Care Groups and Primary Care Trusts were all implemented by his team. He had 
then returned to front line delivery of health services to take up the role of Chief Executive 
of a Strategic Health Authority. The Junior Minister thought of this new Chairman as 
someone who was very strong, experienced and had been in the Department for many 
years, knew primary care and was trusted for his basic judgement about how these 
contracts could be renegotiated and his judgement about the mood around the negotiating 
table.   
John Chisholm reports that the BMA ‘would have construed that as very good news because 
[Mike Farrar] was someone who was widely respected by Ministers, by civil servants, by 
managers and the profession…We got on well with [him] basically because of his palpable 
honesty really. He was a pleasure to do business with even when he was giving tough 
messages [and] would focus on the problems not the person.’  
The Chairman’s first task was to recruit a team and this was announced on 19 September 
2001. Dr Tony Snell, a veteran of pay-for-performance in general practice who had led a 
scheme called the Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness (PRICCE) project in East Kent for over 
four years, was recruited. His East Kent Chief Executive recommended that he apply to join 
the team. Mike Farrar confirms: 
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‘[The team] knew of Dr Snell’s work – it was a factor in selecting him – he came 
through the process…When he [did] it was the nearest thing…operating to 
the…vision.’ 
Others were either well known to the Chairman or were Chief Executives of Primary Care 
Trusts. The Secretary of State’s goals for the contract had an impact on the selection of 
members of the Confederation negotiating team. Mike Farrar describes the strategy: 
‘The idea was to use the Confederation as a membership organisation to recruit 
people who wanted to take part in the negotiation…There was a core group and an 
extended group of advisers…there were one or two people who I suggested should 
put their names forward, some from scratch, other people I worked with previously 
and I knew that [they] knew the inside out of primary care very well.’ 
 
Most participants felt this decision to outsource the negotiations was cosmetic in essence. 
The Junior Minister says: 
‘I wasn’t in the detailed around-the-table discussions but you know I was practically 
in the room so this idea that it was at arm’s length…I think very few people saw that 
as reality. If ever there was a bump in the road they came to me. I was the ultimate 
court of appeal…the BMA knew the Confederation weren’t the politicians and they 
came to the politicians when they needed to unblock things, and so did Mike Farrar.’ 
 
A thorough and strict selection process included vetting for experience in negotiation by 
experts in negotiation skills development. These experts also delivered principle-based 
negotiation training to the team once selected. Dr Snell felt he had been vetted personally 
by the Secretary of State for Health, recalling being invited to meet with him and being 
challenged by him strongly on his attitudes to general practice before approving his role in 
the team. The members of the Confederation team were chosen because of their particular 
expertise across the range of skills which would be needed for the negotiation.  
Participants commented that from the point of view of the BMA, use of the NHS 
Confederation as intermediary was a watershed in the way the government did business 
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with the BMA; John Chisholm said this was ‘because the NHS managers with whom [they] 
were negotiating had a very similar assessment of the problems and solutions…because of 
their experience of being front-line participants in the health service.’ 
One participant contended that the role of the Confederation as negotiators made it harder 
for the government to negotiate their way out of things because the Confederation team 
was seen as first and foremost health service people and the BMA considered that they 
were a new set of allies. There was risk of ‘cosiness’ of relationships between the 
Confederation and BMA during the process. Participants consider that civil servants and 
Ministers ‘had to stiffen the resolve’ of the negotiating team at times.   
The BMA team 
 
The BMA team was formed from members of its General Practitioners Committee, selected 
by that Committee, together with supporting staff and advisers. The BMA at the time 
represented 141,000 doctors in the United Kingdom and had and still has a highly 
democratic structure. The General Practitioners Committee represents the interests of 
doctors in general practice and acts for all NHS general practitioners whether or not they 
are members of the BMA. All doctors can vote in or stand for election to the General 
Practitioners Committee whether or not they are members of the BMA, although the 
majority on the committee must be members. The BMA and thus the General Practitioners 
Committee is recognized by the health departments in national negotiations for NHS 
general practitioners 130. It has sole bargaining rights for all NHS general practitioners.  
The BMA team of doctors included those who had years of experience and training in 
industrial negotiation between them. The leader of the BMA team had been representing 
doctors since 1976. In addition, the team had a trade union negotiator and expert advisers 
including a lawyer, a health economist, a pension expert and actuary and an innovations 
expert. The team had a limited mandate and was described by a participant as ‘actually very 
weak in that they are regularly re-elected, their membership is capable of kicking them 
out...and they put their negotiated positions to votes of all the membership which 
effectively ties the hands of the negotiators.’ Another thought that tight controls were still 
kept on some negotiators (‘he was never allowed to attend a meeting alone because it was 
95 
 
feared he would compromise too readily. He had a huge amount of integrity, fairness and a 
strong value set’). This limited mandate was to place considerable pressure on the 
negotiators at a later stage of the negotiations and gave members of the BMA a powerful 
influence upon the course of the negotiations. This created tensions for negotiators. John 
Chisholm thought: 
‘It is certainly the case in medical politics that there is a tension between 
representation and leadership. [In a] representative role you have to bring forward 
the views of your collleagues as it is them you are representing. And it’s them that 
you are trying to do things for. But also there are issues on which it is important to 
show leadership and to try to take people with you and to try to argue and 
persuade.’   
 
Participants observed different approaches: for example some were observed to choose not 
to ‘sell but to tell’ without commending a particular proposal or seek to influence 
membership decisions. One participant suggests ‘If you take somebody who has been to 
university for a bit and is medically qualified you assume they can judge for themselves … 
you explain and it is up to them what they do with it.’  
Maintaining the support of BMA members during the process was a challenge 
acknowledged by the Confederation team too. As a participant observed ruefully ‘you are 
still stuck with the mandate- givers.’ It was acknowledged by the Confederation team that 
the BMA negotiators did not have the same level of trust from their mandate-givers that 
was enjoyed by the Confederation team. At times it seemed to negotiators that a deal had 
been reached only to have the BMA come back and say their members would not live with 
it. Although in theory able to say that was the BMA’s problem, both the Departmental staff 
and Confederation negotiators understood that this was hard for the BMA negotiators. 
There was a vociferous minority within the BMA membership who bitterly opposed the 
contract. There was an understanding of what would work and what would not work within 
the BMA - ‘the politics of it’ - in the Confederation team. Confederation team members 
went to lengths on one occasion to support the BMA negotiators in presenting the final 
framework for ratification to the representatives of Local Medical Committees of the BMA. 
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Papers were late and there was a risk that the debate and therefore the ratification could 
not go ahead. Mike Farrar recalls that ‘I understood this risk and...went to the meeting of 
the Local Medical Committees and apologized for the Confederation team not having 
provided the documents on time and hoping that as a result they would not throw out the 
opportunity to consider and vote on this very important opportunity for a deal.’ 
Department of Health 
 
In addition to the Confederation and BMA teams, the Departments of Health of England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland appointed a representative each and the four officials 
had observer status at all meetings of the Plenary (or meeting of the whole negotiating 
team), although they were very active between meetings checking back with their political 
and Departmental chiefs about the progress of the discussions.  
Representatives of each of the four national Departments of Health also sat at the 
negotiating table in the sub group of the team which developed the QOF (the Quality Sub 
Group). All commentators identified the tensions between these Departments of Health as 
being an ever-present feature in the negotiations. The English Department of Health in 
particular was seen to seek a more ambitious set of indicators than other stakeholders and 
to be lobbying for these behind the scenes but faced rejection when the proposed 
indicators were not for health conditions which met the key criteria of being a primary care 
intervention which was measurable and made an evidence-based difference to health 
status. 
One participant suggests that even with the contracting-out of the negotiations, the 
contract ‘would never have got...[agreed if it had just been] negotiating with the 
Department of Health for England…it was possible to put things through because there were 
four Departments’ who could hold differing views. This participant also drew attention to 
the internal conflicts and debates about priorities between different sections within the 
English Department of Health which frequently delayed progress on the development of the 
QOF. In fact, the struggle over the inclusion of targets sought by Ministers resulted in a final 
version of the QOF which included indicators not supported by the Quality Sub Group but 
added at the behest of the Departments in the final Plenary sessions. Two indicators to track 
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practice performance in management of cancer patients exemplify this: to keep a register of 
all cancer patients and to track the percentage of patients with cancer whose support needs 
and coordination of treatment requirements are reviewed within six months of diagnosis.  
The academic team  
 
During the negotiations the decision was taken to recruit a team of academic advisers to 
offer independent expert evidence about suitable clinical indicators for the QOF. As advisers 
their role in the process was intended to establish rigorous standards to test each indicator 
for suitability. This was a position of considerable influence and as a result came under a 
critical spotlight. While not members of the teams, these academic advisers were a forceful 
presence. They evoked different reactions from the other parties. Universally seen as very 
important to the process, some were sometimes seen by participants as having a 
relationship which was described by one as ‘rather cosy...a bit sub optimal’, with the BMA. 
Some were thought to champion strongly a particular provision rather than neutrally 
mediating the debate between the parties. Their rigorous tests set high thresholds for 
governments trying to achieve changes in the framework. This is a pattern which will also be 
seen in the New Zealand case study where academic advisers were criticised for the time 
consuming and rigorous nature of their work. As these advisers held the responsibility to 
actually document the decisions of the Quality Sub Group relating to indicators they were 
seen to be in an especially powerful position by one participant. However, their role as 
interlocutors for the evidence-based process of decision-making clearly helped to mediate 
and submerge the overt interests of any particular party. Without them, it is unlikely that 
the scope and quantity of indicators which were eventually included in the QOF could have 
been agreed in such a relatively short time frame. This is more fully explored in the section 
‘Influence of antecedent policies’ below. 
General practitioners   
 
Members of different teams had known one another for a number of years in some cases. 
Most of the participants in the direct negotiations over the QOF were medical professionals 
(7 of 11 members). Almost all were practising general practitioners for at least a small part 
of their working week even when the remainder of the week was spent as a medico-
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politician or academic. There were connections between members of the team of academic 
advisers and many of the doctors on the teams through their shared professional 
backgrounds. With the exception of the politicians, Departmental officials and the 
Confederation Chair, this was indeed largely a policy design by general practitioners for 
general practitioners. 
What was done 
 
The government agenda 
 
The Junior Minister held overall responsibility for the contract negotiations. He says that 
‘No. 10 just wanted a deal: a good deal–their top lines intact, this deal shifts more money 
into primary care and facilitates better work/life balance, addresses health inequalities 
between different parts of Britain and puts in place payment by results. They wanted all 
their top line messages and they got them.’  
He says this included a need to:    
‘…shift more of the money into prevention, more public health [and] more resources 
to be paid to general practitioners on the back of results rather than just per capita. 
The other big thing we had to address was workforce-related issues … The theory 
then was that there was a chronic workforce shortage in primary care that a more 
generous contract would begin to address. It wasn’t just a question of resources – 
better outcomes, better pay and so on – there was also this work/life balance. Under 
the old contract a lot of the GPs felt they were being flogged to death almost.’  
 
He recognised that the problems of recruitment and retention within general practice had a 
serious equity perspective and believed:   
‘We were chronically under-doctored in many parts of the country. We were also 
looking very much at this question of equity of provision in primary care. Over 50-60 
years what had happened here as in other public health care systems, a lot of the 
resource had gravitated to the better-off areas. We never had a problem recruiting 
general practitioners in the home counties, the nicer parts of Britain. But we could 
99 
 
not find a way of getting general practitioners to work in those areas which had the 
greatest health needs because they couldn’t make the sort of money and the work 
was harder.’ 
 
General practitioners fees and allowances  regulations were described by Mike Farrar as set 
out in an ‘old Red Book [which ] was hugely complex...with massive amounts of money 
being spent without any sense of what we got back for it in terms of value, patient benefits, 
health outcomes, information. It was bureaucratic, often fraudulent, paid general 
practitioners to have high list sizes and promoted entirely reactive general medical care.’ 
This meant that a major transformation was required to meet Ministers’ expectations, as 
shared with Mike Farrar, of a ‘move from rewarding inputs to rewarding quality [and] to pay 
for outcomes rather than paying for time.’ 
The Junior Minister strongly identified with elements of an agenda for resolving access and 
quality concerns in the under-doctored areas of Britain. Inequity of health service access 
and health outcomes were a feature of his constituency in the North West of England. A 
participant confirms that he saw the Junior Minister as seeking to achieve a ‘culture change 
so the system worked more for patients and less for clinicians in areas such as access times, 
reflections of patients’ expectations in general practice and so on.’ 
The expectations of No. 10 were, according to a participant, ‘what would be the most help 
to the public to get out of these changes in working relationships? What is wrong at the 
moment, what needs to be fixed?’ Ultimately the outcome of the negotiations can be seen 
to present a set of clear priorities of No. 10 for responsive services as well as improvements 
in equity of access and outcomes.  
This keenness for responsiveness, to be achieved through increased patient choice, explains 
the top priority given to negotiating the removal of out-of-hours care from the contract and 
the transfer of the responsibility for its delivery to Primary Care Trusts (hereafter referred to 
as PCTs) in England  which would need to source it from other private or non-profit 
providers. This achieved two goals – the top-line requirement of the BMA for improved 
working conditions for doctors, as they could opt out of the delivery of out of hours care, 
100 
 
and the goal of introducing competition into primary care services through the contracting 
of these and other services to new entrants to the primary care market.    
The priorities for No.10 were seen by participants as linked to the concern to preserve 
electoral support for a tax-payer funded universal health service. There was a view that the 
service was ‘undersupplying appropriate care, causing long waits for routine surgeries’ 
(Stevens 2004:37) and inviting increasing adverse media commentary which compared the 
NHS negatively with allegedly better health services available in continental Europe. This 
gave the government a ‘mandate to act as a proxy for the consumer using four powerful 
new hierarchical levers mostly absent from the previous Conservative government’s 1991 
health reforms’: national standards and targets, inspection and regulation, published 
performance information and direct intervention in the event of poor performance 2 p.40. 
The BMA agenda 
 
The BMA wanted a new contract for general practice which would give them their share of 
the new health funding. Their campaign for a new contract was strongly reinforced by a 
survey of general practitioners which achieved a response rate of 55 percent. John Chisholm 
says: 
‘The national survey of general practice opinion … in the autumn of 2001…was 
actually conducted by the Electoral Reform Society…The most obvious thing was that 
97 percent of responding general practitioners said too much was being asked of 
general practitioners…with 28 percent of people contemplating a career change 
outside general practice…48 percent planning to retire below the age of 60 was 
evidence of the sort of things we had been saying in previous discussion with the 
Department of Health.’  
 
Pension reform, the removal of the requirement for out-of-hours work and improved pay 
were bottom lines for the BMA. They readily agreed that a pay-for-performance mechanism 
could form a major part of a new contract. One participant believes  ‘that [the BMA] had 
agreed to move into this territory [of pay-for-performance] without much fuss because they 
thought they could shape it in a way that didn’t require a major shift of focus for general 
101 
 
practitioners to new areas of work…they saw the contract as an opportunity to get out of 
work…they were much more interested in the quantum of the cash involved than the fine 
details of policy and looking to the next ten or fifteen years in public health outcomes.’ This 
view was not shared by BMA participants.  
It was hard for the BMA to resist the strong expectations of the Secretary of State for Health 
about pay-for-performance. A participant saw him as insistent that ‘there would be no pay 
rise for work already being done.’ He had a ‘bloody-minded determination for performance 
pay.’ Others describe the goal as ‘something for something’, meaning to make a significant 
part of the payment to doctors contingent on quality targets being achieved. It was not easy 
to negotiate with the Secretary of State. He was also determined to maximize the size of the 
pay increase which would be attached to quality targets. This created the anxiety that 
doctors would be seen as being over-paid.  A participant thinks ‘the difficulty with [the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework] was the amount of money which went into [it] was too 
high. [That] fear has been proven.’   
The Junior Minister was equally determined to deliver pay-for-performance but was seen by 
the participant to be ‘a charming, decent, reasonable man I could easily spend an evening 
having dinner with’ and ‘a man you could really trade with – not a push-over but a decent 
bloke.’  
BMA leaders already had the idea of rewarding quality. John Chisholm says they thought: 
‘There are still issues about unacceptable inequalities in public health terms, in 
health outcomes terms, but also in the quality of care for individuals and the new 
contract was part of trying to invest in primary care and also address inequalities in 
primary care.’ 
 
He also says that ‘the national survey (of general practitioners conducted for the BMA in 
2001) would have given some comfort to the idea that actually general practitioners did 
want to see rules for quality…[the team] wouldn’t have been courageous enough to have 
galloped off in that direction without some kind of mandate.’ However, they would only 
agree to standards which reflected appropriate clinical performance, not political 
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imperatives. For instance, it was believed they would resist any access standards which did 
not have a basis in clinical care even though they might have been asked for by patients. 
Targets, if they were introduced, would need to be appropriately weighted. 
Both parties sought a large scheme. On the government side it was believed that the 
success of pay-for-performance schemes like the Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness project 
(PRICCE) in East Kent had demonstrated the effectiveness of rewarding quality and justified 
a scheme with as many indicators as could be agreed. For the BMA, the larger the scheme, 
the more money was available to their members. A participant believed that the pre-
eminent role for the BMA in its relationship with government would be placed under serious 
threat if they could not broker a popular and lucrative national deal for their members.     
How it was done 
 
Consensus-based 
 
The Junior Minister knew that the Prime Minister also wanted a consensus-based 
agreement with the BMA. Together with the Secretary of State he kept the Prime Minister 
informed during the negotiations. He says that they:   
‘had regular Health stock takes…Health was a big thing for the Prime Minister and he 
wanted to know what was going on, so at least 2 or 3 times [the Secretary of State] 
and I went to No. 10 to brief the PM on the progress with these negotiations and 
where things were going…yes for sure he wanted this deal, he wanted it and we 
wanted to be able to say we had reached agreement with the BMA … it was an 
important political process to get right.’ 
 
The concept of partnership was central to Labour’s NHS Plan, and this is consistent with the 
belief expressed by Stevens that ‘health professionals want to, and generally will ’do the 
right thing’ if properly funded and accorded freedom from external interference’2 p.38. 
However, relationships between the BMA and the government had deteriorated in the first 
term. The Prime Minister recalled that ‘in 1998 the BMA attacked us for the first time’ 125 
p.215. The BMA’s aggressive campaign and ballot for strike action against the government 
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during the 2001 election provoked the decision to distance Ministers from the negotiations 
for a new contract.   
John Chisholm recalls ‘There was I think considerable anger about the tactic and the timing 
of that ballot. I certainly remember on election night…about 11pm, about an hour after the 
polls had closed…hearing David Blunkett talking about the election campaign and railing 
against the BMA’s interference.’ Despite this provocation, this did not undermine the 
government’s desire for a consensual approach to the negotiation of this contract. The 
Junior Minister describes how:  
‘The previous government tried and failed and then imposed an agreement on the 
BMA. I can quite understand why…[ they] might have done that…I was very reluctant 
to get to that point. I wanted consensus, I wanted agreement that would stand the 
test of time. An imposed agreement never is going to last the test of time, not in our 
kind of society where people are in trade unions, there are negotiation processes, 
they want to be treated properly and respectfully and this is a very well developed 
vested interest group, the BMA, a very powerful group, so imposed agreement can 
never survive.’ 
 
One of the participants describes the flawed logic of imposed settlements: ‘You could do 
lots of dreadful things…like in the 1990 contract and you could…change the contract 
without agreement but it ultimately didn’t work. People would vote with their feet and 
those drivers eventually forced [government] to come back and negotiate.’ However, the 
relationship between the BMA and the people heading up primary care in the Department 
of Health in England, who would usually lead such negotiations, was at the time ‘completely 
broken down’ according to Dr Snell. In his view the ‘relationships between the BMA and the 
Department of Health are always up and down and it’s about who shouts loudest and who 
can carry the media.’ 
Many participants agreed that there were problems in the working relationship between 
the Department of Health and the BMA. Partly this was due to the legacy of previous 
negotiations. The BMA’s history of opposition to governments was feared and their 
campaign against Kenneth Clarke when he was Secretary of State in 1990, which was seen 
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as deeply damaging to the Conservative administration, was seen as a salutary lesson by the 
new Ministers. One participant believed that ‘If you have got the general practitioners 
against you it was seen as a very difficult place to be.’   
From the BMA’s point of view, officials simply had not listened to evidence that there were 
serious problems of poor morale in general practice. There had been growing frustration 
arising from their attempts to present this agenda to the English Department of Health. John 
Chisholm says: 
‘There was a sense that the Department was not really wanting to engage with or 
acknowledge its understanding of the analysis of the BMA. There was a sense for 
quite a protracted period nothing very much was happening in negotiations. This 
was between the implementation of [Primary Care Groups] where there had been 
quite a lot of constructive engagement and really the start of the new contract 
negotiations.’ 
 
This led to the commissioning of the BMA’s National Survey of GP Opinion which showed 82 
per cent were experiencing excessive work-related stress. 
The BMA did not completely trust senior officials in the Department to develop positive 
relationships with them. Neither did civil servants believe that Ministers entirely trusted 
them to deliver this new policy. Mike Farrar was seen as one of the few officials who had 
the trust of and credibility with Ministers. However, a participant close to Ministers 
confirmed that the decision to contract out the negotiation to the Confederation was less 
motivated by a lack of faith in the Department than to achieve a bargaining advantage by 
placing the negotiations at arm’s length from the government, thereby defusing the 
potential for conflict between Ministers and the BMA.   
The decision to outsource the negotiations, though successful in its aim to achieve a 
consensus-based result, later placed the government at some risk. The negotiating team, 
though pressed to deliver results quickly, had been given minimal infrastructure and 
financial analysis resources. The BMA team by contrast was very well-supported.  
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Influence of antecedent policies  
 
The NHS Plan set out the broad framework and objectives for the contract negotiations. The 
Junior Minister was then trusted to get on with the process by his Secretary of State for 
Health. A participant observed the relationship between the Ministers as involving the 
Secretary setting out the vision of what he wanted and leaving it to the Junior Minister to 
get it done. The first thing to do, according to Mike Farrar, was ‘getting the mandate 
of...Ministers who said very high level things like moving from rewarding inputs to 
rewarding quality [and] to pay for outcomes rather than paying for time; a more simple 
structure (the old Red Book was hugely complex), less bureaucracy and build the issues 
around recruitment.’ 
The Secretary of State, who, with his and subsequently the Prime Minister’s health adviser, 
Simon Stevens, is credited with writing the NHS Plan 126 p.71, was a strong virtual presence 
during the negotiations. He is referred to frequently in the interviews with participants and 
is generally portrayed as having a high degree of expectation for the negotiations and 
uncompromising views about what he would find acceptable. However, he was removed 
from the process of face-to-face negotiation. He met only occasionally with the Junior 
Minister and the Prime Minister on the issues during the period of negotiation.    
The Junior Minister by contrast had a more visible presence in the process. He established 
clarity about the negotiating strategy for the team, described as ‘what was wanted, the top 
and bottom lines.’ This was achieved at an early point through his request for a session with 
the Chair, Departmental officials and academics from the National Primary Care Research 
and Development Centre in Manchester. This was a key moment in the design process 
according to one participant. ‘It established the framework, key issues, 
absolutes/desirables/not bothereds.’ It fully engaged the Junior Minister. He was given a 
huge pile of pre-reading by departmental officials who had themselves done much 
preparatory work for the negotiations. He chaired the meeting but the presentation of the 
subject matter and management of the debates over issues and strategies was reportedly 
driven by members of the government negotiating team. 
106 
 
For the negotiators, it was important that they understood exactly what the Junior Minister 
expected of the negotiations. Mike Farrar reports that he said to the Minister ‘early on that 
if anyone puts a cigarette paper between you and me we are in real trouble. You need to 
have absolute confidence in me. In the negotiations I would say ‘This is saleable to the 
Minister’ (or ‘not saleable’) and that was in my mind absolutely the case.’ The away day 
consolidated an important partnership between the Chair of the team and a Departmental 
official. Between them the key ideas and themes which would form the basis of a new 
contract were identified and driven through. As a result Mike Farrar had  
‘a clear understanding of what I wanted to do. It was a couple of days where we sat 
down and thought hard – a process of osmosis more than design – …shared ideas 
and thought hard about some of the aspects we had got experience of…I still go by 
the philosophy that somebody somewhere would have a solution. Our starting point 
was what was going on in the NHS which had impressed…[that we could] build into 
this contract…in terms of the ideas and the real form for that, myself and one of the 
civil servants were probably the two most significant people in terms of the design.’ 
 
Several models of quality frameworks were considered. For instance, the Scottish 
Department of Health and BMA representatives suggested that the initiatives in Scotland 
(the Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline Network, practice accreditation and SPICE, the 
Scottish version of NICE) be presented to the team. This resulted in an invitation in 2002 to 
an academic expert who had during the years of the introduction of those initiatives been 
Chair of the Royal College of General Practice in Scotland, to attend a meeting to do so. This 
proved to be a critical turning point in the process and this person was then invited to head 
a team of academic advisers and to himself act as independent chair or Interlocutor of the 
design process within the Quality Sub Group. Along with a small team of academics he 
assisted the Quality Sub Group to agree on the interim framework of indicators for 
ratification by the membership of the BMA in 2003.    
Another model of a quality framework was also considered by the Sub Group. PRICCE was a 
voluntary quality improvement scheme implemented in East Kent in England to improve 
chronic disease management in April 1998. People involved in PRICCE later became key to 
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the development of the QOF. PRICCE offered £3000 in advance to each enrolled general 
practitioner who could meet the entire set of targets for the clinical care of 13 chronic 
conditions as demonstrated by post payment audit verification. The money could be used 
for any purpose. The targets were based on standards developed from published clinical 
evidence of effectiveness and chosen by a local steering group including members of the 
Local Medical Committee and the East Kent Medical Audit Advisory Group. A lower set of 
standards was available for practices in deprived areas.  
Practices had to enrol all their general practitioners and also had to upgrade information 
systems and show participation in audit. In a phased series of uptakes from 1998 nearly 60% 
of general practitioners were enrolled within two years. No data on pre-project levels of 
care were collected but the qualitative evaluation collected a rich body of information about 
the mechanics, strengths and weaknesses of the scheme. The evaluation of PRICCE reports: 
‘the main motivation for doctors to take part…was to improve patient care. Many 
practices invested significantly more than the resources they were given. Key 
motivators for this were the alignment … with the doctors’ own professional values 
and the autonomy given to health professionals in how they achieved the targets … 
despite the considerable increase in workload required, involvement in PRICCE was 
associated with increased morale among primary care staff’ 101 p.3.  
 
Principle-based negotiation 
 
When negotiations started with the BMA in the autumn of 2001, the benefits of careful 
preparation were clear. ‘The whole negotiations took nearly three years…but nonetheless 
the broad outlines of the contract were agreed within about six months in terms of moving 
towards a practice-based contract allocating resources on the basis of population need and 
incentivizing quality. Those features of the contract which were absolutely fundamental 
were agreed quite rapidly,’ reports John Chisholm.  
The Confederation team had been through the same type of negotiation training which had 
for many years been the standard curriculum within the BMA, being principle-based 
negotiation. This training had been utilized by Confederation managers in the past and for 
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the BMA it was routine (for some it was the fourth training since first becoming a 
negotiator), however, for most of the Departmental representatives it was their first 
experience of these techniques and indeed their first experience of such negotiations. 
Participants from both sides attest to the difference this training made to the conduct of the 
negotiations. Mike Farrar says: 
‘It was huge…previously with the BMA when neither side were properly trained…it 
was dreadful – there was banging of tables…they did not quite walk out but nearly. 
Training meant we took a break and parties regrouped. This was a simple technique 
but avoided much grandstanding. The great value was we went through the same 
training programme so used the common language, common techniques. It really 
was a big boost for us.’ 
 
John Chisholm describes principle-based negotiation as follows: ‘Positional bargaining is not 
quite forbidden but it is not the approach you should use…identifying your objectives, the 
other side’s objectives in relation to that particular issue, trying to understand their 
position, trying to decide how far you are prepared to move…in general you are supposed to 
come at a negotiating issue in an honest way.’ 
A government participant says: ‘We were trying to strengthen our hand, the way in which 
we approach the design of the thing was thinking strategically…how we could look at the 
overarching goals that united us then work through the framework as constructive and 
consultative as possible.’ 
A participant describes it thus: 
‘It was very different from anything I had done before. It was quite formal. There 
was calling of time out, which I had not seen before. Sometimes this was quite 
helpful. I couldn’t always work out what was going on and it allowed us to discuss 
how to facilitate getting an outcome.’  
 
One of the participants comments that the five Confederation team members, all either 
Primary Care Trust or Health Authority senior staff, were ‘people who knew how to trade, to 
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negotiate; they didn’t pick these people out of thin air, but because they had the skills which 
you needed. Nobody could say they sent in some soft hearted pussy cat to negotiate with 
the BMA.’ In the debates in the media after the completion of the negotiations there was 
much criticism of the weakness of the Confederation team, but participants denied that the 
BMA were ‘genius negotiators dealing with children. No-one who met [some members of 
the Confederation team] could possibly have come to that conclusion’ according to this 
participant. In fact, Mike Farrar was seen as having exceptional negotiation skills: the 
participant further comments ‘If you look at good negotiators versus bad…[he] had most of 
those features in the quantities you expect: probing skills, revisiting skills, number of ideas 
per cubic metre, different ways of getting to yes, trade and bargain versus war and attack, 
use of humour…negotiation is not about victor and vanquished, it is about trading and 
coming to a wise agreement.’ 
There were a number of different levels within the negotiating structure for the contract 
which involved some people and not others. The Plenary group included some members of 
both the BMA and Confederation teams and the four Departmental representatives. Most 
of the work went on in sub-groups. The Plenary group received proposals from smaller 
working sub-groups, which often included supporting advisers, which were able to focus on 
the detail of particular issues such as workload and quality. One of these sub-groups was the 
Quality Sub Group. This held the primary responsibility for negotiating the clinical and 
quality framework with the two BMA leads on this element. As Mike Farrar describes it:  
‘Once we had decided we wanted a QOF framework and…put some principles 
around that, Dr Snell really ran off with the expert group and delivered the detail… 
they took it away and during the process of negotiation worked up the detail and 
came back to the main primary group for final agreement and sign off.’ 
 
Activities from all sub groups were referred to the six weekly Plenary meetings of the full 
negotiating teams of the Confederation and the BMA, again with all four Departmental 
observers present. These Plenary meetings made the final decisions for referral to Ministers. 
There were fortnightly meetings between a Departmental representative, the Minister and 
the Confederation team leader. 
110 
 
Participants from all sides of the process acknowledged Mike Farrar’s role in facilitating this 
complex set of negotiations in an almost uniformly positive way. He describes some of these 
strategies: 
‘We worked hard and put effort into the social bit...we tried to get people together 
in the evenings. You can often get agreement in that context which you cannot do 
around a negotiating table. [Leaders on each side] spoke when...needed...and had a 
conversation [about] the level of investment right at the beginning – I had high trust 
at the outset about that...We got on incredibly well...we had the same negotiating 
skills and currency. We are both reasonable people. [BMA negotiators] did not have 
the same level of trust from [their] mandate givers...To help them with that I went to 
their meeting of representatives of Local Medical Committees  and was there for 
three hours...answering any questions they had for me on one occasion.’   
Implementation 
 
The Framework could not be implemented without the design of a major new information-
gathering software application suitable for installation in every general practice which came 
to be known as the Quality Management Advisory System (‘QMAS‘). Having designed an 
indicator, a participant describes how ‘then we had to go on and work out how you would 
verify it. There was a whole raft of decisions and negotiations over the IT‘ as the participant 
recalls. 
‘You started with the criteria but then you moved on to what are the standards going 
to be and then what are the exclusion criteria going to be and how are you going to 
measure it and assess it and have somebody go out and have a look at it. What 
about the IT…how were you going to deal with confidentiality…there were people 
suggesting that the patient names should be open to the NHS and the NHS should 
come in and decide whether the criterion and standards had been met [in a 
practice]. It was out of that discussion that we had on the one side the practice-
based system where you can look at the names and we can search to find which 
patients, and you have QMAS which can’t.’ 
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The data had to be extractable from the databases within general practice. This presented 
significant practical problems. There were many different suppliers of computer systems for 
general practice and a small number of practices not computerised. Departmental officials 
worked with the Connecting for Health IT team over 26 weeks to design a platform to 
extract the data. There was also the need to ensure that general practices could continue to 
retain ownership of their information technology but to use software compatible with the 
new system. Mike Farrar recalls ‘These were potential show stoppers but in each case the 
BMA was persuaded to allow them to proceed because otherwise they would have lost the 
whole deal’ and ‘we just crashed through that.’ In the event a ‘high-trust’ system for 
monitoring and reporting achievements against targets was introduced, along with a 
provision for independent audit, so that general practices could be funded for their 
achievements against the QOF.    
By February 2003 Mike Farrar was able to write to the BMA Chair summarizing the details of 
the new contract and attaching the 68-page document ‘Investing in General Practice – The 
New General Medical Services Contract’ for his members to consider and vote on. A 
negotiator recalls ‘at the end [the BMA] took it to [the membership] and there was a much 
more vigorous ‘no’ campaign [than during earlier membership ballots on the interim 
framework] but even then 70 percent supported it.’ It was accepted in June 2003.  
Practices were given a year to prepare for the new Framework. Participation in the 
Framework was voluntary. In England 99 percent of practices signed up immediately and 
within a year they were demonstrating an average achievement of 91.3 percent of the 1050 
points available. 
This section has described the background and context for the design of the QOF, who was 
involved, what was done and how it was done in the policymaking process, and 
implementation processes. The next section considers barriers and enablers of the 
policymaking process as they affected key goals of the process and as they were seen by 
participants and in evaluations and reviews of the scheme.    
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Barriers and enablers of the policymaking process 
 
In this section the major barriers and enablers of the policymaking process are set out as 
described by participants. These were identified from interviews and documentary analysis 
and affected key goals which can be grouped under four main headings: 
 Redistribution of general practice resources 
 Balancing funder interests and clinical autonomy 
 Shaping patterns of interaction between the state and interest groups  
 Solving technical challenges (including choice of indicators, obtaining access to 
practice data and testing the model) 
 
Redistribution of general practice resources 
 
The pay-for-performance programme was one part of a wider strategy, set out in the NHS 
Plan, to achieve reductions in health outcome inequalities by increasing access to general 
practice services and incentivising best practice preventive health care. Achieving leverage 
for the overarching NHS Plan through the contract was a strong drive for Ministers and their 
advisers, who sought ‘a power shift to primary care’ according to one participant. Another 
participant says the focus was on deprived areas: he comments that Ministers ‘had the 
progressive passions that the poor were getting a very bad service – well that Britain was 
getting a poor service of which the poor were getting a disproportionately bad service...the 
drives, the passions for inequalities were...strong.’ A participant explains that ‘the small 
business model [of general practice] had still left large parts of the country that were often 
with high needs and a lower numbers of GPs per weighted head of population and poor 
outcomes...[so the opportunity] to use what would otherwise have been a blanket general 
practice income in an incentive structure to lever improvement was a strong pro-equity part 
of the motivation.’ 
To address these issues required not only the design of the pay-for-performance scheme 
but also improving the distribution of general practice funding and services according to 
health needs. In practice, these two goals sometimes affected one another adversely. In 
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England all NHS patients were registered ‘on the list’ of a general practice. An element of 
the contract, namely to replace a multitude of payments designated in the Red Book (the 
policy guide for payments under the existing General Medical Services contract) into a single 
and simpler global sum per practice was intended to support a more redistributive 
allocation of funding and to facilitate, as described by John Chisholm, ‘considerable 
experiments in skill mix and the balance of the practice team between doctors, nurses, 
nurse practitioners, therapists, pharmacists and so on.’ 
Mike Farrar recalls developing: 
‘the idea…[to] wrap up all the things [being paid] in the allowances infrastructure 
into a single sum which was effectively a weighted capitation meant to recognize the 
people on the list and what kind of problems they had…[and] the global sum should 
fund the core business that everybody should deliver…and…this fantastic thing called 
QOF which effectively brought in about 30 per cent of their income as performance-
related.’  
 
In the process of the redesign of the new General Medical Services contract, the goal to 
redistribute funding was partially frustrated. The national formula for allocation of the 
global sum payments to practices was designed by an academic advisor, calculated 
according to practice list size and adjusted for the age and needs of the local population. It 
was applied to a global sum which had been reduced by 15 per cent by the Department of 
Health, without advising the negotiating teams, to provide for the payment dependent on 
achievement against the Framework. In addition the proposed allocations had been 
modelled on unrepresentative practice data and when presented to the membership of the 
BMA, in John Chisholm’s words, ‘there was an absolute bloody riot in the profession and in 
the General Practitioners Committee in response to that...and a series of demands for 
change in the detail of the contract.’ For many practices their guaranteed income (without 
payments for quality achievements) would actually go down. This led to the creation of a 
‘Minimum Practice Income Guarantee’ (this is also described in the section on Solving 
Technical Challenges). However, this is an indicator of the extent of the change which the 
new General Medical Services contract achieved.’ The fact that a large proportion of pay is 
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dependent on assessing quality and outcomes has incentivised a rapid change that wouldn’t 
have occurred if far less money had been dependent on the QOF,’ says John Chisholm 
The Junior Minister describes the moment when ‘we hit this roadblock...about the 
distribution which again was a big disappointment for us because we were trying to be a 
little bit redistributive about where the money for primary care was...we wanted more of it 
to go to the under-doctored areas and the Minimum Practice Income Guarantee (MPIG) 
basically stopped it because there were too many losers.’ The proposal to transfer money to 
under-doctored areas was stopped, in the view of the Junior Minister, when it was put to 
the membership, because ‘a process where people had to vote for this deal – they are not 
going to vote for it: turkeys and Christmas – so we had to scale it back.’  
It is on the public record that ‘part of the reason for overspending on the Framework is that 
the department reallocated funding initially assigned to fund the Framework to the global 
sum (the per capita amount per practice which was not conditional upon performance), in 
order to fund the Minimum Practice Income Guarantee. It therefore revised its predictions 
of achievement under the QOF. Following implementation, however, Framework 
achievements exceeded those revised estimates. The overspend in the first three years was 
9.4 percent more than provisioned’ (Comptroller and Auditor General 2008).  
Related to the equity issue were well documented workforce supply and distribution issues 
within general practice. A participant confirms that ‘the GPs were getting assertive about 
their request for a new contract...against a backdrop of vacancies or they could 
demonstrate that it was harder to attract new doctors to go to general practice.’ Another 
comments that ‘it was terrible being in general practice in 2002. It was awful, it was 
haemorrhaging people and at the time the government cared: [Ministers were] worried that 
this could all go terribly wrong and [they] could lose general practice…we had to put 
something in place that restored morale and recruitment and if we could do something 
about implementing chronic disease management to a higher level that would also be very 
good.’ John Chisholm describes the BMA survey which ‘was pretty forceful evidence of 
disaffection, of poor morale.’ A commentator confirms that ‘much more fundamental [than 
better quality] was how could we increase the number of GPs because for the previous 10-
15 years the number of GPs had hardly risen...and the government recognised that the GPs 
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‘did most of the work’ and we needed to have more general practice so the contract was 
about giving us more money to improve recruitment and retention.’   
A key element of contract bargaining occurred, therefore, over the right to withdraw from 
provision of out of hours service and the appropriate sum to be deducted from practice 
income if the practice opted out of provision of that service. There was criticism of the price 
agreed for general practitioners to give up the provision of after-hours services. The goal 
was to find a price which was affordable and would enable the PCTs in England (and Primary 
Care Organisations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) to purchase new replacement 
services. It was, however, a valuable bargaining chip for the state which was negotiated 
early on and which was too generously traded away according to Dr Snell: ‘Unfortunately 
the Secretary of State gave away on virtually day one the commitment to have to do after 
hours and didn’t ask for anything in return, which rather created problems for the 
negotiating team.’ For Mike Farrar ‘this was pretty positional bargaining, haggling. We 
needed to make it attractive enough for general practitioners to opt out of after-hours care 
but also realistic for PCTs to re-provide these services.’ The Junior Minister concludes that 
‘the loss of the Saturday surgeries [because of the after-hours settlement] was an error 
from our point of view.’ 
Notwithstanding this unforeseen consequence, politicians were determined to get 
improvements in organisational standards such as measuring patient satisfaction and access 
times for appointments through the contract. A participant reports ‘Ministers were trying to 
achieve not just a level of outcome but a culture change so the systems worked more for 
patients and less for clinicians.’ The focus on non-clinical indicators was a major area of 
discord and consequently a significant achievement for the Confederation team. They had 
the advantage that the Royal College of General Practitioners had already developed 
organisational standards and these formed the major part of the organisational standards in 
the Framework.    
The BMA had mixed views on this: John Chisholm acknowledges: 
‘something that [some of us]  were very keen on...sadly got quite diluted in later 
revisions to the QOF; [ to] make it quite routine that practices should ask their 
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patients what they thought of the services they were receiving I thought was a 
significant achievement.’   
Balancing funder interests and clinical autonomy  
 
The key funder interests which the new contract needed to reflect were public health goals, 
greater patient responsiveness and pay-for-performance approaches to quality 
improvement. The ‘public health agenda was a ‘must-have’ for Ministers...[a public health 
issue such as] obesity was a close-fought issue,’ according to one participant. Managing the 
risks of obesity was a cherished target for politicians but sceptically viewed by those 
charged with finding the evidence-based case for a general practice-based intervention. A 
participant describes the debates: ‘They kept coming up with them…clinical issues like a 
focus on obesity, cancer, osteoporosis.’ This debate included the academic team. The BMA 
considers that the obesity indicator was imposed on them by the Secretary of State. In their 
view, they and most of the participants were against inclusion, but they ‘could be as against 
it as they liked’, it was going to come in because the government was determined to have it. 
In the end one of the participants described the final indicator as ‘this stupid thing we did 
which was merely to save government’s face.’ This is not to say that they could not identify 
interventions on obesity which were worth doing or that obesity is not important. But they 
felt that they did not meet the criteria for the QOF which is where a medical intervention 
delivered in a primary care setting makes a difference. A similar compromise occurred to 
meet ministerial expectations that there would be a cancer indicator, according to this 
participant. On the other hand, they felt that osteoporosis was kept out because the 
government didn’t want to pay for it, whereas there was evidence to support an indicator 
being included in their view. 
A commentator agrees that work on the NHS Plan showed how ‘poor we were in clinical 
outcomes compared to other countries. And we were particularly poor in heart disease and 
cancer...the general issues of primary care not just general practice...the Department of 
Health’s work in these areas around general practice was almost obsessively contractual...’ 
Dr Snell confirms that ‘there was a need and a demand to drive up quality particularly 
around the lower end, the poorer end of general practice and the health inequalities 
bit.’Another participant confirms that ‘the Framework is great...it has helped push up in the 
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back half of the roughly normal distribution curve...got public health stuff in there up to a 
point (we are still quite light on the public health stuff)...the main focus was on some of the 
chronic disease areas...The real benefit from the QOF was the standardisation of the bottom 
half of the performance spectrum.’  
The focus on non-clinical issues was also a major priority. This includes the emphasis on the 
patient experience and improved access.’Putting patients more in the centre of the process 
is a huge impact,’ confirmed a participant. More generally there was a concern for people 
who would have difficulty getting to see their general practitioner or who would find that 
when they wanted to book an appointment they couldn’t do so at a time that fitted with the 
working day. Mike Farrar’s ‘vision was a better coordinated service if PCTs were responsible. 
We thought we could get 50 per cent of the previous draw on GP time after hours triaged 
out by call handling telephonic advice. We felt that we should be using PCTs for multi-
disciplinary after hours service...great as an idea, but I feel PCTs have failed to deliver and 
execute that vision...when they just rolled over contracts,’ he said.  
A commentator is clear about the conditionality of the agreement and use of ‘this 
opportunity to pivot to a ‘something for something’ deal.’ The concept of a conditional pay 
settlement was accepted by the BMA. For the Junior Minister, it was an intention for ‘more 
resources to be paid to GPs on the back of results rather than just per capita. The principal 
defect was we were shovelling lots of cash into primary care but none of it was conditional –
none of it depended on certain sorts of outcomes and that was just simply not a sustainable 
model...I was surprised that was conceded so quickly without any great fuss.’ For another 
there was consistent reiteration of the need for ‘something for something.’ 
This did, however, raise the issue of whether incentives would work too well according to 
another participant: ‘there is ample evidence of a very strong behavioural response by 
health professionals including primary care doctors to financial incentives...you have got to 
calibrate them incredibly carefully and the best forum for doing that is probably not a high 
profile political negotiation between the medical profession and government.’ 
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Shaping patterns of interaction between the state and interest groups  
 
Several new patterns of interaction can be seen to be introduced into this negotiation over 
general practice terms and conditions in this case study: the new governance role for 
intermediate organisations, the PCT, as holder of the contract; the explicit consideration of 
the expectations of patients and their needs for access to general practice services; and 
principle-based negotiation as a pattern of interaction which was intended to encourage a 
sharing of goals rather than a contest for victory.   
For the first time in the history of contract negotiations between the state and the BMA, this 
was ‘a contract for primary care services between a commissioner and an organisation, the 
PCT,’ with the intent to encourage ‘chronic disease management locally’ among other 
objectives, as well as a negotiation over terms and conditions of work for general 
practitioners. There was potential, through this new governance mechanism of PCTs, for 
‘the PCT provision side – the community hospitals, the community nurses, social care 
services’ to be part of the effort to improve health outcomes. Reflecting on whether this 
opportunity was taken up by the PCT, a participant speaking in 2010 believes that the PCTs 
have ‘failed to deliver on the GP side of it.’ Primary Care Trusts were able to utilise new 
forms of contracts such as Alternative Providers of Medical Services (APMS) and Specialist 
Providers of Medical Services (SPMS) to attract new providers of services and encourage 
choice, competition and contestability within general practice services.   
Another new challenge was how to deal with the different interests of the BMA and 
patients. This presented a challenge for Labour: the Junior Minister says ‘you form a 
government and take responsibility for public services – when you think about the NHS we 
have this horrible habit of thinking just about the unions...you always have to think about 
the patients, the consumer. That’s the discipline, it’s a tough one – the Tories found it easier 
than [Labour] for the first few years.’  
The extent of the change agenda which re-designed relationships between the state and 
interests groups in the three years prior to the contract negotiation was emphasised by 
Mike Farrar: ‘We had major change, we created Primary Care Groups, PCTs, introduced 
Personal Medical Services as a concept, had a big change agenda.’ This was the next step, to 
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‘move from rewarding inputs to rewarding quality, to pay for outcomes rather than paying 
for time, less bureaucracy and to build the issues of recruitment.’ Another participant 
believes that ‘the QOF achieved real systemic change not seen since the 90s. Putting 
patients back into the centre of the process is a huge impact.’ For another it was seen as a 
broader agenda of which this is merely a sub-part [to] ‘rip it up and start again.’  
The changes which made the contract practice-based, with incentives for quality of care and 
patient-responsiveness, were accepted by all parties: government, civil service and the 
profession. John Chisholm believes that they recognised that ‘actually GPs do respond to 
incentives’, and another thought that there was evidence about the 1990 contract and its 
targets for immunisation and cervical cytology which showed that general practitioners 
delivered the targets rapidly. Some BMA members were excited about the practice-based 
nature of the new contract. John Chisholm said: ‘The great move is...the practice is given 
global allocation of resources which is to some extent linked to patient need...they are 
judged on the quality and outcomes of care...it was a very big cultural change that not all of 
general practice has yet adjusted to...fundamentally it is about improving public health and 
services to patients.’   
The negotiation of the contract generally and the QOF in particular had a flavour of 
consensus and partnership. The Junior Minister ‘wanted consensus...wanted agreement 
that would stand the test of time...imposed agreement can never survive’ and believed ‘it 
was an important political process to get right.’ However, tactics were used to strengthen 
negotiating positions. For another participant part of the strategy was to put some apparent 
distance between the Minister and the BMA, or ‘a bit of daylight between [the BMA] and 
the ultimate decision-makers, the politicians’ which would reduce the political traction held 
by the BMA. Ministers were looking for an equivalent of the BMA negotiators’ position, 
where, when faced with a hard bargain, they could invoke the democratic process of 
ratification of their actions by special conferences of their membership (‘who constantly 
discipline them against making strategic trade-offs or ‘going soft’), and thereby to withhold 
agreement. This participant believed they ‘were working to find some equivalent...to be 
able to credibly claim that [the] negotiating mandate was constrained’  
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There were six meetings over six months in which the Quality Sub Group met formally but 
one says: 
‘the rest of the time you were negotiating with the Departments of Health about 
what you were going to put in…you are primed, it is stylized. You are negotiating on 
behalf of the Department but you are saying what you have already negotiated that 
you CAN say…you would have a primary strategy dictated outside…but the 
negotiation on the day was a real one. You had to find ways out and you had to duck 
and weave in order to agree…[and] maybe phone someone who wasn’t in the room 
to see if you could continue.’  
Participants report a clear sense of the competing interests of the BMA on the one hand to 
minimize the challenge of the new targets and of the politicians, through their 
Departmental officials, on the other hand to extend the targets to stretch general practice 
to improved levels of clinical quality. John Chisholm describes the process of negotiation: ‘In 
terms of the level of challenge, on many indicators the GPC would have been wanting a 
lower range and the NHS Confederation and the Department of Health would have been 
wanting a higher range. I don’t expect that occurred in relation to every indicator but that 
would have been the pattern. So to an extent you did find that there was a bit of positional 
bargaining however in general one was trying to avoid that. In general, people were starting 
off in different places and through negotiation and compromise they moved towards each 
other.’ 
Mike Farrar says ‘The BMA knew our intention over time was to make it stretchy and we 
knew they would make this hard.’ An official concurs, describing BMA representatives as 
saying ‘You can have that much quality or that much quality – have you got that much 
money or that much money?’ One example of this was heart failure. PRICCE was already 
using standards around heart failure management that were the latest evidence based 
ones, however, the BMA refused to support their inclusion in the Framework initially 
claiming that they were too progressive and too new. The standards have since been added 
to the QOF but this took over three years to achieve. 
Another says:  
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‘They [the BMA] had some degree of acting as a union but they weren’t totally doing 
that, they were also interested in patient care and quality and doing what they could 
get away with and if it was going to be really hard it was going to be costly for 
someone which was fair enough. I don’t think any one group felt they had won. It 
was a good negotiation from that point of view.’  
 
The Confederation team were seen by participants as being very keen to do a deal and ‘the 
Department of Health core civil service team and the political and Ministerial supervision 
constantly had to stiffen the resolve of the NHS employer negotiators.’ The Confederation 
team, however, had credibility with the BMA and inspired their trust. Another participant 
saw it as ‘an approach which says ‘how can we create the right framework to achieve what 
needs to be done?’ Putting in the Confederation was a strong signal from [Ministers] that 
they wanted this to work. They recognised the power and authority of GPs as the gateway 
to service so recognised they needed to have a level of compromise.’ It was an advantage to 
create a greater sense of employer ownership of the negotiations as the Primary Care Trusts 
would be the holders of the contracts for primary care services. They also saw it as a chance 
to divorce this administration from the actions of previous ones and, as another participant 
saw it, ‘deliver peace with general practice.’  
Trust in the Confederation negotiators, based on their personal track record of achieving 
policy change and personal friendships, meant that the brief from Ministers was general 
rather than specific. One participant said ‘there was quite a detailed specification drawn up 
at the time of things [the Department of Health] would like to see in the contract but in the 
end Ministers said no, they knew [the Chair], they trusted him...it was a bit like having the 
Department do it but not do it.’ They believed that the Department’s role was to provide 
analytical support and ensure that political bottom lines were not traded away where they 
could. ‘We overspent, and we are in the position where it probably hasn’t been terribly 
flexible around change and it is not quite as well integrated with some of the other stuff 
going on as we would like to have but overall the evaluation work has been incredibly 
positive.’   
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BMA negotiators saw it as ‘a watershed in the way the government does business with the 
BMA.’ Dr Snell notes that that ‘there was a huge amount of distrust between the BMA, the 
union and the government negotiators which is why externals were brought in...who didn’t 
carry the baggage that the department had.’ He thought that ‘They...ran a very thorough 
and strict selection process for other members of the team...particularly around negotiating 
skills and experience...[negotiation trainers were] involved in the selection...did the 
selection and then did the training.’ John Chisholm thought they also ‘had very similar 
assessment of the problems and solutions...because of their experience of being front line 
participants in the health service. And the insights of [the Confederation members] were 
enormously useful in the negotiations...a testament to the negotiation teams being on the 
same page in respect of many of the issues that needed to be addressed.’ Another said it 
was a different environment from 1990 – ‘it was much calmer and partly that was the 
[government’s] approach to engaging people before they did anything radical. They would 
propose reform then engage people in how you would do all the detail.’  
The negotiation of the indicators in the Quality Sub Group had a flavour of shared purpose 
for all the parties. It should be noted that participants reported that this was not the flavour 
of the contemporaneous negotiations between the Department of Health and Consultants 
which sometimes occurred in adjacent rooms during the same period. These were 
reportedly stormy with much more adversarial behaviour sometimes observed.  
Both parties incurred subsequent criticism for deals done in the negotiation. The BMA and 
its members were criticised in the media for a significant pay increase for less work. The 
Junior Minister thought that ‘the sympathy the BMA took into the negotiations is no longer 
there...the pressure is...on the BMA and general practitioners to earn the public’s trust 
again in the sense that they are worth the money.’   
Public opinion was mobilised by both parties. When the BMA threatened to strike in the 
middle of an election campaign this heated up the atmosphere for the negotiations. 
However, the use of the press was a double-edged sword, exposing the provisions of the 
contract to public view. As another participant  comments ‘When I look back to the past and 
then look at how the GPs are now perceived I see that there is a high profile in the media 
and the question ‘Why aren’t they open when I need them?’ can now be asked.’ The Junior 
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Minister believes that ‘The BMA will never again be able to parade the argument that GPs 
are fundamentally underpaid...there is no time of day for that argument now.’ Another 
reports that ‘The Daily Mail has put the overpayment of doctors in the public domain and 
haven’t said it was reversed’ [by subsequent QOF negotiations in later years].  
Structures and institutions also added pressure. According to one participant ‘The General 
Practitioners Committee was worried that if agreement couldn’t be reached government 
would impose or default to the Personal Medical Services contract which was locally agreed 
and this added pressure because if the Personal Medical Services contract was used the 
General Practitioners Committee would lose its mandate as a nationally representative 
body.’ This is echoed by another participant: [the BMA] ‘were quite strongly motivated to 
get an attractive new contract structure that was different from the Personal Medical 
Services contract in order to retain their negotiating influence which would have otherwise 
dissipated quite rapidly. So that was one of the other tools the government had in its 
negotiating armoury.’ Another suggests that ‘a lot of this was driven by the BMA scared 
about the incursions of local contracting.’  
The scheme had been thoroughly discussed within the general practice membership of the 
BMA. One participant says that ‘We did two sets of road-shows...they were very cynical and 
quite angry but in the end we had a vote and the vast majority thought it was OK. There was 
a very strong no campaign but in the end their votes were not much – they were voting on 
the interim some way through the negotiations to touch base to see how it would go...’   
Solving the technical challenges  
 
Choice of indicators 
 
The use of incentives, according to one participant, ‘gave no cause for doubt or political 
concern...because actually GPs were already subject to a series of incentives...since the 
1990 contract the question was are the incentives aligned right and are we getting bangs for 
the buck...in primary care the focus was very much on chronic disease management.’ The 
scope and speed with which the QOF was designed owes much to the legacy of the 1990 
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contract and the first term of the Labour government which developed national service 
frameworks for many of the clinical domains incentivised in the QOF.  
The early days of the Quality Sub Group were fraught with tension and conflict as 
participants began to debate the way in which a set of indicators might be chosen and 
targets set for achievement in the new contract. However, once its membership had been 
expanded to include the academic team of expert advisers and the BMA Chair, there was 
surprisingly little discord between the Confederation and BMA representatives in the 
Quality Sub Group over the selection of the set of 146 indictors from the literally hundreds 
collected for consideration by the academic team.  
A participant explains: 
‘[The academic team was] asked to become [involved so that it was possible for] 
both arguments to be put...to synthesise and provide the evidence. So, for example, 
someone would say ‘we really need something on mental health’ so the team would 
take advice, come back with a paper and put forward a view. Either side might use 
this for their benefit or talk it up…the BMA wanted as little for as much money as 
possible and the Confederation were driven by departmental rhetoric (especially the 
English Department).’ 
One participant says  that the experience was arduous: ‘You’d get a large volume table 
when the experts had been through all the schemes they could find and we went through 
them to find which ones were relevant…It was populated with formative assessments 
because that was all that was available…the only summative assessment was PRICCE.’ As to 
the atmosphere, this participant says: ‘When I was involved in the negotiation it felt like a 
practice meeting…we thought the patients were going to benefit…we were negotiating this 
in order to achieve patient benefit. Of all the team that was genuinely what we were trying 
to do.’ Another agrees these were ‘discussions rather than negotiations. The government 
people were very well informed. It was between peers…[ with] very much a shared 
purpose.’ 
One recalls that working with the Confederation members, ‘you had to have read a lot and 
remembered a huge amount of data and be able to argue the toss about whether this 
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course of action or that course of action was a high quality intervention and that is 
something they could do very well.’ 
The Junior Minister is clear that the BMA ‘got the QOF to focus on things that they were by 
and large already doing.’ Another points to the ‘steady move from the 1990s onwards to 
seek to draw back the veil on the variation that exists in quality and performance in the 
delivery of care...the independent health inspectorate, the move to more clearly delineated 
clinical guidelines through NICE, the move towards disease-specific standards or 
frameworks...and the fact that GPs were already subject to a series of incentives.’ These 
developments were supported by ‘a whole series of different policy papers and proposals 
over a course of a number of years’ identified by another participant. Indeed, ‘to start 
producing new criteria and standards was virtually impossible...we went with what we had 
rather than producing new’, says another participant. Officials in the Department of Health, 
according to one participant, knew of ‘clearly well defined pay-for-performance schemes in 
England in the NHS which had clearly worked. People were terribly mindful of the 1990 
contract and the development of the Vaccs and Imms [Vaccination and Immunisation] 
higher and lower target payments and how GPs behaved like an economists dream.’ 
Another participant agrees that ‘everything was there – that was how a big scheme was 
done so quickly.’ 
This meant that the team could ask: ‘What is going on in the NHS which had impressed us 
and we could build into this contract. We did this search of the territory and things like 
PRICCE looked like a really strong bet’ according to Mike Farrar. There were several models 
for the team to draw on including a scheme in Nottingham and examples of schemes in 
Personal Medical Services contracts. This led to the recruitment of members of the team 
with strong allegiances to these existing models. Mike Farrar says: ‘I knew of Dr Snell’s work: 
it was a factor in selecting him’ and according to John Chisholm he was ‘the person who 
brought the intellectual energy to that, in effect determined the shape of the QOF.’  
The experience of fund-holding was visible in the evidence. Members of the Confederation 
team in the Quality Sub Group had met and shared their experiences of fund-holding in 
study groups in the past and this had sparked an interest in how to design a framework 
which would deliver the necessary quality to underpin such schemes. There was a 
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developing acceptance by general practitioners, according to John Chisholm ‘that some sort 
of quality assurance of their continued competence to practice was the right thing to do.’ 
Scotland similarly had well developed clinical standards for practices, with professionally-led 
guidelines development and practice accreditation, initiating data frameworks for recording 
chronic conditions, says one participant. A commentator confirms that ‘It wasn’t suddenly 
something that was plucked out of the air and thrown into a culture that hadn’t changed for 
years. Fund-holding made a lot of us GPs much more aware of our responsibility to patients 
who are not in front of us.’ This in turn had an impact on the BMA, says this participant. ‘The 
BMA were against [fund-holding] and the first wave of fund-holders were delivering 
government policy against BMA advice. They accepted it when the power equation changed 
...the BMA...might be representing a majority of the profession but doesn’t tap into the 
innovators...QOF was easy peasy because government and the BMA were aligned and that 
was a good thing.’   
Obtaining access to data  
 
Data issues were identified and needed to be resolved repeatedly throughout the process of 
design. Perhaps the most famous data problem, which was discovered on a day which came 
to be called ‘Black Wednesday’ by some participants, arose as a consequence of incomplete 
practice data used to develop the model for allocation of funding to practices. The problem 
was identified when ‘ready reckoner‘ tests were being done for practices. It is a participant’s 
analysis that: 
‘The original data was all produced from a computer database of people who were 
willing to have their data copied so it was skewed to south east practices. It was data 
which was wrong not the formula.’ 
Many practices under the formula faced a reduction in their core income. However, MPIG 
was quickly able to be designed within four days to provide protection from loss of income. 
Money was provisioned from the total available for the contract. This crisis attracted a high 
level of collaborative damage control from all the parties to the negotiation. John Chisholm 
recalls:  
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‘Within a week of “Black Wednesday” I went to Richmond House for breakfast with 
both [Ministers] at which effectively they were most helpful and indicated they 
wanted to do whatever it would take to secure implementation of the contract. They 
wanted it as much as [the BMA] did and…in the few weeks that followed that up 
until the ballot on the acceptability of the contract both teams  were very committed 
to securing that the contract could go forward.’ 
This was probably the worst moment in what the Junior Minister describes as ‘the inevitable 
bumpy ride…rough patches…unexpected downsides’ of the contract negotiation. He 
describes how ‘it all went belly up about…MPIG…and [the Secretary of State] rang and said 
what the…hell is going on.’  
Mike Farrar agrees: 
‘It put us on the back foot very much. You have situations where a practice has to get 
twice as many pounds per head but get an equal amount of QOF points. This was 
particularly a concern for me with its impact on redistribution and the opportunity 
for the practices in the poorer areas to be supported. However, on an international 
level the ratio of 2:1 funding for richest as against poorest practices is very good – it 
is usually 16:1 or some similar large number.’ 
The money for MPIG was withdrawn from that earmarked for quality payments but by that 
time the Framework and the price per point had been ratified by the membership of the 
BMA and could not be renegotiated. Mike Farrar confirms: 
 ‘The only way we could do that [present a feasible total cost of contract] was to 
moderate our expectation of achievement. So where we had anticipated 850 (of 
1050 available points being achieved on average per practice) we then said well ok 
we will [anticipate] 750 – that made the numbers stack up. If we had realized this 
earlier we would have had a much wiser negotiation…it caught [us] on the hop and 
the moral of the story was [we] did not have the finance team in [our] team…and we 
had come adrift.’ 
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In fact there were several different estimates of likely achievement ranging from 650 by one 
participant to 750 by the Confederation negotiators of QOF, to the confident expectation of 
some others of the BMA team that their members would do on average 950.  
For the Junior Minister, 
 ‘The biggest thing we got wrong was estimating the risk…we thought that about 70 
percent of practices would score the maximum QOF points and it turned out to be 
95 percent and that caused a significant amount of financial pressure in the NHS. It 
was not properly bottomed out…no-one really took hold of that assessment process 
and … rigorously tested it. I don’t think the Department did…If we had been told that 
I’m afraid it is more likely to be 95 percent of practices which will score the top 
marks I think we might well have thought well hang on this is wrong, this is too 
generous…Around the country you could see problems in many primary care 
practices and suddenly under the QOF they all look marvellous.’ 
Others suggest that they openly advised team members that the targets were highly 
achievable for well-run practices. But John Chisholm had a different view:  
‘I actually thought these [indicators] were tough and would take several years of 
development to achieve in terms of possibly employing extra nursing staff, training 
those staff changing the culture to be much more focused on process and outcomes 
and proactive call and recall. Now in the event…I was proved wrong.’   
The media seized on these commentaries as did Opposition politicians and even some 
politicians within Labour, criticising the failure to set a baseline performance measure of 
quality before implementing the QOF, so that the true extent of lift in quality could be 
assessed against the price paid for it. A participant comments that ‘we didn’t have the 
baseline because the GPs were going to get the money anyway so any improvement, 
howeve,r easy to achieve the target [was good] – it was navel gazing by the media to talk 
about the effectiveness of the detail...they want a negative story.’  
By contrast, obtaining access to practice-level data to ensure that achievements against 
targets in the QOF could be tracked and points earned was relatively straightforward.  
Mike Farrar describes this process: 
129 
 
‘I negotiated a deal where GPs could retain ownership of their IT but all software had 
to be compatible. No. 10 advised that they wanted GPs to control their IT. This 
meant some GPs could opt out of data collection. I thought this could be handled 
differently. These were potential show stoppers but in each case the BMA was 
persuaded to allow them to proceed because otherwise they would have lost the 
whole deal.’   
There were data infrastructure challenges for the PCTs in facilitating the complex technical 
requirements of the QOF. A participant suggests there was variation in the readiness of PCTs 
to know ‘what was required in terms of background, of education, of computers, 
policies...you can’t get everyone in on a summative target [such as a target for the 
percentage of your patients receiving a particular incentivised health action] unless you 
have a call and recall system so you have to put this in place.’  
Testing the model 
 
The literature suggests that pay-for-performance schemes should be trialled to avoid design 
flaws which might have unintended consequences. The Minister was never invited to 
consider trialling the contract before implementation and did not request this according to a 
participant. Mike Farrar comments: 
‘Because PRICCE was so relevant we could see how it was going to behave. We also 
built in a review process  so we set up a QOF review team and the principles were 
that this would be revisited every year…we knew we would have got something 
wrong…we have to be clever enough not to be stupid and lock ourselves in. So rather 
than go for piloting it we set in a process [for] an ongoing review.’ 
John Chisholm concurs for different reasons with the decision not to pilot. ‘Well there is a 
long history about piloting. One wants evidence-based practice right across the public 
sector…but on the other hand I identify with the frustration that Ministers and civil servants 
must sometimes feel and have certainly seen times in the past when the call for piloting is 
used as a delaying tactic…I think I am more in the camp of…action research rather than the 
pure research of piloting and rollout and so on.’ And of course ‘general practitioners wanted 
to see the income fruits of the new contract as soon as possible – so they worked hard! The 
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negotiations were more protracted than anticipated…There was enormous pressure from 
general practice about why haven’t we got it and we want it now! So the idea that we could 
then have said that’s it, and we are now going to pilot it in the Northern region for a couple 
of years – we would have been strung up. There was a need to push on and do it.’ 
There was also pressure on the Confederation negotiating team from the high expectations 
of Ministers and from the pressure of time. A participant admits that he ‘was one of the 
people pushing the negotiating team to go further, do more, try harder’ in an environment 
where the ‘GP magazine [was] whipping up GP grass roots opinion and their ability to recall 
their negotiators.’ This prevented piloting of the points for the QOF to obtain more accurate 
predictions of achievements. Dr Snell recalls being asked ‘at D-Day plus two hours what my 
feelings were about standards and achievability...I was put on the spot and I came up with a 
set of figures that turned out to be too low.’ As the level of funding (and therefore the value 
of the points) was not disclosed until after two rounds of BMA membership voting on the 
principle of the framework had been completed, it was too late to adjust the framework to 
reduce the risk of overpayment.  
However, an approach which sought to ensure against possible negative impacts of these 
technical difficulties or unintended consequences was the agreement that indicators could 
be reviewed and replaced or adjusted over the years. A participant explains:  
‘QOF has evolved as we thought it would. We never thought that QOF was going to 
be fixed in time but the public health agenda moves on and we will get more 
ambitious I hope as time moves on…It wasn’t going to solve everything over night 
but getting it entrenched as one of the key foundation stones of the new contract 
was a very important step forward…we would have probably like to have seen a 
more immediate change from the QOF than we actually saw so that was a 
disappointment but that was probably a price worth paying to get the principles 
established  in the first place.’  
Mike Farrar confirms: ‘Since the original QOF there have been a number of changes – kidney 
disease introduced after three years. That has been phenomenal in diagnosing about 3% of 
the population with kidney disease not previously diagnosed because general practitioners 
weren’t incentivised to go out and find it.’ 
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Dr Snell confirms ‘[The BMA] persuaded us to set a very low minimum [target for 
achievement] way below what was acceptable but on the understanding that once people 
had signed it could be increased very rapidly. We probably had a fair negotiation around 
upper levels.’ 
Subsequent changes to the QOF are seen by some participants as ‘rowing back all over the 
place…for doing a deal which has given us so much money’ and there is a fear that the QOF 
will become much harder and there will be attempts to introduce things which have nothing 
to do with general practice and primary care but everything to do with political agendas and 
aspirations. John Chisholm agrees that ‘The government was [in the years after 
implementation] trying to draw back from the generous settlement that it had got to.’ 
Others felt the QOF could have been even more flexible. One says:  
‘It didn’t really challenge much people in the top half and…that is what we 
wanted…we didn’t build in enough flexibility through this negotiation process which 
made it quite static which is a good BMA negotiating ploy…it is built on an annual 
review only up to a point…there have been changes but most people would say it 
has been pretty slow and not quite as responsive as we would like it to be.’  
The BMA achieved a form of insurance against negative impacts too. One element of the 
QOF which attracted criticism was the provision that general practitioners could ‘exception 
report’ or remove a patient from the denominator for a standard (if patients did not attend 
for review or if there was a contra-indication for the prescribing of a medicine) and that the 
upper standard for achievement of targets was 90 percent of patients. 
For the BMA, exception reporting was an important provision to win.  John Chisholm  
confirms that ‘Indeed one of [the BMA’s] lasting concerns was the lack of exception 
reporting in relation to target payments for immunisation and cervical cytology [in the 1990 
contract] because here informed dissent is not allowed…We lost that argument.’ However, 
there was evidence in the literature presented by the expert advisers that this provision 
could be gamed. General practitioners could seek to maximize their performance against 
targets by exempting patients inappropriately.   
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The Framework set the standard for maximum points for achievement of a target when an 
intervention was used with 90 percent of patients. This seemed to some commentators – 
and certainly to commentators in the popular and academic media afterwards – to further 
erode the rigour of the QOF. Mike Farrar says:  
‘One of my regrets is the doubling up effect of the exception reporting and the 
threshold provisions. We were probably over generous about allowing the 10% 
exception because this allowed practices to give up on the hardest patients. The 
model was based on PRICCE but in retrospect it would be easier to have said that 
there were a lower level of points for up to 90 percent and higher points for the last 
10 percent, thus encouraging practices to work really hard to get the gains for their 
resistant patients, but for the same all up costs.’  
In fact evaluations demonstrated that this risk of practices giving up on the hardest patients 
did not occur 131.  
The experience with the cervical cytology and childhood immunization targets in earlier 
incentivised contracts had taught general practitioners that this risk of patient refusal, no 
matter how convincing the arguments from the general practitioner, still existed. The battle 
about the upper level has already been described above but Dr Snell further believes that 
the Department of Health ‘acknowledged the 10 percent was the most difficult to get 
but…refused to allow extra payment for the most challenging 10 percent [as] it was not very 
cost effective.’ Another concurs: ‘When we negotiated it we got higher standards than the 
government eventually agreed. The government reduced them on the basis of cost.’     
 Some participants were acutely aware of the need to preserve bottom lines in the 
negotiation and this was not comfortable for them. A participant says ‘We ended up with 
targets that were less than 100 percent AND exception reporting and we were deeply 
concerned about how easy the whole thing was…could see the process of negotiating away 
from the bottom lines going on. Ministers at that time stepped in.’  
 
 
133 
 
 
Evaluations and reviews of the Scheme  
 
In the three years following the implementation of the new contract, Doran reports that 
having begun the decade in near crisis, by 2009 primary care in the United Kingdom excelled 
in information technology, access, chronic care management, performance review and 
patient satisfaction 132. The number of general practitioners rose by 15 percent and the 
vacancy rate fell from 3.1 percent to 0.8 percent though the distribution of general 
practitioners between affluent and more deprived areas became less equitable as the new 
general practitioners chose to practice in more affluent areas. Morale as measured by the 
BMA survey in 2008 showed improvements, though half continued to report low morale.   
In 2008 the National Audit Office published ‘NHS Pay Modernisation: New Contracts for 
General Practice Services in England.’ The study examined ‘the negotiation and 
implementation of the new General Medical Services contract and how well it was working 
in practice including the extent to which the new contracting regimes have achieved the 
benefits intended by the Department’ [of Health] 133. This was a comprehensive review 
which involved surveying 1800 general practitioners and 138 PCTs, interviews and focus 
groups, visits to surgeries and analysis of data. It summarises the achievements of the 
contract against a set of objectives for primary care services contained in the Business Case 
of the Department of Health, which it sets out in its report 133 pp.10-11.  
 
The Audit Office concludes that recruitment and retention and skill mix within general 
practice had improved though the contract had not increased productivity (i.e. the 
Department expected returns which had greater benefit than the amount of money put into 
the new contract). The Office found that it was too early to tell whether quality had 
improved but found increased flexibility of PCTs to increase the breadth of services for 
patients. While there had not been a significant increase in patient satisfaction, the Audit 
Office considered the contract had assisted in the development of an entrepreneurial 
culture, with PCTs able to contract services to competing private sector providers to meet 
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local needs. General practitioner satisfaction increased initially with the implementation of 
the contract but by 2008 had not been maintained.  
In a report for the National Institute for Health Research Delivery and Organisation 
programme published in 2010, McDonald et al find that the QOF achieved accelerated 
improvements in quality for two of three chronic conditions; however, once targets were 
reached the improvement in care of these patients slowed, and declined for some 
conditions not linked to incentives. However, the variation in care quality related to 
deprivation in general medical practice reduced over time. McDonald concludes that this 
suggests that QOF has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the reduction of 
inequalities in the delivery of care related to area deprivation 134. 
The Final Report of the National Institute for Health Research programme confirmed 
statistically significant associations between higher levels of achievement on QOF clinical 
indicators for coronary heart disease, hypertension, congestive heart failure, diabetes and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and reductions in rates of ambulatory care hospital 
admissions 135 p.121. In deprived areas, QOF achievement reflecting the performance of 
general practice was outweighed by wider social determinants of health, leading the 
evaluators to conclude that insufficient incentives for practices in deprived areas existed to 
identify and manage patients to prevent admission to hospital. The report hypothesised that 
exception reporting and targets below 100 percent, taken together, may have undermined 
the incentives for practices in these areas to actively search out such patients for follow up. 
It concluded that ‘it may prove challenging to shift the focus of general practice from 
providing medical services to taking responsibility for population health and reducing health 
inequalities’135 p.20. 
The QOF has been the subject of considerable analysis by researchers in England in addition 
to official evaluations of the scheme. A wide ranging review of the evaluations conducted 
since 2004 49draws out six lessons from the ten years of experience with the QOF. These 
include the lessons that pay-for-performance is not a ‘magic bullet’ but needs to be 
combined with other quality improvement initiatives, aligned with professional values, 
schemes need to recognise that much clinical practice cannot be measured, reflect the 
concern of physicians for their reputation, recognise the limitation of single condition 
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indicators particularly for elderly patients and refrain from attaching too much income to 
limited areas of practice.  One of the associated impacts has been the development of an 
extensive database of general practice activities which is now available to researchers 
interested in primary health care questions. One study of the impact of withdrawal of 
indicators in subsequent iterations of the QOF has found that levels of performance 
generally remained stable and concluded that health benefits from incentive schemes can 
potentially be increased by periodically replacing existing indicators with new ones relating 
to alternative aspects of care. However, the indicators removed remained directly or partly 
incentivised by other indicators in the QOF and this research is therefore subject to the 
caveat that full withdrawal of incentives may deliver different results 136.  
Regarding patient views about QOF, in a study of exception reporting of patients to 
investigate whether this had been informed dissent, it was found that  this was relatively 
infrequent, suggesting that the incentivised activities were broadly acceptable to patients 
137. A qualitative study of patients’ views of pay for performance who were on disease 
registers in English practices found few had heard of the QOF. Patients in this survey did not 
think pay-for-performance was an appropriate tool to promote quality of care but had not 
noticed any change in their treatment since the introduction of QOF. A minority noticed and 
expressed appreciation of the questions their general practices were now asking such as 
about smoking and weight, which were driven by evidence-based prompts in the electronic 
medical records of patients developed for the implementation of the QOF 138.   
Another study explored whether the QOF led to the neglect of activities not included in the 
scheme (based on a longitudinal analysis of 42 activities of which 19 were not included in 
the scheme). It found that by 2006-7, improvements for 14 incentivised activities were 
significant, reached a plateau quickly but remained higher than predicted by pre-incentive 
trends whereas the non-incentivised indicators achievement rates were significantly below 
those predicted by pre-incentive trends by 2006-7 139. 
In 2009 a new way of developing indicators for the QOF was introduced, involving piloting 
with a testing protocol. A study of the results of this protocol found that there was 
considerable value for money in pre-testing the implementation issues relating to 
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acceptability and unintended consequences as well as technical reliability and feasibility of 
indicators 140.   
This growing evaluative literature has enabled the scheme to be monitored and enhanced 
on an ongoing basis.  
Summary 
 
This Chapter has described the context and the process of policymaking which resulted in 
the implementation of the pay-for-performance programme known as the QOF in England 
in 2004. It has explored a set of the major barriers and enablers of the policymaking process 
and  concludes with a summary of reviews and evaluations of the pay-for-performance 
policy making process and its impacts. 
The next Chapter will apply Kingdon’s MS Framework to this case study and explore how 
well it describes or explains what happened.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
REVIEWING THEORY AND EVIDENCE: QUALITY AND OUTCOMES 
FRAMEWORK  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has described the process of pay-for-performance policymaking in a 
case study of the design and implementation of the QOF in England between 2001-2004. It 
has set out barriers and enablers for the policymaking process which can be identified in the 
data collected in interviews with participants and from documentary analysis. A summary of 
evaluations and assessments of the outcomes of the policymaking process was provided. 
This Chapter now applies Kingdon’s MS Framework to this case study, with particular regard 
to the research questions:   
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process? 
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from the analysis which 
might enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
Kingdon’s MS Framework   
 
To assist in understanding how well Kingdon’s MS Framework  describes and explains what 
happened in this policymaking process, this research will use his five key elements of 
Problem, Politics, Policy, Policy Window and Policy Entrepreneurs, but as enhanced by the 
sub-elements developed by Zahariadis and set out in his diagram in Figure 1 52 shown in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. First, the type of policy change is discussed. Then the evidence is 
set out in accordance with the elements and sub-elements of the model of a policymaking 
process. The purpose is to explore whether Kingdon’s MS Framework provides a theory 
which enables complete understanding of this policymaking process and if not, what other 
drivers of policymaking does the evidence suggest are relevant in helping to explain what 
happened? 
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Non-incremental change in conditions of ambiguity, fluid participation and 
unclear technology? 
 
The first question the MS Framework invites is whether or not this policymaking episode 
meets Kingdon’s predictions about when incremental and non-incremental change occurs 
and the conditions under which these types of change are likely to occur. The pay-for-
performance policymaking process in England was non-incremental change in Kingdon’s 
definition and was achieved in a planned top-down process of policymaking. Although ideas 
were selected from the policy stream which were already in use (the provisions for 
incentivising vaccinations and immunisations from the 1990 General Medical Services 
contract, the Personal Medical Services contract model and an existing pay-for-performance 
scheme, the PRICCE project), the politicians had clear plans to achieve a major change in the 
way the NHS worked. Pay-for-performance was identified by them as a key mechanism to 
achieve this change in the general practice sub-system. The pay-for-performance policy idea 
appeared quickly on the policy agenda, was widely understood and accepted and was 
quickly implemented. However, Kingdon’s predicted conditions for non-incremental change 
are less apparent. Instead of ambiguity, there was a clearly set policy goal to introduce pay-
for-performance. Instead of fluid participation, the participants at all stages of the 
policymaking were carefully selected and admitted to a closed and orderly process. Only a 
small number of aspects of the technology to implement pay-for-performance (relating to 
data collection) were unclear.  
In the agenda-setting stage, an informal style of decision-making was utilised by the  
Prime Minister from 1997. It was known in the media as the Prime Minister’s ‘sofa cabinet’ 
approach to decision-making. This avoided some Cabinet procedures for decision-making 
which were usually undertaken within British governments. This initial decision to introduce 
pay-for-performance into the new General Medical Services contract was taken by the 
Prime Minister in this informal type of process, being made between the Prime Minister, the 
Secretary of State and the Prime Minister’s Adviser on health policy at a discussion between 
themselves during the election campaign. It was, however, a process to which carefully 
selected participants were admitted and the description of the process by participants 
suggests little ambiguity of policy preferences. While the technology of design and 
implementation debated at that discussion contained some innovative elements, such as 
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the use of Confederation negotiators instead of civil servants, in most respects the planned 
approach was one of business as usual for Ministers and their colleagues from the BMA.  
The process of alternative selection, as conducted between the government and the BMA, 
occurred in a closely managed process with rigorously controlled participation and rules of 
enagaments between the negotiating teams. It was based upon a completely unambiguous 
policy preference for pay-for-performance and had clear and existing technology for 
implementation (that is, through the new contract for General Medical Services), though 
strongly contending interests needed to be managed during this phase.     
Problem stream 
 
The MS Framework and Zahariadis’ Model describe how policymakers come to focus on 
particular problems to place on the agenda by noting indicators, responding to focusing 
events and drawing on feedback which, together, create a need for policymaking action to 
resolve. The model also acknowledges that it is necessary to take into account the load of 
other policy work under way which may affect capacity to deal with the problem and hence 
its arrival or priority on an agenda. 
The major items in the problems stream that the evidence from the case study shows 
policymakers observed in 2001 were public concerns about access to and quality of health 
services (see Politics Stream below for more detail) and general practitioners’ concerns 
about their terms and conditions of work. Quality in this case also means patient 
responsiveness. Although there was no specific concern that cost (expenditure levels on 
health services) was a problem, there was a determination to get better value for the 
planned new investment in health services.   
Policymakers in this episode found out about these problems through a combination of 
electoral, media, policy community and interest group activity. The indicators included 
polling during the election campaign showing public concerns about the quality of service 
offered by the NHS, surveys showing 48 percent of general practitioners were planning to 
retire before the age of 60 and increasing shortages of doctors in areas of socio-economic 
deprivation, and studies showing increasing variation in the quality of care, especially in 
areas of socio-economic deprivation. Focusing events included the BMA threat during the 
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election campaign to go on strike and withdraw their services from NHS work, raising the 
level of need for a new contract, and exposure of poor health service delivery in media 
commentary during the election campaign (‘Winston’s attack [on Labour’s handling of the 
NHS]…was now leading the news…Milburn did well doing the rounds but it was all pretty 
difficult’141 p. 208). Feedback of a positive kind which encouraged policy-makers to respond to 
the problems through pay-for-performance approaches was also available through 
Ministers hearing about and inspecting successful pay-for-performance programmes such as 
PRICCE. A summative evaluation of this scheme was available and suggested a workable 
model.  
The load of other problems on policy makers’ agendas at the time was not a barrier as the 
Prime Minister wished to concentrate policymaking efforts on domestic agenda items and 
recognised that these had been neglected in previous term. The government had built high 
capacity and willingness for bold sweeping domestic policy initiatives.   
In Zahariadis’ view, policymaking which originates in the problem stream, as this does, will 
be more likely to lead to a rational approach to policymaking in which the solution is 
consequential upon the problem identification. This is borne out by the evidence in the case 
study. A rational top-down approach was followed, consequential to the threat of general 
practitioners to strike. The Prime Minister and Secretary of State utilised academic advisers 
to provide ideas and alternative solutions about pay-for-performance extensively as part of 
the contract negotiations. So the model therefore makes an accurate prediction of this link 
between the type of problem and the type of policymaking followed in the case study.  
 
Politics Stream 
 
The MS Framework specifies that, in the politics stream, party ideology, national mood and 
administrative turnover will be the main considerations relating to agenda-setting. 
In 2001 party ideology within the Labour Party strongly supported increased investment in 
the NHS and centralised approaches to the management of public services. A section of the 
Party championed modernisation of public services. Re-engineering public services to be 
more responsive to citizens as service consumers was a key policy goal of champions of 
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‘New’ Labour ideology. The evidence shows polling of national mood found that health 
service quality and effectiveness was a key electoral issue for voters. Its electoral salience 
was heightened by the attention paid to the issue of poor quality of NHS service by the 
media. The national mood was reflected in highly critical media reports during the election 
campaign exposing examples of poor quality of health services. Kingdon notes that media 
are often portrayed as powerful agenda setters 51 p.57 but his research reveals that they are 
regarded as having an important impact on the government agenda in only 26 percent of his 
interviews. Participants confirm that the media was important in this case study. The 
electoral salience of health policy was a vivid concern to the New Labour politicians and 
their media advisers. The BMA threat to strike, which created a risk of further immediate 
pressure on service levels, can be seen as carefully timed for the middle of an election 
campaign by the BMA so they could put maximum pressure on politicians through the 
media. Once the decision to negotiate a new contract had been taken, the medical media 
was attentive to the ongoing negotiation of the new contract, including the influential 
British Medical Journal. Participants on both sides of the negotiation reflect their ever-
present concern about the impact which adverse media coverage may have on their 
achievement of their policy goals.    
The general media had less insight to the process of negotiation during the policy design 
phase but criticised ‘overpayment’ of general practitioners after the impact of the scheme 
was apparent. This had some influence in subsequent negotiations and also impacted upon 
the public reputation of the BMA and doctors generally. As future negotiations over general 
practice contracts occur, it will be a matter of interest to see if these perceptions of 
overpayment will have survived in public opinion and whether, if they have, this will 
influence the conduct of later negotiations in any way.   
The opportunity provided by administrative or legislative turnover was a key factor in 
creating the need for new policy, particularly in the arena of health policy. The Prime 
Minister wanted to make more impact upon domestic policy in his second term and was 
actively seeking ideas and strategies to do so. The election victory with its large majority 
gave a second five-year term in office. This provided the opportunity for selection of new 
ministers in the team who were, like the Secretary of State, ‘fully simpatico with the 
direction for change.’ Kingdon’s MS Framework and Zahariadis’ Model rightly anticipates the 
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importance of administrative turnover for the agenda-setting process. Administrative 
turnover is an even more important event in adversarial Westminster policymaking 
environments because of the heightened ‘structural interest in product differentiation and 
incentive to initiate [policy] changes’ to garner electoral support 66 p.24, the greater level of 
executive autonomy where there is  a large Parliamentary majority and the support of a 
professional civil service to implement new policy in these environments.     
However, the major considerations in the politics stream in this policymaking case study 
were two-fold. The first was how to deal with an institutional issue about the need to 
negotiate a new contract for general practitioners. The second was an interest group issue: 
how to respond to the threat of general practitioners to strike unless they got a new 
contract. These considerations are not easily categorised in the Zahariadis Model’s sub-
elements in the politics stream.  
Policy stream 
 
The Framework identifies value acceptability and technical feasibility (or the ease with 
which the chosen policy can be implemented) as they affect two elements in the policy 
stream: the policy idea and the policy community as important factors in whether a policy 
gets on the agenda. Zaharaidis’ model also specifies the importance of the level of 
integration of the policy community and its access to decision-makers, mode of decision-
making, its size and capacity as key factors in whether policies get onto the agenda. The 
policy community is seen by Kingdon to include bureaucrats, academics and researchers and 
Zahariadis expands this to include analysts in think tanks and interest groups and lobby 
groups. 
 Policy idea: In the ‘soup’ of ideas in the policy stream, pay-for-performance for primary 
health care was clearly present. Members of the health policy community were able to draw 
on recent research into the effects of pay-for-performance nationally and internationally 
and within the primary care sector. Academic advisers had ready access to the Prime 
Minister and the bureaucracy to share the results of their research, including research 
conducted in other jurisdictions. The chance of its selection was influenced because it had 
value acceptability to all parties as a way of incentivising changes in quality of health 
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actions, equalizing access for poorer communities and improving customer responsiveness. 
Although there was some scepticism, most decision-makers were comfortable with the 
concept of pay-for-performance. The mechanism for policymaking managed the risks of this 
policy idea by using principle-based bargaining and relationship-building tactics to soften 
and manage disputes. This mechanism also engaged the doctors and ensured ‘alignment 
with the doctor’s own professional values and the autonomy given to health professionals in 
how they achieved the targets’ through their active participation in the policy design 
process. Ultimately all general practitioners affected by the negotiations were able to vote 
on whether it was acceptable and a majority voted in favour. 
The policy idea also had technical feasibility. In the case study evidence, existing pay-for-
performance schemes provided some successful working models. There were extensive 
national service frameworks providing evidence-based quality standards and research 
showing how to successfully incentivise health professional behaviour, and its risks, 
available to policymakers. There was confidence amongst policymakers of the feasibility of 
this ambitious policymaking process because of these antecedent policies.    
Despite potential show-stopping problems such as the lack of a shared data base to monitor 
achievements against targets, both parties were willing to overcome these. English general 
practitioners had a proliferation of practice management systems for patient record keeping 
and concerns about maintaining confidentiality of patient information like general 
practitioners in New Zealand. Despite this, the necessary technical infrastructure to support 
the scheme, the QMAS, was quickly designed and implemented to create a database which 
was able to draw anonymous information out each day to report on performance against 
the scheme at the practice level. Linking the scheme to the negotiation of the new general 
medical services contract provided an incentive for doctors quickly and enthusiastically to 
implement the changes on a national scale. However, the importance of the collective 
action of doctors in debating, voting and agreeing to participate in the scheme is arguably 
more important than the technical process of designing the system. The fact that general 
practitioners had a unified representative structure to negotiate on their behalf facilitated 
the rapid negotiation and implementation of the scheme. So these issues of technical 
feasibility, though significant, were quickly overcome because both parties wanted to 
achieve the rapid implementation of a large scale scheme.  
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The evidence indicates that general practitioners supported the idea of pay-for-
performance primarily as a vehicle to increase their pay, not in its own right as a policy idea. 
This means that other drivers for the willingness of general practitioners and the BMA to 
agree to this policy are likely to be stronger than the idea of pay-for-performance itself. 
Alternative drivers are discussed in the section ‘Importance of rational choice drivers’ later 
in this Chapter.  
The policy community: The level of integration of the health policy community concerned 
with general practice issues can be said to be towards the high end of the continuum in 
England (defined by Zahariadis as consensus-based, in which there are more frequent and 
more formalised contacts, characterised by bargaining or sounding out and compromise). 
The level of formal organisation of the BMA on general practice matters is an example of a 
highly integrated policy community within the larger health policy community. Within the 
general practice sub-system there was growing divergence of forms of practice and 
contracts which were creating a growing heterogeneity of interests and attitudes to 
particular policies and approaches within this community. However, there was an effective 
and well-resourced mechanism to coordinate these debates. The representative 
mechanisms of the BMA and its General Practice Committee, the debating and voting 
framework for general practitioners and the sole mandate it held to negotiate with 
government on behalf of all general practitioners in a closed negotiation process gave it a 
robust structure for coordination of policy debates within the community.   
The BMA continued to have very high levels of access to politicians. This Labour 
government, like earlier Labour governments, sought constructive engagement with interest 
groups, in semi-corporatist arrangements, and reinstated a strongly consensus-based 
approach to the policymaking process or a return to the ‘politics of the double bed’. Debates 
about quality and equity of access and other key issues were readily shared through the 
British Medical Journal and the media.  
Within the pay-for-performance policymaking process, collegial and friendship links and 
shared research interests were reported by many participants who were members of the 
design team, regardless of which ‘side’ of the negotiation process they sat on. The evidence 
suggests that these informal integrating links between individuals facilitated debate, 
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resolution of conflicts and the building of constructive relationships between all 
participants. To further build the level of integration of the policymaking design team there 
was a very careful process of selection of all participants and very restricted access for new 
members. A high degree of administrative capacity was also provided by both parties to 
support the policymaking (though not quite enough financial modelling or time was 
available to the Confederation team to identify and manage some risks). 
This sub-element of Zahariadis’ Model is therefore a useful and important one for the 
analysis of this case study.  
Policy window 
 
In Zahariadis’ Model of the MS Framework he suggests that the characteristics of the policy 
window can be analysed according to its coupling logic. One type of logic is consequential: 
the coupling occurs because of a compelling event. Another is doctrinal: it occurs because of 
a totemic policy position held by a newly-elected administration, for instance. How the 
coupling proceeds will also reflect whether the decision making style of the administration 
in power is bold or cautious  
The pay-for-performance policymaking had a coupling logic which was consequential on the 
opportunity which was presented by a long second term in office for the government and 
the demand to negotiate a new general medical services contract. However, it was also 
doctrinal in the sense that the government’s policy priority for this term was to bring major 
improvements to general practice services as part of a doctrinal principle of modernization 
of public services in general. The decision style was bold – indeed the decision to make pay- 
for-performance the primary element of the new payment arrangements flew in the face of 
caveats in the literature that there were major risks and challenges in designing and 
implementing such a pay-for-performance policy mechanism on a large scale without 
piloting its key features. These opportunities combined to ensure that the Department 
could couple its readiness for bold non-incremental change with the available policy 
window. The enthusiasm by both parties to the negotiation for speedy delivery of a 
contract, combined with this boldness, resulted in some flaws in design and higher than 
expected costs in the short term. 
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This type of policy window is not a matter of chance. It appears regularly in adversarial 
Westminster jurisdictions. The electoral cycle offers a routine opportunity for political 
parties to review policies and refine manifestos and there are incentives to differentiate 
policies between political parties. In majoritarian unitary electoral systems, party manifestos 
of victors can be more assured of immediate implementation and politicans and civil 
servants can plan this process. The civil service prepares in advance for the post-election 
rush to implement manifesto commitments and is adept at serving new governments 
neutrally and efficiently in this process. This reduces the element of unpredictability and 
chance in policy windows in these systems. 
It is important to consider the nature of the governing system, therefore,when analysing the 
role of policy windows in policymaking.  
Policy entrepreneurs 
 
Kingdon and Zahariadis promote the role of actors, particularly policy entrepreneurs, as 
important drivers of policymaking in conditions of policymaking ambiguity. These actors are 
able to manipulate events to gain support for their pet policy idea in these conditions. In 
their view it is this role which facilitates non-incremental change when the conditions are 
right. As expanded by Zahariadis, the model suggests that the activities of policy 
entrepreneurs can be analysed according to three criteria: access to decision-makers, 
resources to influence policymaking and strategies (such as ‘framing, salami tactics, affect 
priming and symbols’) to gain support for pet policies. 
Other writers have introduced the roles of public entrepreneurs and institutional 
entrepreneurs to add to policy entrepreneurs. In a generic definition Ostrom calls these 
actors ‘primarily focused on problem-solving and putting heterogeneous processes together 
in complementary and effective ways’ 74.  
The conditions of ambiguity were not found in the pay-for-performance policymaking 
process. No exogenous policy entrepreneur could be identified during the research. 
However, the research identified several roles played by key endogenous actors which 
clearly facilitated this non-incremental policy change. They did not have access or resource 
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concerns though needed to consider which strategies would best build support for the pay-
for-performance policy.  
The first of these actors is the Prime Minister during the agenda-setting stage, who seized 
an opportunity to utilise a preferred policy. The Prime Minister used strategies such as 
framing to get this item on the government agenda through language used in speeches to 
his own Party members, many of whom opposed his approach, and appealing directly to the 
public for support. He framed the issue for the traditional Labour supporters and the unions 
with the message ‘without reform, more money and pay won’t succeed’ and for the public it 
was ‘the service user in the driver’s seat.’ The Secretary of State added the mantra of 
‘something for something’ to focus the efforts of the negotiation team and this became a 
‘symbol’ of the rationale for the new contract amongst its designers.  
The second is a small group of specially recruited actors who had roles which were 
developed during the alternative selection stage. These actors undertook activities which 
resemble descriptions of institutional and policy entrepreneurs respectively as these have 
been developed in recent writing. These are: 
 the Chair of the Confederation team, who is recruited from front line management 
of health services to build a negotiating team of fellow front line health service 
managers rather than civil servants. He also recruited academics with general 
practice experience to mediate the debates over targets for the QOF design between 
the BMA and Confederation teams. He exhibited the required strategic skills to 
obtain agreement to the policy within the whole negotiation process of the contract; 
and 
 the leader for the Confederation team on the Quality Sub Group, exhibiting policy 
entrepreneurial skills, who is recruited from a post implementing a pay-for-
performance scheme in a regional health service. He ensured that the key features 
of the scheme he implemented in East Kent, PRICCE, became the primary model for 
the QOF through his role as leader of the Confederation team within the forum of 
the Quality Sub Group. He defended these features in the face of seasoned 
bargaining techniques of the BMA negotiators.  
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The empirical work of Mintrom, Roberts, and Oliver adds further descriptions of how 
entrepreneurs in different settings work. Mintrom 82 identifies three key attributes of 
discovering unfulfilled needs and suggesting innovative ways to meet them, bearing 
reputational risks in uncertain situations and resolving collective action problems by 
assembling networks to undertake change. These attributes are exemplified in the actions 
of the leaders of the policymaking process but particularly in the problem-solving approach 
taken by the Confederation Chair during the negotiations.   
Mintrom’s concept  83 p.656 of ‘insider sensibilities’, or deep knowledge of relevant 
procedures and the local norms that serve to define acceptable behaviour, is clearly 
exhibited by the Confederation Chair. He resembles, in Kingdon’s terms, ‘people who can 
act as change agents by making connections across disparate groups and engaging with 
proximate policy-makers.’ He conveys a motivation for improving the terms and conditions 
of doctors as well as the outcomes for patients and disappointment at not being able to do 
more in these areas. His ‘palpable honesty’ was acknowledged by other negotiators and he 
was much admired for his techniques of constructive problem-solving.  
Manipulative strategies such as framing, used by the Prime Minister in agenda-setting, are 
not used here.  Salami tactics or tackling the problem in small slices are explicitly rejected. 
Openness and principle-based bargaining techniques were the primary strategies employed 
in the policymaking process.  
In the Quality Sub Group, the policymaking environment was different. The Chair of the 
Quality Sub Group was a passionate defender of his ideas and upheld these through the 
rough and tumble of negotiation at all costs, in Roberts’ words like ‘the brilliant 
salesmanship of someone offering a finished product’ 142, leading to the respectful 
acknowledgement of the BMA that the government negotiators were not ‘some soft 
hearted pussy cats.’ Other innovations were then developed to manage the risk of 
negotiation break-down: the Chair of the BMA team joined the group and the Chair of the 
Confederation team enlisted the services of independent academic interlocutors to settle 
the process into a balanced and manageable debate, actively using strategies from 
principled-based negotiation to maintain a constructive environment of problem-solving.  
149 
 
Although these actors do not play the roles of policy entrepreneurs as originally described 
by Kingdon, they are examples of new forms of endogenous policy and institutional 
entrepreneur which reflect the needs in the different policymaking rhythms and risks of the 
Westminster setting.    
Entrepreneurial risk-taking 
 
It is intrinsic to the concept of entrepreneurship that risk will be taken in order to obtain 
greater reward than would be derived through more conventional or routine (and therefore 
less risky) processes. This concept of risk is at the heart of Kingdon’s theory that non-
incremental policy change is often only possible when entrepreneurial forces are brought 
into play. The policy and institutional entrepreneurs identified above took risks 
characteristic of this entrepreneurial behaviour to a certain extent. Taken at the direction of 
politicians in one administration, they may render the strategies of the entrepreneur 
inappropriate for a successor administration. The major risks taken as part of the pay-for-
performance design process are explored below: 
Public support risk: the risk that some aspects of the negotiation might result in loss 
of public support. This proved to be accurate. There was commentary in the media 
that an excessively generous settlement for general practitioners had been reached 
in the media. The right for general practices to contract out of after-hours services 
resulted in the wholesale cessation of Saturday morning surgeries, public frustration 
and the criticism that doctors would now receive much greater pay for reduced 
hours of work. The Prime Minister himself was confronted by unintended 
consequences of the new contract when he was advised on live television that it had 
created an incentive to prevent booking of appointments in advance, thus reducing 
rather than increasing easy access and responsiveness of services to the general 
public.  
Design risk: the greatest design  risk taken was to retain a large share of the income 
under the new contract as contingent upon performance (to maximise the effect of 
the incentives in the new contract). As the targets proved to be easy for most 
practices to reach, this resulted in a better-than-budgeted performance under the 
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performance-related pay provisions The Auditor General’s confirmation that the cost 
of the scheme was excessive in return for relatively poor productivity gains 133, at 
least in the immediate period following the negotiation, was the consequence. 
Explanatory comprehensiveness of Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
To recap, this case study exhibits a non-incremental policymaking process which runs 
counter to Kingdon’s predictions about how non-incremental policymaking occurs. It 
departs from his predictions because it occurs in a planned top-down way in conditions of 
great clarity of policy preference. In the agenda-setting phase it has none of the features of 
ambiguity, fluid participation and unclear technology predicted by Kingdon to create 
conditions for non-incremental change. No exogenous actor using political manipulation 
was identified (though endogenous actors with a role to facilitate major change are 
deliberately recruited by the administration to achieve this result). The pay-for-performance 
policy in the alternative selection phase was developed in a rational and top-down way but 
utilising negotiation. Kingdon acknowledges in his further reflections on his original 
framework that a ‘government might generate its own agenda and can be at least 
somewhat autonomous’  51 p.230. Zahariadis confirms that in the problem stream, rational 
approaches to which are consequential upon the identification of problems can occur. He 
invites us to specify the conditions under which and the ways in which policymaking works 
from the top down. This case study shows an example of policymaking in these conditions. 
In this case study the key conditions were a clear electoral mandate for change, a large 
parliamentary majority, a bold parliamentary leader with able colleagues and civil servants 
to assist him, an interest group keen to negotiate a change in their members’ conditions and 
well-studied policy antecedents to provide confidence of the policy idea’s feasibility.  
There is thus a partial fit between Kingdon’s Framework as elaborated by Zahariadis and the 
complex processes observed in the case study of the design of the QO F. On some large and 
important predictive theoretical positions, such as the link between chance and non-
incremental change, the MS Framework has not been accurate. In many other aspects of 
the policymaking process there is a strong resonance between the components of the 
model developed by Zahariadis and the empirical evidence of how this policymaking process 
unfolded.  
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Other drivers of policymaking processes 
 
Based on the analysis of the fit between Zahariadis’ model of the MS Framework and the 
description of the policymaking process which has been set out in the preceding pages of 
this Chapter, there are some major gaps in the way the model captures and encourages us 
to look for key drivers and features of the policymaking process which were, in the empirical 
research undertaken for this case study, shown to be critical to the process and outcome of 
this policymaking episode. These are set out below.   
The importance of historical antecedents   
 
The scope and speed with which the QOF was designed clearly owes much to the historical 
antecedents of the policy. Existing paths, largely arising in the 1990 General Medical 
Services contract, could be trodden in the design of the new policy. England and Scotland 
had well developed clinical standards for practices, with professionally-led guidelines 
development and practice accreditation which were well-accepted by general practitioners.  
In Tuohy’s terms, these are examples where ‘policy-makers continue to cycle through their 
existing repertoires, shifting the mix of instruments and the balance of influence within the 
parameters of the established policy framework’ 23 p.5. Kingdon acknowledges that in the 
alternative selection phase of policymaking, civil servants may propose policies they have 
been working on in the past and use a process of ‘softening up‘ 51 p.214. He notes that officials 
will also utilise feedback about existing policies to create new ones but in the alternative 
selection phase rather than the agenda setting phase. He acknowledges the idea of ‘spill-
over’ or ‘establishing a principle’. This captures the phenomenon that a change in another 
arena of policymaking or a previous experience of policymaking which sets a precedent of 
some kind will make it easier to achieve the same sort of policymaking in the new arena.  
These concepts of ‘softening up’ and ‘spill over’ do not capture the importance of the role of 
historical antecedents, which the evidence shows laid reliable foundations for the 
policymaking, nor the strong momentum which drove the grand and ambitious scale of the 
pay-for-performance scheme achieved in the English policymaking episode. There is a case 
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for including these sub-elements as part of Zahariadis’ model to ensure they are considered 
in policy analysis using the framework. 
 Institutional and structural features  
 
Kingdon’s Framework and Zahariadis’ Model are muted or silent on the impact which 
underpinning institutional features may have on the process of agenda-setting and 
alternative selection, such as the relative ease with which a Westminster majoritarian and 
unitary governing system can undertake non-incremental policymaking by contrast with 
federal systems or those with a separation of powers. An institutional approach to 
understanding policymaking would look first to these features to explain patterns of 
policymaking. The ways in which the governing system in England affected the policymaking 
process differently from Kingdon’s predicted patterns have been set out above. These 
indicate that Westminster governing systems seeking to implement non-incremental policy 
change can achieve this without having exogenous actors using political manipulation to 
drive such policy change. This suggests that the Zahariadis Model, if it is to be more 
applicable to Westminster systems of this type, needs some amendment.  
The institutional landscape for a system or sub-system (such as the health system or the 
general practice sub-system) and the way in which this might structure the relationships 
between the state and interest group actors has also been shown to be an important factor 
in a policy design process. Below, the impacts of these institutional features at the general 
practice sub-system level are set out.  
If this institutional approach is taken to this case study of policymaking, it is clear that the 
general practice sub-system landscape included a singular form of ownership for general 
practice with: 
 A semi-corporatist working relationship between the BMA and the state 
 A single payer financing arrangement for general practice 
 A single national contract between most general practitioners and the Department  
 A centralized structure for health policy making  
 A single national representative body for general practice   
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The analysis of the evidence shows that, together with the policy antecedents, these 
features enabled a context of bargaining and negotiation - ‘something for something’ - 
which greatly facilitated the speed, scale and scope of the policy making on a national basis. 
The legitimating of a single general practice organisation as representative of general 
practitioners was crucial to the successful and rapid conduct of the design and 
implementation process. This also facilitated the design and implementation of the QMAS 
to resolve information management difficulties.  
Importance of rational choice drivers  
 
The case study evidence shows that individual actors were important in the successful 
design of the pay-for-performance policy, acting in entrepreneurial ways. There are also 
some clear rational choice drivers which can be identified at the heart of this policymaking 
process, operating both individually and collectively. The major driver was the prospect of 
greater rewards. The first example of this is the way general practitioners as a collective 
chose a guaranteed practice income and improved terms and conditions over retention of 
absolute clinical autonomy. Secondly individual general practitioners avidly implemented 
the pay-for-performance programme, which was a voluntary scheme, in their own practices 
to secure this increased income. Third, the BMA chose to negotiate a lucrative contract 
mindful of the need to preserve its sole bargaining mandate. All of these drivers were 
important to achieving the rapid design and implementation of this policymaking process.   
It should be noted that other rational choice drivers were present too. These included 
support for quality indicators of practice and doing what was best for patients. From the 
economic point of view, ‘physicians do not only try to maximise income and minimise 
workload. Their utility function consists of other non-price elements such as ethical 
restraints, professional standards which may dilute or even completely remove incentives 
for physicians to provide ineffective care’ 43 p.191. 
The existence of an institutional framework for bargaining and negotiation enabled the 
profession to make these choices to trade some clinical autonomy for greater income. So 
the opportunity for bargaining and negotiation or the use of rational choice drivers was 
facilitated by the institutional features of this general practice sub-system. Government 
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negotiators respected and facilitated these institutional processes during the negotiation 
phase. To anticipate the analysis in the next case study, the New Zealand case study will 
show a clear difference, having multiple forms of ownership and governance within general 
practice, multiple general practice organisations and a less integrated policy community, 
which gave policy-makers fewer institutional features which could be used to facilitate the 
process of policy design and implementation.  
Does the Zahariadis Model encourage consideration of these 
factors? 
 
The set of sub-elements in the Zahariadis Model does not invite consideration of interest 
group factors such as the positional advantage conferred on the BMA with its right to hold 
sole bargaining rights for all general practitioners. Nor does it invite consideration of 
institutional factors such as the ownership and governance arrangements for health services 
which gave positional advantage to the state actors in this situation. These factors had a 
significant influence on the relative strength of different interests and actors in the policy 
making process. The evidence shows that these two factors in the political stream - the 
mandate and resources of the BMA and the responsibilities and legal powers of the 
Department of Health - were vital sub-elements in the policymaking process. The sub-
element relating to policy entrepreneurs does not reflect the possibility that these actors 
may be actively sought out and engaged by state actors to champion particular policies or 
governance frameworks as part of the policymaking process.  
Summary 
 
This Chapter has analysed the fit between the evidence of the design of the QOF and the MS 
Framework in describing and explaining what happened. It then considered the relevance of 
other historical, structural and institutional drivers in the policymaking process. In the next 
Chapter, the case study of the design of the New Zealand Performance Programme is 
described, the barriers and enablers of the policymaking process are discussed and 
commentary of evaluators of the Performance Programme is presented.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEW ZEALAND: CONTEXT AND THE PERFORMANCE PROGRAMME  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the context for policymaking and the process of design of the pay-for-
performance programme, the Performance Programme (PP), designed in New Zealand at 
the same time as the QOF was designed in England. This Chapter draws upon an analysis of 
the New Zealand health policymaking literature, documentary records, published 
commentary on the implementation of the PP, some media reports and the transcripts of 14 
semi-structured interviews with participants in the design process. Where a participant’s 
comments are included in the text, this is stated and quotation marks are used to highlight 
the comment.  
First, the health policymaking context for the New Zealand government in 1999 is set out. 
Next the process of development of the PP is described. Then, a set of the major barriers 
and enablers of the policymaking process which affected the goals of policymakers, as 
described by participants, is described. These are derived from clearly-patterned content 
from interview transcripts and document analysis, usually reflecting that they were reported 
by a majority of participants or were expressed with strength and intensity of expression by 
a smaller number of participants, or because they were clearly identified with a particular 
type of participant or type of belief. The Chapter concludes with a summary of reviews and 
evaluations of the pay-for-performance policymaking process and its impacts. 
Background 
 
In 1999, New Zealanders elected a majority coalition government led by the New Zealand 
Labour Party after that party had been nearly a decade out of office. Health services had 
high electoral salience in New Zealand as they did in England during the election campaign.  
Laugesen 96 p.140 contends that health reformers had become ‘more attentive to voters’ 
perceptions of reforms and the distribution of costs and benefits’ in New Zealand and that 
156 
 
political revisions to reflect public opinion had begun to supplant technocratic blueprints for 
efficiency or health care professional and provider interests in health policymaking.  
Prior to its election victory, the Labour Party had set out a Manifesto  dealing with health 
policy, ‘Labour on Health’ 39. Similar themes to those of the Labour Party elected in 1997 in 
England were set out in this document. In both countries, politicians were concerned about 
the gap between the expectations of taxpayers and health system performance. In New 
Zealand the concern was also to re-establish the ‘moral authority’ of the national health 
system 39 whereas in England the Prime Minister sought to avoid a situation in which 
citizens ‘would begin to buy their way out and the NHS would spiral down to become a 
residualist safety net’ 2. 
In both countries a revolutionary programme of health reform had been introduced by the 
previous administrations during the 1990s, which had been largely imposed on an unwilling 
health sector 19 p.57. Each Labour Party promised to distinguish itself from the previous 
administration by moving away from key features of these reforms, particularly strategies 
based on the introduction of competition and quasi-markets, towards a system 
characterised by greater cooperation, improved quality and a greater focus on prevention of 
chronic health conditions. Like the Labour Party in England, the New Zealand Labour Party’s 
‘core commitments’ were ‘to focus on patients not profits and to cut waiting times for 
surgery’ 39 p.2. But its objectives also addressed some different needs: for ‘restoration of a 
non-commercial system, with the focus on the provision of quality services’; ‘full 
involvement of the representatives of local communities in decisions about ... services in 
their region’; ‘significant improvements in the effectiveness of health services delivery to 
Māori and Pacific people’ and a system in which ‘primary and secondary care will be well 
integrated.’ 
A non-commercial system 
 
Labour On Health criticised the National government’s policy to develop quasi-market 
systems to improve efficiency and effectiveness in social services, stating that this had 
caused health services to become ‘run down, privatised and commercialized…to the 
‘overwhelming alienation of the public’ 39 p.2. Labour on Health also signalled a focus on 
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population-based and preventive health care, stating that the current system was ‘too 
focused on treatment services at the expense of improving the health of the community.’ 
The document criticised the type of accountability measures which were being monitored in 
the system, stating that the only accountability measures regularly reported on related to 
financial rather than health service quality indicators. While promoting the benefits of 
longer term funding arrangements for health providers, it also stated that only 
‘organisations which are funded by the state and have  a history of providing a quality 
service will have funding arrangements which provide [this] security’ 39 p.4. Clinical 
accountability was to be given the same priority as financial accountability. Quality and 
effectiveness was to be ‘the yardstick by which we measure the quality of the service’ 39 p.3. 
The overall priority for the public health system as outlined in Labour on Health was to ‘raise 
the health status of New Zealanders and reduce the health status inequalities between 
different sections of the community’ 39 pps. 3-4. The public health goals included reductions in 
smoking rates, incidence of asthma and diabetes, heart disease and high blood pressure, 
cancer related mortality, poverty related illnesses such as tuberculosis, meningitis, rickets 
and cellulitis and targets to increase immunisation rates 39 p.5. The document stated that ‘the 
key to improving the health status of New Zealanders in the long run hinges on public health 
and public policy measures more than on treatment’ but that many of the illnesses ‘which 
are reducing life expectancy and requiring treatment are preventable within existing 
knowledge’ 39 p.10. The commitment was made to set and monitor national population health 
goals and ring fence funding available for District health boards for population health 
initiatives.  
So clear intentions to encourage, support and measure the delivery of population-based 
health services and to achieve improvements in the quality of primary health care services 
were set out in this Manifesto. Addressing the problem of inequitable health outcomes was 
seen as tractable if existing knowledge could be applied to prevent illnesses more 
effectively.  
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Problems of ‘Moral authority’   
 
The promises to restore full involvement of the representatives of local communities were 
intended to restore the ‘moral authority’ 39 p.2 of the health system. These would provide 
democratic accountability mechanisms, together with the promise to restore affordable 
access to primary care so ‘that people’s access to the health system is not restricted by their 
ability to pay’ 39 p.3. These problems were not encountered in England to the same extent 
because in that country general practitioner services were free at the point of care and 
there was an effective line of accountability from each general practitioner to the Secretary 
of State for Health and Parliament, through the mechanisms of the General Medical Services 
contract which bound general practitioners funded through its provisions.  
Labour promised to  ‘return to a health system which allows people to have a say’39 p.2 by 
making changes in governance and funding arrangements at the regional level and drawing 
primary care firmly into the ambit of these new systems for public governance of health 
planning and policymaking. The management of the interface between an integrated 
primary and secondary care sector would be ‘governed by organisations in which the 
community and consumers of services have a voice’ 39 p.4. At the national level, all functions 
for policy advice, funding, regulation and monitoring and public health services would be 
returned to the Ministry of Health and direct Ministerial, and therefore parliamentary, 
control. Elected local representatives would form a majority on re-established District 
Health Boards, which would also be responsible for primary care. Decision-making would 
‘once again be an open and publicly accountable process’39. This was intended to improve 
the visibility of health services and therefore the accountability of health care providers to 
citizens generally 28 143. It represented the re-introduction of a vertically integrated national 
health system, drawing all public health policy and funding back under the hierarchical 
control of the state.  
Health needs of Māori and Pacific peoples 
 
The New Zealand Labour Party Manifesto made a commitment to ‘ensuring that low cost 
quality primary health care services are available in areas of low income and high health 
need’39 p.13, 4 and that ‘significant improvements will be made in the effectiveness of health 
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service delivery to Māori and Pacific people’. As part of the process of developing the 
Labour Party manifesto policy, Labour on Health, the Opposition Spokesperson for Health 
had done much talking about how a new approach to primary health care could be achieved 
with doctors who were part of her local urban constituency but also those who practised in 
more isolated and needy communities in New Zealand and with researchers in the health 
epidemiology, policy and services academic community. The Manifesto promised ‘we will 
ensure that people’s access to the health system is not restricted by their ability to pay’ 39 
p.3.  
New Zealand’s semi-commercialised model of primary care delivery had become 
unaffordable for many New Zealanders. The primary care sector was already highly 
privatized in both production and consumption 94 but the changes made in 1993 withdrew 
subsidy for primary care entirely from most New Zealand adults 29 p.2 144. Disparity in health 
outcomes was a pressing concern to the New Zealand Labour Party. Research had shown 
that there were ‘significant and enduring health disparities relating to both ethnicity and 
deprivation’ including a nine-year gap in life expectancy between Māori and non-Māori New 
Zealanders and between males living in the most deprived and least deprived geographical 
areas 21 145. The strategies to reduce these disparities outlined in the Manifesto included the 
use of population-based funding formulae to determine funding levels for personal health 
services so that funding could be redistributed based on need. Targets for delivery of 
preventive as well as curative services and the introduction of the requirement for people to 
enrol on registers for health care were also intended to facilitate delivery of a population-
based and preventive approach to delivery of services.   
Objectives to reduce disparities between ethnic groups also reflected the major changes 
which had occurred in the 1990s to establish health services run by and for Māori 13 p. 75-78 
and the growing assertiveness of a Māori worldview in health policy which challenged the 
dominant ideas at the time and ‘were seen as a chance to re-establish a small measure of 
rangatiratanga’ (or self-determination) by Māori over their own health needs and services. 
In New Zealand, general practitioners had always been acutely aware of the need to deliver 
a responsive service to their patients because patients were, along with the state, direct 
payers of their primary health care services. There was a more genuinely competitive 
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market for patients in New Zealand in many parts of the country, especially the larger cities, 
than in England and although the service had attracted some criticism about a character of 
paternalism and poor cultural responsiveness, nevertheless the key indicators of patient 
satisfaction, such as availability and length of appointments and satisfaction with the service 
provided, were relatively high in New Zealand 146.    
Integration of primary and secondary care 
 
Manifesto statements that ‘Labour favours moves towards capitation funding for general 
practitioners’ services’ and that ‘the present fee for service model has not facilitated 
integration between various parts of the system and has often inhibited better management 
of the overall health resource’ signalled intentions to make major changes to funding 
arrangements for primary care 39 p.12. In both countries the budgets for primary and 
secondary health care had been integrated during the 1990s and regional funders had been 
given the task to contain levels of primary care spending. Contracts for budget management 
for pharmaceutical prescribing and sometimes laboratory tests (in New Zealand ) and fund-
holding for hospital services (in England) with primary care organisations had been the 
preferred way to do so 21. However, both incoming Labour Parties had announced their 
intention to terminate these contracts. The New Zealand Labour Party also proposed to 
prevent public funding being spent on contracts with for-profit organisations. This signalled 
a major challenge to the network of existing Independent Practitioners’ Associations (IPAs) 
which had formed in the 1990s to facilitate contracting between general practitioners and 
regional funders. These were primarily doctor-owned private companies 147 and most had 
adopted contracts for referred services budget management offered by regional funders 
during this period. These contracts had the intention ‘to curb growth in referred services 
expenditure...and typically rewarded reduced expenditure by allowing organisations to keep 
a proportion of the savings for agreed projects’ 148 p.16. Funders had offered two choices of 
contract:  
 Budget management of a fixed allocation of funding for referred services based on 
historical expenditure. If, through improved quality of referral practice by general 
practices, savings in expenditure were made, a share of these savings could be 
retained and spent by the provider on health services or quality improvement 
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programmes for their practices with the agreement of the funder. If expenditure 
exceeded the budget excess expenditure was met by the funder. So these contracts 
were non-risk bearing for the IPAs. 
 Budget holding of a fixed allocation (by one organisation only). In the same way as 
for budget management, the provider was able to retain savings from improved 
referral practice but under budget holding contracts primary care organisations such 
as IPAs carried the financial risk of over-expenditure. In this case, however, there 
were more flexible provisions for the way in which savings could be utilized. 
 
These contracts had delivered savings which funded significant new health service 
developments by IPAs 26 and those other general practice consortia (including some 
community organisations in rural communities), which adopted them and funded clinical 
governance initiatives for their members. There were 30 IPAs in 1999, representing over 75 
percent of general practitioners 149 and ‘almost all’ had taken on responsibility for budgets 
for pharmaceutical services with some also having budgets for laboratory  services. The level 
of savings obtained by some large IPAs and the ability for these Associations to determine 
how to use these savings without consultation with the community was specifically criticised 
in the Labour Party Manifesto. A participant in this research suggests ‘there was a 
perception that the budget-holding exercises of the previous...years had resulted in 
inappropriate and inequitable capture of funding...and IPAs...gained a lot.’   
Primary care organisations which formed within the network of community-governed not- 
for-profit health centres in New Zealand typically did not take up budget management 
contracts. Evaluation in 1999 indicated that IPAs, who benefited most from these contracts, 
were those with high historical levels of expenditure on referred services and high utilisation 
rates serving ‘well-off populations with general practitioner availability well above the 
national average’ 150. Expenditure on referred services had been observed to grow at rates 
in excess of population needs in some regions where IPAs had formed and there was 
‘increasing evidence that the distribution of expenditure on these services follows the 
‘inverse care law’ i.e. that ‘the availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with 
the need of the population served’’ 148 p.16. This concern was shared by both the Labour 
Party and by National politicians: another participant commented that ‘their organisations 
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have ended up with enormous amounts of money sitting in a bank and even [a 
spokesperson within the National Party] just goes apoplectic, it is $80 million because it is 
not spent on health...and it was utterly up to the Trust [of the IPA] how they decided to 
spend it.’  
A challenge to heterogeneity 
 
The Manifesto announced that any contracting for services with primary care organisations 
by the new District Health Boards would be with non-profit groups with adequate 
community or consumer representation. The health reforms initiated in 1993 in New 
Zealand had led to a proliferation of new types of services, delivery approaches and 
organisational forms within primary care. The primary care sector was characterised by 
increasingly heterogeneous organisational and governance forms. While welcoming 
diversity especially where services had developed to serve high-needs communities and 
Māori and Pacific populations, the incoming government was keen to see a more planned, 
coordinated and community-oriented approach, accountable to Ministers,  which delivered 
benefits more consistently and equitably to different communities within New Zealand and 
which facilitated improved access to and dissemination of information about service 
delivery 151. The British Prime Minister, by contrast, was seeking to encourage heterogeneity 
within primary care to improve customer responsiveness.  
In New Zealand a careful path needed to be trodden between a variety of heterogeneous 
general practice and primary health care groups and interests as part of the policymaking 
process. A major new influence within the general practice sector was the network of IPAs 
which had established clinical governance processes for their member practices during the 
1990s, but so too was the new network of other consortia of general practice organisations 
and Māori and Pacific organisations which had developed to deliver services to their people 
during the same period.   
Organised clinical governance  
 
Unlike in England where quality improvement initiatives within general practice during the 
1990s had been established in centrally-driven national programmes, in New Zealand these 
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were largely developed through regional professionally-led initiatives arising in the IPAs and 
other similar primary health management organisations. One of the positive consequences 
of the contracts for budget management and budget-holding had been the development of 
clinical governance approaches within these organisations, defined as ‘the exercise of 
collective or organisational accountability for management of clinical performance,’ to 
improve the quality and resource management of pharmaceutical prescribing and 
laboratory test referrals amongst their members 152. These utilised resources gained from 
budget management of referred services so that variation in prescribing and referrals 
practice could be minimised and savings maximised. In a study reported in 2002 which 
sought to quantify medical practice variation in primary care settings, researchers noted 
that evidence of ‘substantial inter-practitioner variation in patterns of primary care activity 
has been established for over a decade’ and that the literature tended to explain this by 
practice and practitioner attributes including professional uncertainty and supplier-induced 
demand. This study of prescribing and referral behaviour in 10,000 encounters in a 
representative sample of general practitioners in the Waikato region of New Zealand  found 
considerable variability in medical practice after controlling for case-mix and patient and 
practitioner attributes and concluded that some 10 percent of this variation was 
attributable to physician attributes 153.  
Complementing general practitioner-led peer group networks, the IPAs and similar 
organisations implemented ‘comprehensive information systems, computerised practice 
registers...personalised feedback on prescribing behaviour and laboratory use and peer 
group discussion of guidelines’ 149 p.1341 to address this picture of considerable variation in 
practice. Malcolm et al found that it was largely based on volume rather than price (in which 
prescribing members prescribe many more drugs but not necessarily more expensive drugs 
than low cost prescribers). Savings achieved by these arrangements varied between levels 
of 5-10 percent of referred services budgets 154. The Manifesto of the New Zealand Labour 
Party signalled that privately owned companies would no longer be able to obtain funding in 
this way for these quality improvement initiatives.   
Associated with these developments in organised clinical governance had been supportive 
national initiatives 152, including the setting up of the National Health Committee and its 
launch of a national programme of capacity building for quality, including clinical guidelines 
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development, in the 1990s. This led to the formation of organisations such as the New 
Zealand Guidelines Group in 1996 and the Clinical Leaders Association of New Zealand in 
1998. This Association had a brief to research the learning needs of clinicians and develop 
programmes to meet these.    
IPAs’ goals and policies 
 
Key elements of the Labour on Health proposals were a challenge to the aspirations of 
organisations representing most New Zealand general practitioners. A survey of 30 IPAs 
conducted in 1998 155 to explore their goals and policies attained a 93 percent response rate 
and provides a window into the values and approaches which were developing in these 
organisations. The survey found that, by comparison with an initial survey undertaken in 
1994 to establish a baseline, in 1998 these organisations rated ‘achieving better health 
outcomes for your patient’ and ‘making better use of primary care resources’ as the top 
goals. Their main source of income was budget management contracts. The majority of 
respondents supported policies to integrate primary and secondary care funding and to 
move from historical to population needs-based funding but opposed carrying any risk 
relating to going over allocated budgets. All opposed retaining savings as personal benefits 
for practitioners. A majority supported integrated, capitated budgets for general medical, 
nurse practitioner, laboratory and pharmaceutical services if these could be negotiated 
group by group with funders, but were concerned about the ‘compulsory imposition of a 
capitated general medical services regime’ by funders. The respondents rated their 
achievements over the previous years of establishing an infrastructure, collaboration 
between members and developing information systems and primary care resource 
management most highly. Achievement of community involvement was lowest-rated 
though half thought it to be quite important. The other half thought it slightly or not 
important. Just over a third had community representatives on their Boards and seven had 
community advisory boards. They strongly supported initiatives to develop outcome-related 
performance indicators and developing multi-disciplinary practice teams but less than half 
supported sharing of information between their group and similar groups. The conclusion of 
the authors was that IPAs had evolved towards new forms of internal and external 
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relationships and a new model of clinical governance and were serving more than narrow 
general practitioner interests 155 p.36.  
Community-governed not-for-profit primary care practices 
 
By contrast, community governed not-for-profit primary care practices employed 3% of 
general practitioners but these worked in multi-disciplinary teams of other health 
professionals. In comparison with for-profit practices, they served a younger, poorer, largely 
non-European population, with higher levels of certain types of health issues including 
asthma, diabetes and skin infections 26. They and their representative organisations had 
‘long taken a broader population perspective beyond the traditional general practice focus’ 
102 p.17. Whereas the focus of the IPAs was on engagement with their general practitioner 
members, the focus of non-profit practices was strongly on engagement with their local 
community. The values and perspectives of these practices and organisations were better 
aligned with the proposed changes outlined in the Labour on Health document. In some 
regions, these practices joined meso-organisations which were not IPAs but offered similar 
services to them.    
Recent policymaking context for primary health care 
 
The health reforms of 1993 had ushered in a new health policymaking approach in New 
Zealand as well as revolutionary changes to ownership and governance arrangements for 
health care. This was a top-down, rationalist and technically-driven approach, non-
consultative in its process of design and decision-making 33. Some of the intended changes 
were hidden behind the provisions of confidentiality associated with the passage of budget 
and urgent legislation in the House of Representatives in 1993 38. It is explored from a 
number of perspectives in academic analysis of policymaking during the 1993-1999 period 
13. In the arena of health care policymaking the exclusion of the medical profession from the 
process was a notable feature of the 1993 reforms. Davis and other commentators 22 also 
note the subsequent unravelling of much of this policy intent during the process of 
implementation, as both medical and public opposition to the changes built during this 
phase.  
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Finlayson 33 describes the attempts to implement one aspect of the 1993 reforms, to 
integrate the funding and purchasing of primary and secondary health care services and 
require general practitioners to enter into contracts with newly established  Regional Health 
Authorities for delivery of services to an enrolled population for a capped sum. These 
contracts were to supersede the existing fee-for-service arrangements for payment 33 p.168-9. 
General practitioners refused to do this as they had done in 1938 and in later attempts to 
introduce contracts for their services (such as in 1990). The policy was amended, initially 
temporarily, to permit continued fee-for-service funding.  It was in the context of this 
‘threat to their financial and clinical independence’ that the formation of IPAs began to 
occur, to give general practitioners ‘critical mass for negotiating with the Regional Health 
Authorities.’ Only in one Regional Health Authority did substantial take up of capitated 
funding arrangements occur.  In Finlayson’s assessment, ‘the Regional Health Authorities’ 
ability to counteract the power of the medical profession was impeded by their lack of 
information and expertise necessary for the negotiation with doctors.’ The relationships 
between the Regional Health Authorities and the IPAs, though initially fractious, settled into 
more constructive ones over time. Finlayson notes that the Regional Health Authorities 
‘subsequently succeeded in overcoming general practitioners historical reluctance to 
contracting with the Government or its agents. This will provide an avenue for more 
innovative arrangements for paying for primary care in future’ 33 p.170. Finlayson concludes 
that key aspects of the 1993 reforms proved impossible to introduce successfully because 
much of the policy was based on inadequate assumptions about its environment and 
because implementation was not a ‘neutral non-political stage of the policymaking 
process...rather the whole process has the potential to be highly politicised, especially when 
key groups have not been involved in the formulation of policy.’ Finlayson further contends 
that the 1993 reforms were poorly designed and conceived and lacked clear and consistent 
goals even at policy formulation stage and this made it difficult to implement successfully.  
It was in the context of this pre-history that the incoming Labour government embarked 
upon its counter-revolutionary changes in health policy in 1999 27.      
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A Ministerial/Civil Service partnership 
 
Once elected in late 1999, the incoming Labour government began to implement its 
Manifesto commitments immediately to ensure results could be delivered within its three-
year term of office. The new Minister of Health and the Director-General of Health met 
promptly after ministerial appointments were made. These two entered into a strong 
partnership to implement the reform programme. A participant observed that working with 
the new Minister, ‘it was a very Westminster ‘here is what we want to do, can you tell us 
how we would do it?’…it was what you would expect and it was very very constructive. [The 
Ministry] would do the work, test it with her, if it needed to go to Cabinet and come back, 
very supportive, very willing to be driving but to be patient…it was a good partnership, 
each...doing [their] own roles which meant that we could get some difficult stuff done.’ 
Researchers in the New Zealand Treasury offered the new government a post-election 
preparation report on health and disability support services purchasing, addressing the 
recent experience of purchasing and provision approaches and offering options for possible 
evolution. In respect of its advice on primary care, this emphasised the need for purchasers 
to establish a new set of relationships with primary care providers, especially general 
practitioners, and noted that ‘there were few incentives on primary care providers to 
consider the wider implications of their decisions for the rest of the sector and [that] the 
delivery of primary care is imperfectly coordinated with other services’ 35.  
This report acknowledged the benefits of contracting with general practitioners which had 
seen ‘movement away from fee-for-service payments towards capitation and modest 
budget-holding experiments which have reported impressive ‘savings’ in GP-initiated 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests.’ It acknowledged the growing 
bargaining position of IPAs on behalf of general practice and the increasing sophistication of 
information held about their member general practitioners. It also noted the diversity of 
primary care organisations including the not-for-profit primary care organisations which 
were community-owned and controlled which had grown to meet the need for more 
accessible and affordable primary care services.   
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The authors noted the growing support amongst IPAs’ leaders for capitation for not only 
laboratory test and pharmaceutical funding but also payments for consultation fees, but 
recognised that the major barrier to further extension of a budget management role was 
that New Zealand general practitioners remained ‘largely dependent on private fee income 
and act as private entrepreneurs who can set their own fee rates without any external 
regulation [so that policy makers will be] extremely reluctant to see them allocated budgets 
which cover their patients’ use of hospital services.’  
The report specifically acknowledged the differences in the primary health care systems 
between the United Kingdom and New Zealand with respect to co-payments and to budget 
management contracts held by general practice groupings such as IPAs. These differences 
were seen to dilute the incentives associated with English general practice fund-holding. 
Although the report recommended that the incoming government considered the option of 
further development of primary care budget-holding, it recognised that there was conflict 
between the status of general practitioners as private practitioners operating small 
businesses and the government’s desire for moves towards larger primary care 
organisations based on enrolled populations, funded via capitation and involving services of 
a team of primary care professionals. Advice was given that such a development would need 
to be connected to changes in the way general practitioners were paid 35 p.67. This would also 
prevent New Zealand policy-makers giving consideration to the large scale changes which 
occurred in England in 2010 to establish general practitioners as commissioners of hospital 
and community care for their local communities, in which they became the principal 
purchasers in the system, combining their professional power with state authority in a 
dramatic extension of their professional  mandate 67 pps. 16-19. 
The Government Strategies 
 
The development of two major health strategies, the New Zealand Health Strategy, 
published in December 2000, and the Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS), published in 
February 2001, was undertaken with the assistance of Reference and Expert Advisory 
Groups to obtain both clinical and community input. These were groups of members with a 
wide range of interests including older peoples, women, minority ethnic and disability 
interests as well as funders and practitioners and academics from the different health 
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sectors 1. There was widespread consultation on each strategy. The New Zealand Health 
Strategy attracted 466 written submissions and 1500 people attended over 60 meetings to 
provide feedback 156 p.33. This is a higher response rate, at approximately 0.5 percent of the 
total population, to consultation than was achieved in the United Kingdom (where 
responses to consultative documents on the health strategy attracted approximately 0.3 
percent of the total population). For primary care, a discussion document was issued in 
2000 and over 300 written submissions and 54 meetings provided input into the 
development of the final Strategy. 
The New Zealand Health Strategy has as its predominant theme the need to reduce 
inequalities in health care 156. Governance changes, structural changes in financing 
arrangements, goals to improve performance on particular conditions and an injection of 
new money were the chosen mechanisms to achieve this. The Strategy established thirteen 
population health objectives to reduce the impact of disease and poor lifestyle choices. The 
inequalities theme was expressed as a more pronounced theme than in the earlier 
Manifesto, perhaps reflecting the strong voice of Māori advocacy during the design and 
consultation process.  
The Minister herself was seen by a participant as wanting to ‘make a real difference to use 
the structures to deliver in a way that looked at the fence at the top of the cliff rather than 
the ambulance at the bottom.’ The New Zealand Health Strategy acknowledged that 
primary health care was critical to both improving health and reducing inequalities in health 
status.  
The PHCS which followed, therefore, set out ‘a new direction for primary health care with a 
greater emphasis on population health and the role of the community, health promotion 
and preventive care, the need to involve a range of professionals and the advantages of 
funding based on population needs rather than fees-for-service’ (King, 2001). Services in 
future would be organised around a defined group of people, enrolled with a Primary Health 
Organisation (PHO) as the local structure to achieve this and which involved the community 
in its governing process. Ambulatory-sensitive admissions (admissions to secondary care 
which might have been prevented if services had been delivered effectively in the 
community) were noted as an indicator of the accessibility and effectiveness of primary care 
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and tracked as from 2000/1 as part of the assessment of the effectiveness of the PHCS 157. 
Advice from the Treasury researchers to establish new relationships with primary care 
providers, especially general practitioners, was noted but not heeded.  
Links with past disputes over health policy 
 
The development of the two strategies was seen by some participants in this research as 
part of a continuing struggle between general practitioners and the Labour Party over 
primary care health policy (which occurred most intensely over issues associated with 
private billing by general practitioners). The stresses in this relationship between the Party 
and some general practice organisations was still fresh in the minds of several participants 
in this research even though these events had occurred over ten years prior to the 
development of new primary health care policies. On the balance of the evidence, while 
they are a contextual factor which deterred whole hearted engagement of some sections of 
the general practice interest groups representing most general practitioners, they are 
incidental to rather than a driver of the rationale for the PHCS. The Strategy was firmly 
grounded in the ideas promulgated through the Alma Ata declaration and the research 
which proposed to put primary care in the driver’s seat within national health systems  43. 
Other participants close to the Minister for Health appointed in 1999, Hon. Annette King, 
confirm that she personally led the development of the New Zealand Health Strategy and 
the PHCS, that the Prime Minister left it all to her as Minister of Health and that there was a 
‘bit of a myth about [the Prime Minister] and Health…but she wasn’t [in the role of Minister 
of Health in the previous Labour government] very long...and [Labour] had a very detailed 
manifesto in Health. It was all done in Opposition [by Hon. Annette King as Opposition 
Health spokesperson who was the Health spokesperson for three years].’  
Once appointed, the Minister of Health, Hon. Annette King was given authority to 
implement the Labour on Health manifesto commitments, with Cabinet oversight. She did 
so, keeping the Prime Minister informed. This sometimes brought her into dispute with 
Cabinet colleagues and she is credited with winning many battles, for instance over new 
money for health services and the need to reflect ethnicity in the allocation formula for 
health spending. A participant suggests that:  
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‘…I think the only thing [the Prime Minister and she] ever differed on was…[that] 
there had to be a weighting for Māori and Pacific…but it was right after [public 
controversy about a positive discrimination strategy] Closing the Gaps…and there 
was a real reluctance…[the Minister] lost it actually as a straight decision but did it in 
another way.’ 
The Ministry of Health did the detailed work in developing the published strategy, based on 
the principles of the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 at the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care. A participant says that ‘the strategy was actually written by the 
Ministry with [the Minister’s] input and the input of people…who were very aware of how it 
works [such as] having been a doctor up the East Coast.’ 
As a model of governance for primary health care, participants felt it was internationally 
acknowledged to be one of the first thorough-going attempts at implementation of the 
Alma Ata principles with fidelity: a participant describes it as ‘the zeitgeist on health around 
the world, the population-based approach.’  
Primary Care Sector agendas 
 
The heterogeneous general practice community in New Zealand had a variety of responses 
to the proposed changes to primary care. In the early months as the New Zealand Health 
Strategy and the PHCS were being developed, there was interest and support from within 
the general practice profession generally. But a Chief Executive of a large IPA summarized 
the reactions of stakeholders in the primary care sector about particular provisions as 
‘varying.’ In her view clinicians were excited about the recognition of the importance of 
primary care but had their strongest focus on patients who walked in the door, feeling a 
high level of commitment to advocacy for those patients. They did not understand 
‘disparity’ in access to health services well. They felt little responsibility for a population-
based approach to health. There was a pervasive feeling that they were paid for seeing 
patients in consultation, not for those outside the practice register or who chose not to visit 
the practice 158. 
While there was strong conceptual support for the goal to reduce health inequalities, this 
Chief Executive suggests that doctors did not all necessarily believe it to be their 
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responsibility and they did not like the targeting of health care to a particular group of 
patients. They felt that all who were ill needed the same level of clinical response. Despite 
some familiarity with population-based approaches to immunization and screening for some 
conditions, general practitioners did not feel that they had the expertise to develop health 
promotion or health education strategies or to utilize population health tools as required by 
the new PHCS.       
Participants interviewed for this research saw the PHCS as having many laudable elements 
but containing a fundamental threat to doctors by what they saw as explicit proposals to 
augment clinical leadership and clinical governance of their practice with a primary care 
team-based and community-governed approach. One participant says that ‘there were lots 
of things that made general practitioners very tense. General practitioners associated 
Labour with being anti-general practitioner. This was never manifested in the composition 
of groups [in which consultation about the PHCS was conducted], they managed [to conduct 
consultation with an inclusive approach] well. Everyone you would expect to be there was in 
the groups I was involved in. [General practitioners] are actually a private business and if 
you don’t build that into your policy you will strike resistance and fail in certain ways.’  
As another participant put it: 
‘It was a turbulent time. Government and the [primary care] groups were in a major 
conflict around how government funding was rolled out … [the Prime Minister] had 
had a low view of GPs.’ 
This period of policymaking was described by a participant as engendering:  
‘a major cultural shift with the PHCS and PHOs, and organised general practice was 
really deeply concerned for the right reasons that what had held them together 
through the 90s and supported a lot of the innovation they got into such as cell 
groups, utilization review and feedback, performance improvement activities had 
been…budget holding…[and] had mobilized general practice…Then when the 
Primary Health Care Strategy and PHOs came along, all those budget holding and 
budget management contracts were abandoned as inappropriate in the new 
environment…they were seen as  GP-centric as opposed to primary care-centric; 
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they were not universal in their coverage – just a few IPAs were delivering services 
under these contracts and there was idiosyncratic budget setting so it wasn’t 
compatible with the population-based funding formula models of DHBs and the PHO 
capitation formula.’ 
For one participant, ‘the primary care organisation I was associated with made a decision to 
exit the market and disappeared.’ Other stakeholders within the primary care sector, such 
as community-governed not-for-profit primary care practices and their umbrella 
organisations, welcomed the changes.  
Top-Down Implementation 
 
Unlike the spontaneous emergence of organisational and governance forms within primary 
care during the 1990s in New Zealand, the legislation for changes to primary care ownership 
and governance from 2001 was quickly enacted and implemented by the Ministry of Health 
and District Health Boards, despite misgivings in parts of the primary health care sector. 
With implementation of the PHCS, the tentative commitments about capitation, including 
changes to financing arrangements, in the New Zealand Labour Party Manifesto were 
strengthened and implemented. District Health Boards received a fully integrated budget 
for all health care used by people who live in their area for primary, secondary and tertiary 
services. The opportunity for organisations to form as new intermediate non-profit 
organisations, PHOs, to be funded on a capitated needs-based formula, was set out. There 
were clear criteria set down for an organisation to become a PHO.  
Research has established that ‘a hierarchical mode of governance was in fact implemented 
quickly, with mechanisms to ensure political accountability to the government’ 159 p.118 
through the new District Health Boards (DHBs). The Boards and their staff were strongly 
influenced by national strategies and targets for improved outcomes and integration of 
health services. A shift from ‘preoccupation with resource management to health outcomes 
as the ‘bottom line’ of health service organisations’ was delivered through these governance 
changes 160. 
In the PHCS Minimum Requirements for PHOs issued by the Minister in November 2001 161 
the Minister stated that ‘Māori providers, Pacific providers, Independent Practitioners’ 
174 
 
Associations and other organisations can all evolve into PHOs.’ The requirements specified 
that services delivered with public funding must be directed towards improving and 
maintaining the health of the population as well as first line services to restore people’s 
health when they are unwell; to involve the communities in their governing processes and 
show that they are responsive to communities’ priorities and needs; demonstrate that all 
their providers and practitioners can influence the organisation’s decision-making rather 
than one group being dominant; and be not-for-profit organisations fully and openly 
accountable for all public funds they receive. PHOs were required to identify initiatives to 
improve the health of their enrolled population and work with groups who have poor health 
or were missing out on services to address their needs. 
The Minister of Health’s Foreword to the set of minimum requirements stressed that 
providers and communities should be able to ‘move at their own pace’ and the document 
stated that the process for implementing the PHCS ‘is to be an evolutionary one’ 161. 
Nevertheless, this set of requirements was incompatible with the ownership and 
governance arrangements of most existing IPAs and would require them to radically change 
their mode of operation in order to comply with the requirements and access the new 
funding for primary care services. For example, the survey of these organisations conducted 
in 1998 155 had reported that the main source of funding for 14 of 28 respondent 
organisations was from contracts which were now being terminated by the incoming Labour 
government. All IPAs would need to become not-for-profit organisations if they wished to 
become PHOs. Of respondents to the 1998 survey, over half were limited liability 
companies, four were partnerships and four incorporated societies, with two being non-
profit trusts.     
While it was voluntary for a general practice to become a member of a PHO, there were 
considerable financial incentives to do so once new funding for primary care was 
announced. Only through PHOs could new levels of subsidy be gained. By 2005 there were 
77 PHOs covering 3.9 million New Zealanders who had enrolled for their services.  
The Independent Practitioners’ Association Council of New Zealand sought to influence the 
new primary health care funding provisions when these were published for consultation as 
part of the implementation of the PHCS in 2002. A change was eventually made, which later 
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became known as Care Plus, in the funding package. Participants in this research who were 
describing the challenges and benefits of consulting on the development of policy for 
primary health care said ‘we agonised over it, we thought it would be easier without Care 
Plus...but hang on its got some good benefits...what helped was us being open to it if it’s a 
good idea...rather than [say to its proponents] go away its complicated enough.’    
Designing the PP 
 
From the Ministry’s point of view, once the structural health reforms were completed, there 
was both the time and the need for other more operational policy design to strengthen 
primary care performance to support the goals of the PHCS and to deal with policy issues 
arising from the reforms themselves.   
Who was involved 
 
There was no mention of pay-for-performance in either the New Zealand Health Strategy or 
the PHCS, though the Health Strategy spoke of setting standards and performance targets 
and rewarding achievement of these. The introduction and approval of the pay-for-
performance policy proposal came through a working group led by a senior civil servant 
which had been set up to find ways to manage pharmaceutical prescribing and referrals to 
services more equitably within a population-based funding framework, now that budget 
management contracts were no longer available. Resembling the technically-driven and 
rationalist policymaking process developed during the 1990s 33, it was nevertheless a more 
inclusive one which readily adopted ideas from within the primary health care sector, than 
the process which was used to develop the health policy proposals implemented in 1993. It 
is described by a participant: 
‘The idea came forward that it would be very good to incentivise certain 
performance measures…grew out of the nexus of communication between the 
Ministry and the sector…the primary health care sector itself had measures and 
some of the groupings of general practices had gone quite a long way down the 
pathway’; 
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and: 
‘It was also very much in the interests of the Ministry to find ways to increase the 
commitment of the new PHOs and their funders to improving the health status of 
their whole enrolled population, particularly since the new capitated funding 
arrangements carried with it the risk that practices might just sit there with the 
additional money and not see the people…So [the Ministry] were wanting to shift 
the focus from the one to one walk in the door fix the big toe to ‘you have an 
enrolled population, we want you keeping them healthy, we want measures that are 
collective and for the PHO to be able to influence’.’ 
The Ministry of Health had an evolutionary ‘build forward’ approach. There was a 
willingness to build on what existed, such as the utilisation review and clinical governance 
systems which IPAs had developed. This participant says that  officials were keen to say 
‘look [they] had this in place prior, could [they] not use something like this in future, could it 
not be national.’ Understanding that it was ‘fertile ground – [the sector] had done some of 
the work’ and that ‘[it was possible] to use some of their ideas, [not] rubbishing the 
structures that were there, [but to] use them to build into the future’ assisted in the 
building of acceptance of the changes.  
A participant in the design team confirms that ‘key elements such as utilisation review and 
feedback, comparison of individual utilisation patterns versus that of a wider group [was] 
what we were trying to preserve. In essence that was the nucleus of the 90s that we were 
trying to take forward into the next stage, but shifting the focus from ‘pharms’ and ‘labs’ 
into a population health environment compatible with the PHO model and scalable and 
reproducable across the whole country.’  
Another participant acknowledges ‘the government were trying to say you guys had done 
some performance stuff and we are keen to try to understand that and put it into this new 
paradigm – I credit them for that.’  
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The Referred Services Advisory Group  
 
The Terms of Reference for the Referred Services Advisory Group (RSAG) convened by a 
senior official of the Ministry of Health in 2001 included provision of advice on suitable ways 
of funding referred services, how to develop and support clinical governance, suitable 
performance measures and information needs and other tools 148. 
Many providers serving high needs populations had not participated in the schemes. In fact, 
there were concerns that their populations were under-serviced. A participant explains a 
motive as: ‘we needed to move away from rewarding savings on historical budgets and 
instead reward quality and at the same time put much more focus on equity. Under the 
existing arrangements, the more disadvantaged populations tended to have low levels of 
‘pharms’ and ‘labs’ spending and were missing out – on drugs and lab tests as well as on the 
opportunity to benefit from the savings achieved by [other] general practitioners.’ 
Even those areas where use of referred services was high would over time reduce their 
capacity to make savings. The RSAG was presented with an opportunity to design ‘suitable 
ways of funding referred services to meet the needs of a defined population.’ The new PHCS  
had required New Zealanders to enrol for primary health care services so that these were 
delivered to a defined group of people in each PHO 1 p.viii. The RSAG was tasked to advise the 
Ministry, amongst other things, on ‘appropriate incentives for organisations to manage 
referred services within a predetermined budget’ 148 p.4. 
The Report of the RSAG demonstrates the dominance of concerns about equity which 
underpinned the initiatives in primary health care during these years. Its subtitle is ‘Building 
towards equity, quality and better health outcomes.’ The opening statement of the 
Summary states that ‘There has been concern for some time that the expenditure on 
pharmaceutical and laboratory services (‘referred services’) has not been allocated 
according to need’ 148 p.3. The report establishes as its context the report of the National 
Health Committee in 2000 which identified that ‘achieving better health outcomes for New 
Zealanders, and reducing wide inequalities in health status, is significantly dependent upon 
better access to and utilization of primary health care services’162.  
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Membership of the RSAG was heavily dominated by academic and funder interests. Of ten 
members, one was a well-known and influential practicing general practitioner serving a 
community with a mixture of low and high health needs. He had considerable experience in 
the study and development of quality frameworks. Four were academics, one of whom had 
undertaken extensive research into IPA budget-holding schemes as well as research into 
patterns of prescribing and referral from an equity perspective. There were three District 
health board staff, an employee of a network of primary health providers and an academic 
employed by the Royal College of General Practice with experience of analysis of practice-
based data and a track record in indicator development. None held a representative 
mandate, however. They were invited to join the group because of their personal expertise.   
The RSAG met on six occasions between October 2001 and August 2002 and delivered its 
report to the Ministry in October 2002. In this relatively short time frame, the RSAG 
developed recommendations covering the general approach for funding pharmaceuticals 
and laboratory tests, an exemplary set of indicators, a payment and information 
management framework and a clinical governance framework together with an 
implementation plan.  
The Report of the RSAG devoted nearly one third of the body of the report to the issue of 
inequity and variation in the use of referred services. Up to 2001, funding for primary care 
services had been ‘distributed according to the number of services provided by doctors and 
the associated prescriptions that are written’ whereas the new funding arrangements under 
the PHCS provided funding to PHOs according to ‘a formula that reflects the relative need of 
their enrolled population, taking account of factors such as age, sex, deprivation level and 
ethnicity’ 1 p.14. The new approach to be taken was to provide ‘financial rewards for quality 
practice, as opposed to financially reward under-spending of a budget based on historic 
spending levels’ 148 p.7. To do so the report stated that a set of nationally consistent quality 
indicators needed to be developed.     
The Report acknowledged the achievements of budget management strategies by IPAs in 
developing amongst general practitioners a ‘sense of collegiality and accountability, greater 
sensitivity to quality issues, acceptance of the need for evidence-based decision making, 
exposure to peer review and building a sense of identity within a new and broadly based 
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organisational framework’ 148. It recognises that clinical leadership, the potential for savings 
and a commitment to promoting good quality general practice had been the drivers of these 
achievements. In the new environment the Report noted that it would be necessary to 
establish needs-based budgets for referred services, a set of nationally consistent quality 
indicators, quality payments to reward achievements, equity payments to increase levels of 
under-funded regions and systems for comprehensive information management. The 
Report envisaged PHOs would develop clinical governance frameworks and would need 
training and support to build on the approaches ‘developed to date by primary care 
organisations’ 148 p.9. Consistent with Treasury advice about the perverse incentives involved 
35, it expressed opposition to risk-based budget holding as an appropriate mechanism in the 
new environment but advocated increased payments to enable PHOs to establish 
organisational systems and infrastructure to support the new approach.  
An exemplary set of 29 indicators was set out in the Report drawing on the work done for a 
primary care organisation, First Health Ltd, which had been published in the New Zealand 
Medical Journal in 2002 163. Only some of these relate to referred services. The set contains 
proposed indicators such as advice to smokers, childhood and older person flu 
immunizations, blood pressure screening, action plans for asthmatics and diabetes 
management processes. These resemble the breadth and potential for impact on health 
outcomes of the QOF in England and are consistent with the most pressing health problems 
noted in the New Zealand Health Strategy. It is in fact a blueprint for incentivising quality 
and for improving health outcomes generally. The report notes that the commitment by 
government to a substantial increase in funding for primary care services justified an 
increased expectation by funders on improved quality of service.  
Recommending that the confirmation of a set of indicators is subject to consultation with 
sector stakeholders, the report goes on to emphasize the importance of an improved and 
nationally consistent information database to enable assessment of compliance with quality 
practice and of the availability of clinical governance systems to support practices in 
improving quality.   
It proposed a funding model which offers up to 2 percent of annual average per capita 
spending, including on referred services, as a reward for PHOs achieving the maximum 
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quality score. A period of three years transition from the current historical pattern to a 
population-based funding formula was recommended. Cabinet ministers were advised of 
the progress with this work and of the policy intention to reward PHO gains in key health 
priority areas in October 2002 164 p.7.  
Consultation with the Primary Care Sector 
 
Prior to the completion of the RSAG’s report, as part of the Group’s deliberations, a 
consultative workshop on the proposal to establish a performance management framework 
for PHOs was held in August 2002. This workshop supported the proposal to take the set of 
29 indicators and consult more widely with sector stakeholders. 
The next step was to establish a group of providers, professional groups and funders to 
oversee a consultative, internet-based process for developing a broad set of quality 
indicators for PHOs, with performance measures and targets. The decision to commence 
this further process reflected the concern that there were strongly held views about quality 
improvement within general practice. The full participation of medical practitioners in the 
decision-making around selection of quality indicators was seen to be essential. A 
participant recalls that though an evidence-based set of indicators was proposed by the 
Advisory Group, ‘it took three more years to undergo a process of achieving buy-in from the 
sector...it is undermined and challenged still [in 2007]. [Academics] knew better than to 
simply present a set of indicators as a fait accompli - they would not have been accepted. 
People...had their own measures in place and they were very attached to them. The general 
feeling was that indicators were an important tool but that each group of GPs should be 
able to determine their own set.’  
Firstly an internet-based Delphi process was implemented. This was a process to debate and 
decide upon the indicators. Led by an academic, with an advisory group who were in touch 
with the academics involved in the design of the QOF in England and who co-published 
articles with them, the process commenced with commitment from a wide variety of 
participants. A participant recalls that ‘30 general practitioners were in the sample who 
suggested indicators, they did not have to meet but we did a lot of analysis between cycles 
and if someone wanted to get rid of some indicator the reason was provided and little 
181 
 
graphs were sent out...we looked at the attrition rate as people had to...score it and we 
used lots of different ways [to monitor and encourage engagement]...the only resistance we 
had was from people who wanted a more rigorous process.’ However, participation levels 
dropped away. Others suggest the process became undermined by technical problems and 
absenteeism and that small numbers of participants stayed the course of the process. 
However, one participant noted that this reduced the visibility of the process to interest 
groups, saying ‘because the PP took so long to become concrete, there was not much 
interest group involvement.’   
Following this process, in September 2003 a Clinical Performance Indicator Advisory Group 
was established to provide advice on implementation of a set of clinical indicators and had 
commissioned Otago University’s Wellington School of Medicine and Health Sciences to 
develop an indicator assessment tool and report with recommendations for the process for 
identifying and deciding upon indicators.  
The Project to Implement the Pay-for-Performance Programme 
 
In a parallel process the second stage of the implementation of the RSAG report was to 
establish another project. Leadership of the process was handed to joint Chairs representing 
the District Health Boards and the Ministry respectively and their brief was to consider 
management of referred services within an incentivised framework. The intention was that 
further planning and implementation would also be jointly managed by funder and policy 
personnel. These two Chairs developed and obtained approval for a project plan which 
required a large group of stakeholders to come together to debate and design a PP for 
primary care. They then convened and jointly chaired this group known as the Referred 
Services Expert Advisory Group (RSEAG). By contrast with the rationalist and technocratic 
approach taken in the design phase of this policy making process, the implementation phase 
was intended to obtain maximum engagement with key funder and provider stakeholders.   
During the course of the project, the Clinical Performance Indicator Advisory Group and the 
RSEAG merged their efforts in a collaborative process to develop the final Performance 
Management Operational Framework and its initial agreed set of indicators, including 
referred services performance measures, and formed a Primary Health Organisation 
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Performance Management Advisory group to advise on and support implementation of the 
programme 164.    
The Joint Chairs of the RSEAG themselves were carefully chosen. One was a general 
practitioner and ex-general manager of a primary care network organisation who had been 
appointed to a senior advisory role in the Ministry of Health to support the implementation 
of the PHCS. Another was employed in a large District health board, who had also had 
considerable experience in managing budget holding and budget management contracts 
during the 1990s. He knew the sector leaders very well and his management experience 
complemented the clinical experience of the other co-Chair. In fact they had worked 
together in a Regional Health Authority during the 90s and were instrumental in developing 
a capitated funding approach for general practice that was widely accepted by providers in 
their region. In this sense these two policy makers resembled leaders of the English initiative 
– outsiders to the core civil service who could be considered to have high experience and 
credibility built in the earlier era of market-oriented funder/profession relationships. These 
skills and relationships were seen as necessary and useful if they could be carried into the 
new collaborative, community-oriented era.    
When it came to the selection of members for the RSEAG and the design process itself, the 
Chairs had a clear strategy. As a participant recalls: 
‘Basically [they] got everybody inside the tent...chose the stakeholders, the people 
to get into the tent and they were of course all the troublemakers, all the people 
with very strong opinions on it plus...moderated that a bit by making sure...[there 
was] vocal Māori and Pacific presence there.’ 
Members were primarily chosen for their expertise. They included general practitioners, 
pathologists, pharmacists, people with an inequalities perspective. Another recalls: 
‘People selected were identified on the basis of expertise and experience with 
actually making something happen in relation to clinical governance, not on the basis 
of representation of professional groups. That particular approach caused tensions. 
The reality was most of the people were also members of national groups but [they 
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were chosen] not because they were representing these but because they were 
recognized as leaders in this area.’ 
Within the different interests, a distinction could be made between those with experience 
of organised general practice – the IPAs – and those general practitioners who were focused 
on high needs population and equity of provision. A participant from within the first group 
comments: 
‘the membership reflected the ideology of the times – quite sensibly the government 
were trying to say [the sector] have done some performance stuff and we are keen 
to try to understand that and put it into this new paradigm – I credit them for that 
thinking but the ideology was more important…it was a state-directed programme.’   
Some general practitioner members of the group were reported by participants as later 
disowning the resulting programme. A participant acknowledges ‘At the end of it would I say 
the College [of General Practice] had a sense of ownership around the programme? – 
absolutely not for reasons which are quite complex…it is a question of control.’  
One participant suggested that representatives of IPAs who had pioneered quality 
improvement initiatives in the competitive context of the 1990s were uncomfortable and 
unable to quickly adjust in the new collaborative environment. They had been asserting the 
ability of IPAs to achieve better results but now all organisations could participate in a 
national scheme and see if this was true (Personal communication). Another recollects the 
efforts of the IPAs during the 1990s in quality improvement initiatives, both within their 
own organisations and in IPA conferences, to share techniques, but noted that some were 
secretive about processes to achieve quality while boasting about levels of achievement. 
Levels of contribution and influence within the RSEAG differed, especially between officials 
and other group members: 
‘generally those Ministry people were much more involved in it – it’s their day job – 
whereas the GPs were in an advisory role and would turn up once a month. Those 
who were living and breathing it day-to-day have a sense of confidence about the 
way they talk about it, the depth of thought they have put into their suggestions, 
rightly or wrongly, which tend to become trickier for the people who are the 
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weekend warrior type…to resist the way some of these things go. There are key 
individuals in those groups who exercise influence at certain times and there are 
some who command attention throughout the meetings and those for whom a 
fraction of the decisions go their way.’ 
The project team, therefore, included members with many differing interests and resources. 
The chosen approach was facilitative and sought to engage all members of the team in the 
production of a shared plan for implementation of the pay-for-performance programme. 
This was an extremely challenging task.   
What was done 
 
The RSEAG met over a nine month period. The generation of papers for debate by the 
Group and literature reviews was undertaken by the small project team staff, one of whom 
had previous experience of the implementation of PCTs in England. 
 A participant says 
‘there was a set of themes and principles that we got straight out of the PHCS that 
needed to provide the foundation and it was a real challenge keeping those clinical 
leaders in the tent…those people had a belief system about IPAs that…had been 
shaped during the 90s and a lot of those principles and beliefs and values were quite 
incompatible with the PHCS. What [was attempted] was re-orient the world into the 
PHCS and [there was] some difficulty keeping everybody in the tent through that 
process. On the other hand they did recognize the issue and everybody knew we 
couldn’t just reproduce the 90s.’ 
There was a clear recognition of the problem that the Group had to solve and an agreement 
that there needed to be a conscious, informed decision about this which had the support of 
clinical leaders. A participant suggests that ‘intermediate organisations are very context-
specific. IPAs were a result of the 1990s and the philosophy of the 1990s and the drivers of 
the health system of the 1990s. They were useful in…generating a collegial network of 
practices and the better ones did good things around quality…but it was highly variable…the 
Labour government moved to the next level of saying actually primary care is about 
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populations and it is about communities and it is as much philosophy as it is anything else … 
and it is certainly not just a medical model.’ 
Clinical leadership in the new environment 
 
The proposed restructuring of the primary health care sub-system led to vigorous debate 
amongst members about how existing systems and resources for clinical leadership would 
be affected. There was considerable anxiety voiced amongst leaders of IPAs that their 
systems and resources for clinical leadership would be imperilled in this new environment 
and income streams upon which they had come to rely would be closed off. A participant 
explains: 
‘Performance improvement activities had been funded through pharmaceutical and 
in some cases laboratory budget-holding…which allowed them to undertake all these 
activities that had mobilized general practice and led to a lot of the performance 
improvement initiatives…these people had been the leaders in the 1990s and had 
personally led a whole round of innovation and entrepreneurial drive and that 
needed a home.’ 
The inequalities agenda 
 
There was also the need to address health inequalities and this was vigorously championed 
by members with experience of community-based primary care service delivery in regions 
with high health needs and by Māori and Pacific members. There was a perceived need to 
remove the wide variation in referred services expenditure which was not explained by 
patient factors and which pointed instead to inequity of utilisation. A participant says:  
‘[They] needed to have some transparency around equity in budget setting…take [an 
IPA with] some of the highest pharmaceutical utilisation in the country - how would 
you set a “pharms” budget…using a national formula? They would never have any 
savings…[the IPA] had got to get expenditure down to the national norm.’    
An equity focus was also important because the international experience with pay-for-
performance is that schemes can aggravate inequalities in the short term. 
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The focus on quality and equity arose in part because the problem of cost containment 
which budget management contracts had been set up to solve had been effectively tackled 
already. That participant continues ‘The driver of pharmaceutical budget holding had been 
growth in pharmaceutical expenditure, but actually Pharmac (New Zealand’s central 
purchaser of pharmaceuticals) had that under control, so why bother? In respect of labs that 
was the start of the period [when] labs were themselves…moved off fee-for-service and 
onto fixed contracts meaning they were carrying the volume and price risk.’  
This meant that quality improvement had to be the rationale for the project, requiring a 
fundamental shift in focus. The participant further explains ‘At the end of the day [it] was 
about improving performance in primary health care.’ There was also an acceptance that ‘all 
patients are in PHOs, all practices are in PHOs, this has got to be a model which is available 
for all, not just negotiated idiosyncratically IPA by IPA.’ 
This in turn raised concerns. Another participant says, ‘There are some organisations who 
feel uneasy about funders wanting to get into performance and quality improvement 
because it is seen as an area where professional control is fundamental.’ There was 
sympathy for those concerns. ‘[It was necessary] to understand why people would be 
concerned…do I want to get into bed with government, how could I protect myself … mostly 
they wanted to do well for their patients…[they] had to walk in the shoes [of those 
organisations] – it is classic change management really.’  
How it was done 
 
As one participant describes it, it was like herding cats to come up with indicators that were 
appropriate, with clinical and financial indicators and a focus on Pacific and Māori and high 
needs all in place. There were often 20 people in the meetings. One of the Chairs was 
reported by participants to play a key role in getting the dynamics of the group working well 
and ensuring the process was based on consensus (Private conversation). Another 
participant believed the vigour of well managed debate created a more robust policy 
framework. ‘Do you want everybody thinking the same and it being easy or do you want a 
bunch of people who think differently…but at the end of the day you get a better 
product…because you have ironed out all the ifs and the buts.’ 
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The Group included Māori and Pacific members who advocated strongly for the needs of 
their communities. A participant recalls  
‘Areas of real dispute included whether or not to make recording ethnicity a 
condition of entry to the programme, some were won and some didn’t get through. 
Some got manipulated and changed, so they became ineffective in changing 
behaviour.’ 
Another area of dispute was whether to focus on one or two major targets with large health 
impacts such as smoking ‘which is the biggest preventable cause of death in New Zealand. 
Why didn’t we choose that first? [we some years later] put a proposal...that we should 
dump everything except Cardiovascular disease and spend the entire money on CVD as the 
one thing we should go after...it got a hearing but it didn’t win the day but it did change the 
balance of payments...it is more valuable.’ 
Pay-for-performance? 
 
The issue of incentivising performance was not prominent in the debates. One participant 
recalls ‘I am not sure the government was actually trying to implement pay-for-
performance.’ An informant confirms that the use of financial incentives was to strengthen 
the role of PHO and bring in the general practitioners and nurses for education. Participants 
felt that the financial incentives were used because there was evidence that they worked 
but their primary purpose was not to incentivise general practitioners.  
It will be seen that this differentiates the New Zealand scheme fundamentally from the 
English one. In England the locus of impact of the incentives was to be the health actions 
taken by the individual general practitioner with patients on their register, albeit through a 
new form of practice-based rather than individual contract. The English scheme required an 
entirely different set of incentives and processes to be managed both in the process of 
design and implementation and in its eventual management as a pay-for-performance 
programme. The locus of impact of the New Zealand scheme was on the actions of PHOs to 
encourage providers of primary care series in their community to focus on preventive health 
care. The incentives and processes associated with this scheme operated at the level of PHO 
policymaking and practice, at some arms-length from the health actions of general 
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practitioners or from the clinical governance systems which supported quality improvement 
in general practice. The same incentives for individual general practitioners to engage with 
policymaking which, it has been seen, animated the negotiations in England were not 
present to the same extent in the New Zealand policymaking process.   
This is further confirmed by the strong principle agreed by all parties that the money went 
to the PHOs rather than automatically into practice income as it would do in the scheme in 
England. There was no antecedent policy of incentivising general practitioners directly as 
there was in England. Even IPAs’ budget management savings had to be re-invested in 
clinical governance systems and health services. In fact, this was also a point of dispute for 
some participants with experience of the earlier IPA schemes who maintained that income 
from savings in their schemes was never able to be distributed directly to general 
practitioners as it was possible to do under the PP. The survey conducted by Malcolm et al 
in 1998 had reported that IPAs considered ‘the retention of savings for personal benefits as 
both unprofessional and unethical’ 155.  
The risk of crowding out other valued behaviours was also a concern to the group, explained 
by a participant as follows: 
‘It is small by comparison with QOF because the committee didn’t want people to 
spend all their clinical hours focusing on these indicators some of which might not be 
relevant. It’s a burden for practices to do all this extra activity so why would we get 
them to do activity which would not necessarily improve health…So [they] were 
reluctant to add in more.’ 
Convivial debate 
 
The discussions were seen as convivial – one participant commented that ‘there were no 
stand up rows and walking out’ and another felt: 
‘The dynamics in the group were great…we had about the right amount of people 
with the right types of views and common agreement that we would debate the hell 
out of them.’ 
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However, there was a pattern of disengagement by some members with experience of 
organised general practice from active participation in the debates, both during the process 
of implementation design and later when the PP was launched.  
Sometimes the technical challenges of the task were sufficient to transcend deep-seated 
differences in interests and priorities. Officials were sometimes surprised at the way in 
which members of the Group appeared to place the interests of their organisations second 
to the technical requirements of designing an effective scheme. A participant said:  
‘I did a presentation to…the Ministry – it’s another one of those vivid memories 
where you go to the Ministry and say this is where it is going and its completely 
wrong and [the official] looked at me and said why on earth would YOU tell me this – 
if we correct the formula it will get worse for [your PHO]…this attitude about PHO 
motives persists today.’ 
Another says: 
‘There was intense distrust between the Ministry and general practice – always has 
been and always will be. They have different goals. The Ministry of Health is a 
bureaucracy and wants to maintain itself and serve its political masters. General 
practice is not that animal – it has its own role and different parts have different 
goals like ensuring the financial viability of doctors or maintaining their power and 
dominance and access to the money and other socialist parts of general practice see 
the role to improve the health of the population. General practice in NZ didn’t want 
to see the closeness of the relationship with the government that exists in the UK.’ 
The plurality of forms of general practice which had occurred in New Zealand was reflected 
in these debates. The views of the members associated with IPA contrasted with those from 
other types of primary heath management organisations and non-profit groups with largely 
salaried staff operating as primary care health centres in areas of high socio-economic need. 
One participant said that these latter were sometimes ‘conscientious objectors to budget-
holding and there were some research individuals who chose to support that view, with 
research of varying quality about suggesting that it was skewing things, couldn’t possibly 
work with their population. What they used to say was this will aggravate health 
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inequalities.’ These organisations were seen to provide the model for practices under the 
PHCS: another participant suggests ‘the PHCS was largely based on the Health Care 
Aotearoa model – the union/community owned model of health care’; and another says 
‘this is what [they were] trying to achieve out of PHOs…almost a reaction against the IPA-
type model…the population focus, community-linked, focus on inequalities was what was in 
the strategy, not focusing on making a dollar.’ 
In the design stage, the Chairs worked hard to achieve policy recommendations based on 
consensus within the group, referring these for decision where necessary to the respective 
sponsor organisations, the Ministry of Health and the combined District Health Boards. 
Consensus rather than unanimity was achieved within the group. No attempt was made to 
achieve formal approval from representative primary health care provider organisations or 
the general practice leadership in New Zealand, about the recommendations for the 
scheme. Members of the group were not mandated to nor expected to speak on behalf of 
their organisations. As has been reported above, some, subsequent to the approval of the 
framework by Ministers, later disowned elements of it.  
The final set of thirteen indicators reflected compromise, pressure of time, ready availability 
of data and a belief that it was better to ‘build the infrastructure and expectations around 
measuring something’ which could then evolve. There was also a sense amongst some 
members that it was an important response to a level of: 
‘uncertainty about whether these change programmes would still be encouraged or 
not –  budget holding contracts [had been] cancelled so [people] were thinking are 
we doing this or are we not and there was a certain level of anxiety believing this 
was a good thing to do.’ 
Another said: 
‘Nobody said we can’t use an indicator because the evidence wasn’t bullet proof – 
some of the stuff will never get to the 100 percent answer. It’s going to be evolving 
so let’s just get on and do something.’ 
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Academic advice 
 
The group utilised a variety of consultative methods and the assistance of the University of 
Otago Wellington School of Medicine and Health Sciences to complete the selection of a 
small set of thirteen indicators for the first phase of implementation. The selected indicators 
had to be the subject of existing data-collection processes so did not always directly 
correlate with improved health status. This issue of data availability also reflected past 
disputes between IPAs, which had been seen as reluctant to share information, and other 
community-governed organisations which were keen to collaborate and share information 
and strategies to improve services with one another. The divergent approach reflected in 
the survey of Independent Practitioners’ Associations undertaken by Malcolm et al in 1998 
which showed that ‘only 12 [of 28 respondents] supported sharing of information between 
IPAs and similar groups’ 155. A participant believes ‘One of the principles of the [doctors in 
the 1990s] regime was “we own the data”. When you strip away the rhetoric you get “if we 
own the data we own the system. You can buy it but we will tell you which bits you can buy 
… this really illuminates the whole system of PHOs versus IPAs. IPAs own the data but PHOs 
can say we are the community and it is our data – why shouldn’t we share it”.’ Another 
group member recalls that some general practitioners were very concerned about privacy 
risks and that data relating to some indicators such as mental health conditions and breast 
screening could become identifiable (Personal communication). 
Although there was academic advice about the selection of indicators and target setting 
methodology, the group modified this advice. The selection process recommended by the 
academic advisors (‘the sieve’) was thought to be overly demanding and the proposed use 
of bands of achievement thought to be unfair where if a PHO was at the top of a band only a 
tiny amount of reward was payable for getting to the next band (Private conversation).  The 
group adopted  a model of continuous lines (‘the closer the Primary Health Organisation 
moves towards its target the greater the proportion of the payment they will receive’8) so 
that no matter what proportion of improvement was achieved,  the corresponding funding 
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for that indicator was paid. The work to design a ‘sieve’ to select indicators was also lengthy 
and incomplete at the time that decisions needed to be made on the initial set of indicators. 
One participant says ‘The initial set were a bit of a hotch-potch and not necessarily 
completely academically validated and weren’t necessarily consistent to objectives but it 
was always intended that that was the starting point. [Leaders] used to say ‘don’t let the 
perfect get in the way of the good.’ 
A first step 
 
The set of indicators which were finally selected for the launch of the PP were of three 
types: clinical; process indicators (focusing on the ability of the PHO to support population 
health and quality interventions); and financial indicators of pharmaceutical and laboratory 
expenditure against benchmarks of indicative budgets weighted for unmet need. The clinical 
indicators were those which could be drawn from national databases in a pragmatic step to 
enable the programme to get under way. It was decided that implementation of a second 
set of provisional indicators would need to be contingent on more work at the practice and 
PHO level. These were to be focused on chronic disease (including smoking status, statins 
use, recording of chronic disease and certain data relating to cardiovascular risk, diabetes, 
urinary tract infection investigation and tests for iron deficiency). 
The framework for targets, scoring and rewards was constructed on a PHO baseline 
performance level. In the first measurement period, to attain full marks those with low 
levels were expected to achieve more than those whose levels were already at or near the 
national goal. The clinical indicators constituted 60 percent of the total possible score and 
financial indicators 30 percent, with 10 percent for process achievements. A double 
weighting for achievement for high needs populations which could be identified within a 
PHO total enrolled population was provisioned. The rewards could be used for extending or 
introducing health programmes, quality initiatives, continuous quality improvement 
infrastructure, rewarding practices for effort or funding professional development, as 
agreed between the PHO and the District Health Board.  
The indicative budgets for referred services management for each PHO, against which their 
expenditure performance would be measured, were set taking account of estimated 
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historical expenditure and utilisation based on age and gender, an allowance for policy 
changes and an unmet needs adjustment to reflect low historical utilisation in deprived 
areas. However expenditure would be measured at a practitioner level. If the PHO 
expenditure was found to be in excess of the target, it would not receive the full score for 
that measurement period. This made the need to have a strong connection between the PP 
provisions and clinical governance mechanisms in each PHO critical to the success of the 
scheme, which was not seen to have been achieved in subsequent evaluations 165.  
At the Minister’s request, officials had scoped the options for rewarding PHOs for charging 
low fees to patients as part of the PP. This was not recommended because of a number of 
perceived technical and other risks, however, provides further evidence of the continuing 
search by Labour politicians for ways to discourage co-payments which might create barriers 
to access to care for people with health needs.   
Funder sponsors were pleased with the process of policy design, which was reported to the 
Minister of Health as an operational framework in 2004 164 p.7. Funding was approved by 
Cabinet in July 2004 164 p.2. The Cabinet Social Development Committee, in August 2004, 
noted that the Cabinet had invited the Minister of Health to report to the Social 
Development Committee annually on ‘the development of effective accountability 
measures to ensure that PHO funding is used as intended, including incentives such as 
performance-based payments and sanctions for PHOs’ 166 and received regular reports on 
progress thereafter. A final report to the Minister of Health, detailing the ‘emergent 
approach’ with a ‘good level of sector buy-in,’ was completed in May 2005 164 p.16 with 
recommendations for the implementation of the Programme. In all, the process took a 
further two years from the completion of the Referred Services Advisory Group report in 
October 2002 to complete the detailed policy design for decision. Together with the 
subsequent implementation projects, the whole design process took five years to complete 
prior to the commencement of the PP and a further two years for implementation.    
Implementation 
 
In a second phase of policy implementation, a Primary Health Organisation Performance 
Management Advisory Group was tasked with the development of an Operational 
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Framework for the PP in 2004. Feedback on the draft framework for the PP had been 
sought, as in England, from the primary care sector in a national road show in that year. The 
set of indicators and the funding framework were approved in July 2005. A new 
organisational network, District Health Boards New Zealand (or DHBNZ), had formed in 2001 
to strengthen coordination between the 21 District Health Boards, offering services 
including industrial relations, liaison with the Ministry of Health and leadership in regional 
collaboration. A team within this organisation led the roll out of the new PP with great skill 
and patience. The approved framework was introduced in two further road shows in 2005 
to give details of its operational aspects and to give technical report training to staff of PHOs 
and District Health Boards about the PP. It is clear from the framework documents that its 
purpose is to ‘improve the health of enrolled populations and reduce inequalities in health 
outcomes.’ 9  
Finally, in 2006, the network of, then, 81 PHOs, were invited voluntarily to take up the PP. 
Those PHOs wishing to participate had to demonstrate that they had recorded ethnicity for 
85 percent of their patient register. They also had to show compliance with the fees 
agreement in their contract with their District health board. On this basis they could obtain 
funding in two instalments to establish the PP: an initial sum to assist them to establish the 
PP and a further payment to accompany an agreed Performance Plan. To obtain this 
agreement they needed to show that they had complete reporting of general practitioners’ 
information with sufficient data to enable baseline reporting of the performance indicators 
and compliance with the reporting requirements in their contract with their District Health 
Board (such as service utilisation reporting and associated Immunisation Reporting). Each 
District health board was free to add its own funded indicators or to add more funding to a 
national indicator to reinforce particular local needs. It was expected that all participating 
PHOs would use their existing clinical governance structures and processes to engage 
clinicians and achieve improvements. Disbursement of payment would be according to the 
agreement reached between the PHO and their District Health Board. It was recognised in 
the Updated Summary Information that ‘General practices will be the ones that change and 
improve clinical practice to achieve against performance indicators. They will be supported 
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in this by their PHO. General practitioners will receive individualised feedback reports on 
their pharmaceutical and laboratory utilisation compared to their peers...nationally 
consistent educational materials tailored to their local needs...[and] other services...which 
may include clinical facilitators who can discuss utilisation patterns.’ 
Thus the implementation of the PP was consistent with the approach taken to the PHCS in 
general: it was seen by one participant as ‘a very permissive environment and not in my 
view micro-managed...there are central controls and accountability but there is an 
unprecedented opportunity to create your own micro-climate.’ 
Twenty-nine PHOs participated in the first phase of roll out (a number higher than 
expected), rising to 42 the following year. The number of participants in 2007 rose to 81 of 
the then 82 PHOs. Achievement levels against the indicators averaged 81 percent in 2009. 
Payments were made six-monthly to the PHO based upon performance reported to them in 
two previous quarterly progress reports. The performance payments so earned are 
calculated based on $6 per head of enrolled patient population for each PHO divided by the 
percentage achievement level. For a PHO with 70,000 enrolled patients and average 
achievement (81 percent), the annual performance payment would be just over $330,000. 
This might have resulted in an annual payment of over $20,000 per practice (based on an 
average enrolled population of 5000 per practice).  
This was in fact a significant amount of money. A participant recalls ‘The Referred Services 
debate was really crunchy because we knew we had money – all the prior stuff was 
theoretical but here was money.’ However, the size of the potential rewards for practices 
was not promoted by the Ministry and was a surprise to participants in the governance 
group of the PP after its roll out. It was not promoted to practices after roll out. Doctors’ 
representatives may well have been misled by this. They were surprised by how much 
funding was available but not being accessed when they discovered the amounts budgeted 
for the programme. 
 Some years later when the governance group for the PP  had been extended and included 
more members from large general practice organisations, a discussion was held about the 
funding available for the PP. A participant recalls that ‘[on the group it was] said there was a 
line item for $35 million but they didn’t expect to spend it because people wouldn’t achieve 
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the targets. In the room GPs suddenly had a quick discussion and said so if we lowered the 
targets we could get all that money and the Ministry people nearly fell off their chairs. It was 
a good example of the thinking of different groups.’  
Results began to be published in 2008. There had been minimal general media interest in 
the scheme though regular coverage in NZDoctor.  
The decision not to pilot the PP was based on the confidence that several precursor 
schemes had been trialled and because the scheme was deliberately small and incremental 
in scope. It was recognised and acknowledged to people that this was something being 
trialled, it wasn’t perfect and there would be improvements. It was a start and the end point 
was not explicit at the time (Personal communication). 
In the next section, the barriers and enablers of the policymaking process are explored. 
Then a set of evaluations and reviews of the PP are summarised.  
Barriers and enablers of the policymaking process 
 
In this section the major barriers and enablers of the policymaking process are set out as 
described by participants. These were identified from interviews and documentary analysis 
and affected key goals which can be grouped under five main headings: 
 Redistribution of general practice resources 
 Balancing funder interests and clinical autonomy 
 Shaping patterns of interaction between the state and interest groups  
 Solving technical challenges (including choice of indicators, obtaining access to 
practice data and testing the model) 
 
Redistribution of general practice resources 
 
As in England, the pay-for-performance programme was a part of a larger primary health 
care strategy. New Zealand’s  Labour politicians in 1999 sought to implement a ‘counter-
revolution’ to restore universality, hierarchical governance and community engagement in 
health services 27 and resolve  inequity of access to primary care services. This inequity had 
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arisen as a result of a number of factors including historic patterns of distribution of general 
practitioners, variations in their resource utilisation and increasing levels of patient co-
payments for consultations. These problems of universality of access and governance were 
not so pressing for English policymakers who had a universal system which was free at point 
of use and also had funding based on capitation and a system for patient enrolment.    
The PHCS in New Zealand moved the funding environment from a targeted, fee-for-service 
arrangement to a universal, capitated environment for general practice, with higher funding 
levels to reduce co-payments to patients. The governance arrangements to establish District 
Health Boards and PHOs with capitated, integrated and capped budgets gave new 
mechanisms for funders to achieve more equitable distribution of general practice funding 
and services. To support these mechanisms, particularly the introduction of capitation, the 
state also needed to achieve the enrolment of all New Zealanders with a PHO. The 
requirement to allocate a unique National Health Index identifier to all patients 
accompanied this initiative and provided a system for tracking service use and a population 
denominator for measuring practice and primary health organisation performance.   
In practice this meant that PHOs and their general practices then had to be supported to 
utilise data about their enrolled population and plan resource utilisation in a capitated 
funding environment. One participant confirms ‘we were trying to make sure that at a PHO 
level there was accountability for an enrolled population...keeping them healthy, we want 
measures that are collective and for the PHO to be able to influence...members/practices.’ 
Another notes that the decision to attach the PP to the contracts which existed between 
District Health Boards and PHOs was significant and integrated it fully into the process to 
ensure implementation of the PHCS. This desire to incentivise the PHOs to achieve targets 
rather than to reward the general practitioner for improving the quality of practice is in 
contrast to the QOF which was seen incentivising doctors directly for particular health 
actions.  
In a second strategy to redistribute general practice resources, additional funding in the 
form of higher subsidies for visits to practices was made available to regions with high socio-
economic deprivation. Availability of these higher subsidies was contingent on practices 
agreeing to limit co-payments to patients. This was a visible policy conflict, both for the 
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Minister, who sought the elimination of financial barriers to health care, and for the 
representatives of organised general practice, who continued to cherish the right of 
practices as private businesses to set their own fees. Descriptions of this battle over fee 
levels are prominent in participants’ recollections of the policymaking process shared in the 
course of this research. Until it was resolved, by reinstating an earlier fee oversight regime 
with a fees review committee and independent lay chair, as described by one participant, 
the roll out of the new higher levels of subsidy for communities with high socio-economic 
deprivation was thought to be at risk of stalling.   
As part of the larger Strategy implementation process, the Ministry recognised that there 
was value in the improved utilisation management achieved by budget holding contracts. 
The PP, a national programme offering incentives to continue this focus on utilisation 
review, ‘had the same objective really.’ It was recognised there were existing models of 
organisations getting rewarded for spending below historically high levels and that a 
national pay-for-performance framework could ensure that this continued. It was 
recognised that some areas needed to increase spending to reflect historic patterns of 
under-utilisation of pharmaceuticals and referred services. So the pay-for-performance 
policy was another mechanism to achieve redistribution of funding based on need rather 
than on historical patterns of resource utilisation and was focused on ‘population not 
practice.’ Another agrees that ‘we needed to be much more quality-focused, population-
focused rather than just utilisation-focused. Another participant closely engaged with 
implementation confirms that although the first tranche of indicators was very provider-
based, the intent was not to manage the performance of providers. It was always intended 
to be PHO-based, to strengthen PHOs and emphasise a collaborative environment.  
An area of health inequality which particularly concerned the Labour government 39 was the 
need for ‘significant improvement...in the effectiveness of health service delivery to Māori 
and Pacific peoples.’ At all stages of the process of design and implementation of this policy 
making episode, the voices, needs and concerns of Māori and Pacific communities were 
strongly reflected. Within the RSMAG, the theme that ‘Maori, Pacific and low income groups 
are among those who have been missing out on primary care…’ is more strongly expressed 
than in the Manifesto 148 p.3. This was a primary purpose of the PP’s counter-balancing 
initiatives to deter under-servicing. Population-based treatment and screening initiatives 
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were not core business for general practice and took both time and resources which 
practices did not believe they had. One participant thought ‘you need to target to improve 
access. For [some] areas…which needed to reduce their utilisation down to a national norm, 
within that they needed to increase utilization for some. It required a level of sophistication 
that was very very challenging and that is why it was absolutely critical to have the [Māori 
and Pacific voices] in the room as advocates for those populations and the need for clinical 
leaders to step up to make a difference to health inequalities…[the Māori and Pacific 
members] were very powerful in that group. They weren’t put off by the need to be 
outspoken.’    
Another participant recalls that ‘the old style fund-holding worked well in some areas but 
where it didn’t work well was inequalities and this was really in vogue back then. It was part 
of ‘the new’. Closing the Gaps [in outcomes between European New Zealanders and Māori 
New Zealanders] was one of the really significant things Labour came out with when it was 
releasing the strategy so…designing a Referred Services stream that didn’t rely on historic 
budgets (because that is what promoted the inequality) meant that it drove it down an 
incentives programme route.’ For some it did not go far enough for fast enough. A 
participant confirms ‘Areas of real dispute included whether or not to make ethnicity a 
condition of entry to the programme, some were won, some didn’t get through … the other 
thing we kept saying was why should we pay for achievement for the dominant population 
when there is no problem. Why wouldn’t we…only pay for results for the priority population 
– which might shift depending on the indicator…we didn’t win that debate.’ 
One participant subsequently reflected: 
‘One thing I feel really positive about is the focus on inequalities across the 
programme. While that was a principle at the front end at the start of the process 
there was no detail about how that was going to be achieved. In particular, it was 
the participation of [a particular member of the group].’ 
Balancing funder interests and clinical autonomy 
 
Participants describe a conflict between funder interests and clinical autonomy in three 
major ways during the policymaking process for both the larger PHCS and the PP design: 
200 
 
seeking to influence health actions of general practitioners, the principle of clinically-led 
quality improvement and fee levels. The first two are focused on here.      
In New Zealand the Labour Party policy document Labour on Health included promises that 
funding arrangements would be focused more on the outcome which is being expected than 
on specifying exact types of services to be delivered, that quality and effectiveness is the 
yardstick by which success of a service would be measured and that there would be long 
term funding for those organisations with a history of providing a quality service. These add 
up to a strong theme of improving quality to improve health service outcomes 39 p.3-4 and the 
PHCS took up this quality agenda, incorporating a section to ‘Continuously Improve Quality 
Using Good Information’ 1 p.24. This section acknowledged the range of quality tools used by 
various IPAs and spoke of organisations rewarding and supporting a culture of continuous 
improvement. However, these are the most general and high level statements. Participants 
described needing to ‘put the meat on the bones’ of the Strategy to turn it into policy which 
could be implemented. A participant who was closely involved in later design stages 
confirmed that ‘a whole mixed bag of people and organisations were raising [their fear of] 
losing our focus on quality improvement...around pharmaceuticals and labs’ and this was 
the origin of the idea for the PP. 
While it was understood that it was ‘the natural desire of independent businesses to be 
independent of government...if government is putting more money in then there has to be a 
balance between Government being specific about what they are going to get for that 
money.’ It was believed that doctors had firmly held views about things like the patient 
relationship. This was echoed by a participant who confirmed that uneasiness ‘about 
funders wanting to get into performance and quality improvement...this area is one of the 
defining characteristics of a profession.’ Much discussion focused on ‘the boundary between 
professional issues and funder issues.’ Another on the group confirmed that ‘the old debate 
between PHOs and IPAs about who has real control – the community board of governance 
or the health professionals...was another arm wrestle going on....General practice in New 
Zealand didn’t want to see the closeness of the relationship with the government that exists 
in the UK. Go back to the Bassett era [a former Labour Minister of Health] and the attempt 
to control general practice and...they saw it as a victory over the forces of darkness.’ 
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Once the poIicy design process began, a major and fundamental division occured over 
whether the process of design of a quality improvement system should be clinically-led 
(primarily by general practitioners) or driven by community priorities. A participant, in 
commenting on who was involved in design of the policy,  confirmed that ‘it was a big call to 
have a multi-disciplinary group – part of the issue was that...what you wanted delivered 
wasn’t delivered by general practitioners anyway...there is more to primary health than 
general practitioners and they didn’t like you saying that but it was true ... if we go back to 
totally doctor-dominated general practice then we have lost all the idea that the PHOs 
weren’t just about going to the doctor.’ Implicit in the comment was the recognition that 
the product of the policy implementation process was not specifically directed at general 
practitioners but at the wider primary health care professional team. 
Many participants were not concerned about the make-up of the group or the role for a 
broad range of primary care professionals in setting clinical standards as it was consistent 
with the way in which community-governed not for profit practices, with which they were 
familiar, operated. For IPA-oriented representatives this was a more fundamental issue of 
control of a core aspect of professional identity – independence.   
There were big debates about who should be at the table. For one participant the issue was 
simple:      
‘This was a state-directed programme. I have often reflected that I don’t think a 
single thing [some participants] said...was reflected in the programme that was 
rolled out...[such as] peer-led, based on feedback and performance data to 
individuals, the data referenced to colleagues and the group as a whole and using 
clinical meetings based on the evidence and outlier management visit...a non-
judgemental, peer accountability process.’ 
Amongst some representatives of general practice it was believed that in New Zealand the 
intent of the PHCS was to replace clinical leadership and governance with community 
leadership and governance, and an attempt to make ‘the union/community owned model of 
healthcare...the New Zealand health care system model.’ The PHCS had not used the words 
‘general practitioner’ and this was seen as ominous by many in the profession. Another 
participant reports that the Independent Practitioners’ Association Council of New Zealand 
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set itself the role, though it wasn’t given a formal mandate by Ministers for this, to ‘ensure 
that there was appropriate general practice governance of the programme and there was 
appropriate and robust evidence underpinning what was going to be included in the 
programme.’ However, in the initial design, it is acknowledged by another that ‘they had a 
small part in it.’   
By contrast with processes in New Zealand, one participant describes how in England ‘the 
Secretary of State [for Health] was on stage talking and he was entirely comfortable with 
talking about a GP-led system.’ One participant contrasted the New Zealand process with 
the process of contract negotiations in England: ‘New Zealand has always been a more 
socialist society...Internationally there has been a move to genuine primary medical care. 
New Zealand took that seriously and decided to negotiate without [mandated general 
practice] representatives. The Treaty of Waitangi meant we always had specific obeisance 
[to Māori as citizens], which often came through [stakeholder organisations such as] Health 
Care Aotearoa and representatives of Māori or someone with this interest in the Ministry. 
We did have a far more democratic...history than the British – [their process of policy 
making] was much more collusive.’  
While these divisions were strongly felt by participants, to some extent participants were 
talking past one another. Another participant comments that this anxiety about the place of 
general practitioners in the PHCS was misplaced: ‘if you go to the public record and look at 
speeches of the Minister of Health around the PHCS at the time the vast majority identified 
general practitioners as absolutely central within primary health care delivery…but secretive 
competitive commercial models are not compatible with…a more community collaborative 
multi-disciplinary model.’  
Shaping patterns of interaction between the state and interest groups  
 
In the New Zealand case study, most political energy was focused on changes in governance 
structures including the implementation of the new PHOs. There was great importance 
given to relationship-building, with widespread consultation and stakeholder engagement 
over the proposed policy changes.   
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There was a history of adversarial relationships between some parts of the general practice 
sector and the Labour Party which had always added to the difficulties faced by Labour 
governments to build positive working relationships with all parts of the general practice 
profession. One participant comments that ‘I think it goes right back to the first Labour 
government when they wanted to have socialised medicine...and general practice was an 
important part of it...and the fight started back then.’ By contrast with politicians in England 
who had ‘quite a lot of support at times from the BMA...that was very rare [for a New 
Zealand politician to] ever get a compliment.’ Another dates the lack of trust of some 
professional leaders of general practice to ‘the 1940s since the first attempt to get the Social 
Welfare Act together post war...but they walked away from it and said no we don’t want to 
be a part of it and the subsidies that were there got smaller and smaller and the rest is 
history.’ Another spoke of ‘the stories that rolled around Labour conferences – bad doctors 
hadn’t fallen in with the social security legislation in 1938’ and went on to say ‘Actually I 
don’t think it served anybody particularly well: we can’t change history.’  
Like the English policy-makers, much effort in New Zealand was directed at demonstrating a 
new collaborative approach and seeking win/win solutions to policy dilemmas, but in a 
context of consultation with stakeholders in primary health care, not negotiation with 
appointed representatives of general practice. Speaking generally about the whole primary 
health care changes, one participant comments ‘[we knew we] had to bring [the general 
practitioners] along because it wasn’t only about what they charged but getting them to 
think differently about a health team...with health it was a relationship issue...it really was 
about relationships, first, second and third, and money...[we] used force of personality, 
partly.’ ‘[If you] looked at what had happened to [previous Labour Ministers]...in the end 
they would fight...and they would undermine [the Minister]…so [we thought we] had to do 
it by power of persuasion.’  
Many acknowledge the key role played by the Minister, including opponents: one 
participant says ‘she just had the personality to make it work’; another says ‘She achieved 
amazing change within general relatively low noise.’ The Minister understood the benefits 
of a variety of approaches: she reportedly knew that ‘telling [general practice] to do things 
hasn’t worked but money has – money talks to them.’ 
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A participant suggests  
‘They wanted the money because primary health care was struggling in comparison 
to someone who was in a specialty. [She] addressed many of their meetings and it 
was trying to be cooperative, flexible, pleasant whilst having a bottom line and then 
[she would ]reach her rub with them…reach a crunch point and say you are doing it 
and a fair few of them came along with [her].’ 
Developing good working relationships at all levels and all phases, especially 
implementation, were explicitly prioritised. Describing one of the joint Chairs, a participant 
said it was agreed that ‘we need a really key person who is going to be influential, the status 
to be able to relate to the sector...from the point of view of persuasion, influence and mana 
[or respect from colleagues]’.  
One participant saw this as a consequence of the unique New Zealand approach to primary 
care: ‘we don’t operate by command and control so…it is about people and relationships 
and influence…[the NHS] overall system is command and control…it is a much more strongly 
medical model than in New Zealand. It is accepted that the doctor will be the leader of the 
team, whereas, if you said that in New Zealand you would not get out alive.’   
Design needed to be managed through individuals because ‘there is not a unified 
representative structure for general practice...[and within general practice] you certainly 
have different groups’. One participant, comparing the New Zealand scene with England, 
found that general practice was ‘slightly fragmented and doesn’t speak with the same 
political voice that the BMA does.’ Even the leaders of national organisations agreed that 
there were major divisions between them as well as between the large organisations and 
some smaller ones ‘who weren’t part of the national thinking.’ Another participant says ‘In 
those days the College was in bed with the government, the NZMA were working as one and 
the rural general practice network didn’t count so much really and then you had [large 
PHOs] and PHONZ [Primary Health Organisations New Zealand]...who had a completely 
different view of the world...there was always a tension between Health Care Aotearoa, the 
Māori-led PHOs and the mainstream white pakeha [New Zealand European] organisations.’   
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There was a view expressed that differences of policy preferences existed between those 
people considered to be leaders of general practice and the main body of opinion within 
general practice. It was suggested that leaders were more sensitive to threats to the 
independence and autonomy of the profession. A participant explains: ‘When you are 
putting in capitation funding there is always the thing that you control it because you set it 
...when you are setting up a pot and divvying it up that is fee control. You may reward 
people a little bit more if they restrict fees, have zero fees...all these things are direct 
attacks and the leaders tend to be of this ilk: it is regarded as evidence of control and 
monitoring of professional standards and quality of care something which is the 
responsibility of the professional body.’ A participant recalled a survey of general 
practitioners conducted by NZDoctor, a fortnightly publication which is delivered free to all 
full-time general practitioners, showing that the organisation which claimed to be the 
preferred representative for ‘organised general practice’ was ranked third of the 
organisations who speak on behalf of general practice. One participant considers that the 
New Zealand Medical Association was consultative about the position they should take on 
policy matters in a way which was not a ‘charade’ but that generally there has been a lack of 
representation of general practitioners. Another said there are regional differences: ‘there is 
democracy in different ways at a regional level. In Christchurch it is quite democratic ... they 
really do engage with their docs on these issues and ask them but in other parts of the 
country it is not like that at all...leaders will determine what the direction is, then advise.’ 
Another asks ‘in a devolved system which is what we are, what is the value of a nationally 
professional representative organisation versus…local clinicians in local communities getting 
engaged with their funders to sort their own problems out?’  
This meant that it was complex for general practitioners to obtain representation on issues 
which were of key importance for them, such as fee control. For individual general 
practitioners themselves there is some evidence that this diversity and disunity was 
affecting morale. A survey of this was conducted in 2000 attracting a 68% response rate 
from 658 general practitioners. This found that excessive paperwork, bureaucracy, multiple 
problem consultations, time pressures and combining work with family life were potent 
causes of low morale and unhappiness but that morale was higher than in the United 
Kingdom where these factors were exacerbated by structure, management and 
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expectations of the NHS 167. While less paperwork and a higher General Medical Subsidy 
were the preferred solutions of 171 and 153 respondents respectively, a preferred solution 
of 108 of 448 respondents who suggested solutions was a united and realistic 
representation for the profession.  
The IPAs were a distinct set of interests in the institutional mix. A participant’s assessment is 
that the general practice sector ‘became dominated by health sector corporates whose 
membership was private and that were dealing with very large amounts of public money so 
the dynamic then changed very considerably...wasn’t planned but was in response to 
government’s introduction of contracting and government’s desire to organise primary 
health care in a more systematic way.’    
As a participant explained, ‘going from a Union Health Care Clinic to a Procare [a large IPA] – 
two vastly different structures.’ 
Another participant remembers that: 
‘those big corporates [IPA] – their behaviour was mixed. Quite a lot of it was 
progressive and pro-system and quite a lot of it was self-interested...basically holding 
back...[in the face of] government...wanting legitimately to have a say in what goes 
on in primary care.’ 
Others said that there were major divisions between them and between the large 
organisations and some smaller ones ‘who weren’t part of the national thinking.’ A 
participant found the general practice organisations ‘very mixed. Some were really helpful 
but others were set on frustrating the process. They had firmly held views around things like 
the patient relationship – ‘how dare the government try to get in there!’ It wasn’t just about 
the financial impact...[it was said] that one GP leader had said ‘This will never happen, PHOs 
will be gone by next year’.’ One participant characterised the successive attempts by 
governments over the years to make policy as a ‘ridiculous dance of ‘please do this we are 
begging you and we will give you a bit of money’ and they say ‘bugger off’.’ Another 
participant notes that the government position on ‘boundaries between legitimate 
government control and private sector control’ has been confused over the years and 
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subject to debate while the IPA for instance have been much clearer about where those 
boundaries lay. 
 
Solving the technical challenges 
 
Technical challenges dominated the design of the PP to a greater extent than the 
policymaking process in England. Problems relating to choice of indicators and obtaining 
access to data led to a decision to proceed with implementation on an incremental basis.  
Choice of indicators  
 
Selecting clinical indicators presented many challenges, despite many methods being 
utilised to obtain agreement on these. A comprehensive set of 29 indicators was proposed 
by the RSAG in 2002. However, consultation with the sector through a Clinical Performance 
Indicator Advisory Group using a Delphi process, as well as enlisting academic advice, failed 
to achieve agreement on this larger set. A final set of 13 was selected and implemented.  
Obtaining access to data 
 
The problems of inadequate centrally-accessible data were frequently mentioned by 
participants as a barrier to the scheme. A Ministry official confirms that the initial 
programme was based pragmatically upon data elements that were readily available from 
central sources, even though those data did not relate to outcomes the Ministry was 
interested in. This left them open to criticism that the indicators were not relevant. 
However, a participant, while acknowledging that a number of the indicators were not that 
meaningful, saw the value in using readily available rather than perfect information and not 
achieving a national target in step one but setting a baseline and measuring incremental 
improvement from that baseline. He acknowledged that to move to the stage of more 
meaningful data would require access to practice management systems and that would 
raise the questions about ‘ownership of clinical information and its accessibility to people 
outside practice. That is the next major challenge for the health sector.’ This was a major 
issue: it was believed a new database would have taken many years to create (Private 
conversation). A participant saw general practice claiming to ‘own the data’ and although 
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some participants agreed ‘you needed real time data’, another thought this would lead to 
government seeking to obtain access to practice data using ‘spyware.’ Initial data was in fact 
drawn from systems designed for payment purposes so presented many quality problems to 
the implementation team.   
This differs from the situation in England where policy-makers were able rapidly to design 
and implement a new computerised database through which all general practices could 
input their activities, get real time feedback on progress towards targets and their 
entitlement to payment could be assessed and tracked. This was a deal cut in the 
negotiation between the parties and facilitated by the national basis on which negotiation 
and contracting was conducted. By contrast the breadth of the New Zealand scheme was 
severely curtailed because the choice of targets was limited to those available on the 
existing national databases to which funders had access. These targets were not those 
which would ideally have been prioritised for such a programme – they were the only ones 
with the data available, however. Gauld records the isolated development of information 
management initiatives, lack of central oversight and difficulty for government to influence 
these activities in 2002 168.    
Because of the holding of patient data at the practice level in a variety of different practice 
management systems, the route to increased clinical accountability in New Zealand lay 
through the profession. The profession in New Zealand held the information critical to a 
large and adequately monitored set of targets, though it existed in a variety of largely 
unconnected databases. In the New Zealand case study the profession can be seen to be 
using patient data-management systems as a source of power, contending that they owned 
the data and therefore had a key strategic advantage over the operation of the whole 
system. One participant believed that they would drive a very hard bargain for access to the 
data. An effect of this strategy was dramatically to limit the Performance Programme in 
scope. Without the engagement of the profession as a whole in the negotiation of an 
agreement to share detailed information about general practice activities on a national 
basis, the scheme was bound to be a limited one and to have a limited potential impact 
upon health outcomes.    
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Testing the model  
 
PHOs were invited to take up the scheme in their own time and way, within certain 
important parameters. This is in sharp contrast to the large-scale reforms of governance of 
the health system in 1999-2001 which were revolutionary in character 25 27. Scepticism 
about pay-for-performance but also recognition of the imperfect levers and limited history 
of effective accountability mechanisms between the state funders and general practice 
drove this decision to proceed on pay-for-performance policy implementation with caution. 
A participant says the Ministry believed that ‘being able to evolve it rather than a revolution 
was quite important’ and officials wished to evolve it as they could see it working. Another 
participant reports the Group was keen to ‘build a momentum rather than a quick 
fix...creating a platform on which things could be built and modified over time.’ Another 
acknowledges that the selection of indicators was a ‘start here list. We always knew that 
these were going to change’ and a member of the group agreed that ‘It is going to be 
evolving so let’s just get on and do something.’ A manager involved in implementation, 
speaking about the decision not to pilot because of previous successful examples of 
incentive schemes, confirmed that the incremental nature of the policy process was 
deliberate (Private conversation). As it happened ‘getting into the finer details – this has 
taken literally years’ is the view of one participant and ‘It is only now we are getting rid of 
some of the crap indicators.’  He acknowledges that ‘you build the infrastructure and 
expectations around measuring something...When you have got that infrastructure and 
attitude you can supplant whatever indicator you like so there is always a value in moving 
towards that.’        
A number of participants commented upon the anxiety felt about pay-for-performance 
schemes having unintended consequences (‘the amount of money was small because of 
nervousness...it could be increased over time if it proved to be effective’; it was a ‘building 
towards equity, quality and better outcomes’). Some note that the QOF was being closely 
watched and ‘our people were happier with [small incentive money] because they felt 
that...there is a risk it will take you down too narrow a pathway.’ A participant explains that 
‘The amount of money was small because of nervousness and doubt about what to measure 
and incentivise. If you got it wrong and put too much weight on it you could have perverse 
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outcomes, for example a focus on the things being measured at the expense of other 
equally important aspects of primary care.’ Another says ‘There was ambivalence...there 
wasn’t any evidence that it was working or not working – it was too early.’ A participant 
acknowledged the concerns about possible gaming of the programme. Another recalls 
anxiety at the Ministry about the large percentage of money which had already gone to 
general practice from budget management contracts during the 1990s and wanted to make 
sure this money was more designed to help PHOs to get a structure and focus on quality 
within primary care (Private conversation). Pay-for-performance could be ‘oversold’ 
according to one participant, seeing it as  ‘one piece of the jig saw but only one piece…what 
does it take to influence clinical decision-making – the environment in which you work, your 
contact with peers, focus groups, measurement, reward for measurement. But it isn’t a 
silver bullet.’ 
Evaluations and reviews of the PP  
 
At a conference of general practitioners affiliated to IPAs in 2006, held in Auckland a few 
months after the launch of the PP on January 2006, the QOF of the new General Medical 
Services contract for English general practitioners was prominently presented and debated 
in several full conference sessions. A former editor of the BMA journal, the BMJ, a former 
President of the General Medical Council and other academic commentators were brought 
to New Zealand to address the conference. By contrast, the New Zealand PP was profiled in 
a single session, concurrent with several others, by two officials involved in its management. 
In presenting it, officials stated its purpose to: 
 Improve health outcomes 
 Reduce disparities 
 Encourage clinical governance 
 Share good models 
 Assist with improvement costs and 
 Reward excellence. 
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The intention of the scheme to protect intrinsic motivation through its very indirect use of 
financial reward was highlighted. In this feature there was clear contrast with the QOF 169.  
In the same session a senior manager from a large IPA presented an example of an effective 
outcomes-based payment model trialled in his organisation and took the opportunity to 
rate the PP against a set of five key characteristics of an effective performance 
measurement programme, reflecting the disaffection with the scheme felt by IPAs. In his 
assessment framework it scored 14 of a possible 25 points, failing principally on the criteria 
of alignment of the incentive with the desired outcome and giving value for all partners. This 
contending set of perspectives is typical of much of the debate between the public servants 
administering and the general practitioners delivering the programme in its first few years 
170.  
In 2008 the organisation responsible for implementing the PP commissioned an evaluation 
of the PP which was published in December that year 165. Evaluators were tasked with 
finding out how effectively the PP was engaging with PHOs and to what extent it had 
supported PHOs to make improvements in their practice through affecting their capacity, 
capability, systems development and implementation of clinical governance. To do so, 
evaluators selected a cross-section of six PHOs and interviewed managerial and clinical staff 
of the PHOs and others connected to the Programme, forming six case studies. These case 
studies were then analysed to assess the PP against dimensions of management and 
governance, operations and clinical practice. Informants were also asked how relevant they 
believed the QOF was to the New Zealand PP. 
Evaluators found wide PHO variation in population characteristics, size, history and 
relationship with an IPA, the nature of ownership of practices, whether they integrated into 
wider networks and human resources challenges such as workforce shortages. These 
conditions created different contexts for PHOs in implementing the PP.  
Although most PHOs saw the PP indicators as offering a narrow but reasonable snapshot of 
best practice, they tended to qualify this with the view that the indicators are partial or less 
important indicators of quality practice and risked diversion of effort from other more 
pressing clinical matters. There was dispute about the fairness of the performance 
212 
 
framework which, using relative measures, can allocate the same performance as either 
successful or unsuccessful depending on where the target has been set.   
Visibility of the PP was found by evaluators to be highest amongst management rather than 
clinical staff.  Correspondingly, many management staff did not know what clinical staff did 
with the data from the PP when they received it, the processes of clinical leadership and 
peer support for clinicians being separate from management of the PHO. A variety of 
funding allocation practices existed, with two of the six PHOs not distributing performance 
payments and most sharing these between the PHOs and practices. Data exchange and 
distribution caused a variety of concerns relating to confidence in its quality, the privacy of 
the data exchange process and timing of reporting periods (feedback of performance under 
the scheme was delayed by several months after the end of the reporting period). In this 
relatively small sample of PHOs, general practitioners received reports mainly from their 
practice manager in a process of administrative feedback rather than peer-led debate and 
critique of practice.   
In assessing the impact of the PP on clinical quality, the evaluators found that PHOs saw it as 
partially aligned with the recognised drivers of clinician behaviour change and part of the 
larger set of primary care strategies, supporting these in a low profile way rather than 
driving practice improvement itself. It reflected achievements rather than incentivised 
them, and the primary reward was evidence of improved quality, not payment.  
This feedback confirms the significant difference in the mode of operation of incentives in 
the scheme by contrast to the English scheme, targeted as they are in the PP on the actions 
of primary care organisations rather than the actions of individual general practitioners.  
The scheme was not able to directly incentivise the health actions of individual general 
practitioners in the same way as the QOF was able to do in England. The evaluators 
concluded that the heterogeneity of the PHO and practice landscape and the separation of 
management and clinical roles provided considerable challenges to the PP’s effectiveness. 
Future success in achieving clinical behaviour change would be dependent upon PHOs 
obtaining greater leverage with clinicians, the availability of reliable credible and timely data 
and the role of champions.    
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The evaluation can be seen as indicating some fundamental flaws in the design of the 
scheme if it is assessed as an incentive scheme targeted at changing health actions or the 
day to day decision of general practitioners. Against this criterion it has many shortcomings 
by comparison with the QOF.  
Themes in the evaluation noting the heterogeneity of context, history, ownership and 
interests amongst PHOs and practices are echoed in the evaluations of the overarching  
PCHS completed in the same period 171 p.30. A suite of reports was commissioned to evaluate 
the PHCS by the Ministry of Health, the Accident Compensation Corporation of New Zealand 
and the Health Research Council and these were completed and published by the Victoria 
University Health Services Research Centre between 2006 and 2010. The reports focused on 
four topics of the status and activities of general medical practices, patient fees as a 
metaphor for different underlying purposes in the Strategy, and the role and functions of 
PHOs and how these evolved in the years immediately following establishment. While they 
did not comment specifically on the PP, they are of interest since they offer assessment of 
the degree to which the goals of the PHCS were seen to be achieved, citing similar barriers 
to change identified by Martin Jenkins.   
Amongst other findings, the reports display the continuing divisions between types of 
general practices, deriving from their funding and ownership arrangements. For instance, 
those PHOs which grew out of IPAs tended to give prominence to general practice needs 
and perspectives more  than community-generated ones and were more reluctant to 
discuss fee levels and patient co-payments with practices than those which grew out of 
community trusts or similar organisations 172. There was muted support amongst general 
practitioners about some of the specific goals of the Strategy such as creating PHO, 
provision of universal low-cost access and seeking out of patients who do not present for 
care, and the Care Plus programme for those with chronic illnesses 173.      
In a report completed by the Health Services Research Centre in 2008 on exploring issues 
that could contribute to high impact change for service improvement in primary health care, 
a key theme was the continuing lack of integration of funding streams to enable better 
alignment with local health needs and priorities, the report noting that ‘despite a capitation 
approach to funding, providers remained in a fee-for-service mind-set, especially in areas 
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where the patient co-payment remained a significant element of the practice income’ 174 
p.15.  
Evaluation of the PP in 2012 
 
A further evaluation of the PP was undertaken in 2012 175. This was a comprehensive review 
of the strategic vision and purpose of the PP, its impact on service planning and delivery and 
its information technology systems and impact on data capture. Qualitative and quantitative 
analyses were completed including in-depth interviews with 11 PHOs and two surveys of 
practices. An initial survey of staff and stakeholders in nine PHOs attracted 38 responses. 
Feedback from respondents indicated that there was inadequate information about the 
programme and a second survey (which included more context for questions) was then sent 
to the remaining PHOs, received 68 responses. Forty-five percent of responses were from 
general practitioners, 25 percent from practice nurses and 29 percent from other roles.  
The evaluation found that the PP was seen by the sector as a valuable programme, was the 
only programme that rewards activity on a performance basis and was widely seen as a 
potential vehicle for future collaborative primary care data development. However, a need 
for speedier development of indicators and improvements in data integrity and timeliness 
were expressed. The need for a higher level of incentives to reward efforts to drive results 
more effectively into high needs populations (who are harder to reach) was expressed 175 p.5. 
The evaluation records performance trends for the current set of funded indicators. These 
had evolved from the initial set, over time, to address more pressing population health 
targets including ischaemic cardiovascular disease detection and risk assessment, diabetes 
detection and follow up, influenza vaccinations of older people and immunisations of 
children under two (all from 2009) and recording of smoking (from 2010) and advice on 
smoking cessation (from 2011). Performance against all targets had improved at the PHO 
level. Performance improvement was more rapid for high needs populations and the gap 
between these and low needs populations had decreased since 2006. By 2012 the PP had 
become broadened to include indicators for health actions which had higher potential for a 
positive impact upon population health outcomes and had results which were reflecting 
greater levels of quality improvement in services for populations with higher needs. These 
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results mirror the results found for the QOF although in the latter case they were achieved 
more rapidly.   
The evaluation finds there was still mixed support for the PP and rising sector frustration 
with the low usability and minimal approach to enhancements for data capture and 
interrogation in practice management systems and the effort required for data collection. 
Greater transparency and granularity of and access to data was also identified as a major  
point of dispute, with debates about this causing frustration between stakeholders (such as 
the Ministry of Health) ‘seeking greater utilisation, publication and transparency of activity 
and others, mainly in the primary sector, extremely reluctant to do so’  (ibid. p.24). These 
problems had been avoided in England with the design and implementation of the QMAS 
for data capture and reporting. 
There were mixed views about whether the PP improved quality of care, with some 
stakeholders viewing it as setting important clinical governance baselines, others finding it 
an interference with patient care and others regarding it as ‘cookbook’ medicine. 
The governance group for the PP (which had expanded its membership over time) was 
regarded as reflecting a variety of sectoral interests rather than providing strong leadership 
though there was moderate agreement that the advisory committee for the PP had the right 
clinical experts. At the time nine of 14 members were from primary care, three being 
practising general practitioners. This had resolved earlier concerns about the ‘perceived 
shortage of clinical leadership...particularly around indicator selection’ in the design of the 
original set of indicators 165 p.4.  
Impact on ambulatory-sensitive admissions 
 
It will be seen that in England, evaluators were able to demonstrate a statistically significant 
association between higher levels of achievement on clinical indicators for coronary heart 
disease, hypertension, congestive heart failure, diabetes and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, 135 p.121 and measures of population outcomes such as rates of ambulatory care 
hospital admissions. Although a reduction in ambulatory-sensitive admissions  was not 
specifically a key measure of success and was used more to motivate reform of existing 
primary health care arrangements in presentations about the proposed PHCS, Cranleigh 
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Health utilised this measure in their evaluation and were not able to demonstrate this 
association in New Zealand for the two of three indicators which might have reasonably 
been expected to have this outcome (cardio vascular disease (CVD) assessment and 
detection, influenza vaccinations and immunisations). This is possibly because the indicators 
were too recently introduced (as is the case with CVD) or the number of hospital admissions 
for influenza small. A statistically significant relationship was found between PP 
achievements  for immunisation of children under two and vaccine-preventable hospital 
admissions 175 p.50. Overall the ambulatory-sensitive hospital admissions for Māori and 
Pacific Island peoples had remained the same or increased from 2000/1 to 2005/6 although 
they declined for non-Māori or non-Pacific Island New Zealanders 157 p.8. 
 
Review of Performance and Incentive Framework 
 
In 2013 an Expert Advisory Group was convened to recommend a new integrated 
performance and incentive framework for the health system, which would include primary 
care. The final report of the Group, published in February 2014, signalled a fundamentally 
new strategy to address equity, safety, quality, access and cost of services (including 
unexplained variation of referred services). Comprising nationally-set system-level measures 
and processes for reporting and assessing performance, the framework proposes to confer 
levels of achievement and incentives based on performance on PHOs. However, within 
national targets, detailed quality improvement measures would be developed locally in 
clinical and consumer-led alliances to reflect local needs. The Performance Programme  
resources would be re-directed to provide direct incentive payments to practices which 
achieve performance targets and to up-front allocations of investment to PHOs to support 
capability and capacity improvement 176. The framework would not in itself modify other 
policy settings such as funding, co-payments or service coverage, but would substantially re-
design the current PP. Such an approach has the potential to incentivise quality 
improvement at the practice level more directly, with greater potential to influence health 
actions of general practitioners and other practice staff more directly, providing it does not 
lose the explicit connection between a health action of a general practitioner and the 
availability of a reward. This in turn may result in a greater ability for policymakers to 
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achieve more pronounced associations between the PP and ambulatory sensitive hospital 
admission outcomes.   
Summary 
 
This Chapter has described the context and the process of policymaking which resulted in 
the implementation of the pay-for-performance programme known as the PP in New 
Zealand from 2006. It has explored the major barriers and enablers to goals sought by 
policymakers from the policymaking process and concludes with a summary of reviews and 
evaluations of the pay-for-performance policymaking process and its impacts. 
The next Chapter will apply Kingdon’s MS Framework to this case study and explore how 
well it describes or explains what happened.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REVIEWING THEORY AND EVIDENCE: PERFORMANCE PROGRAMME 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter has described the process of pay-for-performance policymaking in a 
case study of the design and implementation of the PP in New Zealand between 2001-2007. 
It has set out barriers and enablers to the key goals sought by policy-makers, from the data 
collected in interviews with participants and from documentary analysis. A summary of 
evaluations and assessments of the outcomes of the policymaking process was provided. 
This Chapter now applies Kingdon’s MS Framework to this case study, with particular regard 
to the research questions:   
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process? 
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from the analysis which 
might enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
In the same process set out in Chapter Six, the purpose of this Chapter is to explore the 
utility of Kingdon’s MS Framework, as enhanced by Zahariadis, in explaining the 
policymaking process in the New Zealand case study. The analysis begins with an 
assessment of the type of policy change achieved, according to Kingdon’s definitions. Then 
the key themes from the case study evidence are discussed in order of the five key 
structural elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework and the sub-elements as identified by 
Zahariadis and illustrated in his diagrammatic representation in Figure 1 in Chapter Two. 
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Non-incremental change in conditions of ambiguity, fluid participation and 
unclear technology? 
 
Answering the first question about the type of change in Kingdon’s MS Framework, the 
evidence shows that the introduction of the PP more closely matches the definition of non-
incremental change than incremental change according to Kingdon, although it takes longer 
to be implemented than the QO Framework in England. The other conditions which Kingdon 
suggests will nurture non-incremental change do apply in the New Zealand context at the 
time. The health sector was an environment of differing, if not exactly ambiguous, policy 
preferences contending for attention, with considerable fluidity of participation and unclear 
and inadequate technology for many of the policymaking activities under way at the time. 
Both committees convened for designing the pay-for-performance programme contained 
members with a wide variety of views and interests, types of professional expertise and 
levels of engagement with the policy problem. They were developing policy in an 
environment of rapidly changing rules and new policy goals. This required much innovation 
and flexibility in the policymaking process as well as a need to look for existing models 
which could be quickly adapted for new purposes. Some political uncertainty also existed in 
2001 in that the Labour government was half way through its first term of office and had a 
history of short periods in office. The situation was, according to Kindgon’s model, ripe for 
political manipulation by a policy entrepreneur (or ‘loosely coupled’) 67 p.4. 
It is important to note that the pay-for-performance policymaking process was  operational 
policymaking nested within a larger strategic policymaking process, the design and 
implementation of the PHCS, which was also planned, top-down policymaking, non-
incremental, boldy designed and rapidly enacted and implemented by politicians within the 
politics stream. This overarching reform was intended  to achieve a sea change or ‘counter-
revolution’ 25 27 in the way governance and structural arrangements in the health system, 
including payment systems for Vote Health funding, worked. Within it, the implementation 
of the PP followed a different pattern, being subject to extensive consultation and a phased 
and voluntary process in which many decisions could be taken at the regional level.   
In this case study, agenda-setting occurs in a civil servant-led committee. Alternative 
selection occurs in a new phase of work accomplished through a large committee led by 
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jointly appointed Chairs with a mix of general practice service delivery management and 
health services funding and development experience.   
Although no policy entrepreneur in the classic Kingdon model is found in the case study 
(neither is there one readily identifiable in the development of the PHCS overarching 
policymaking process), it can be argued that actors resembling institutional entrepreneurs 
were recruited and made a key contribution during the alternative selection stage of 
policymaking. These have been described earlier as ‘exploring the transferable, concealed 
and dormant institutional resources of their societies’ 75 p.157 and being effective in 
environments  in which uncertainty exists as well as heterogeneity. This is the more so when 
there is political uncertainty or the inability to predict political shifts that could change the 
landscape for new institutional arrangements  67 p.4. This is a particular characteristic of the 
New Zealand health policymaking environment in which fierce partisan positions, short 
terms of office and relatively frequent changes of administrations differentiate it somewhat 
from the English health policymaking environment. This is explored below in the section 
‘Policy Entrepreneurs’.  
Problems stream  
 
This policy making episode arises in the problem stream which, according to Zaharaidis, will 
be more likely to lead to a rational approach to policymaking. This is borne out by the 
evidence. During the implementation phase of the larger PHCS (which created its ‘policy 
window’), the problem arose of how to maintain a quality-oriented approach to 
pharmaceutical and laboratory services utilisation under the new PHCS structures, capitated 
funding and principles for equity of access and outcomes. An additional policymaking 
challenge was how to change inequities in prescribing and funding of these services for 
poorer communities. A mechanism was needed to redistribute resources and rectify 
variances in prescribing patterns.     
Indicators of the need for a new policy included analysis of prescribing patterns showing 
unexplained variances and lower levels of resource in poorer communities and data which 
showed significant variance in life expectancy for some citizens, particularly Māori. Focusing 
events included an identified need for new policy to manage allocation of pharmaceutical 
and laboratory testing resources identified in the implementation of the PHCS. Policy 
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makers had feedback that positive results in changing prescribing patterns from budget 
management contracts had occurred but also reports that significant public funds had been 
obtained by IPA through savings achieved in budget management contracts. This was a busy 
time for primary health care policy so the load created a low priority for this work alongside 
a major workload of policy issues relating to implementation of the PHCS.   
Zahariadis’ Model is very useful in the analysis of this process of problem identification and 
definition. 
Politics stream 
 
Kingdon suggests party ideology, national mood and administrative turnover are relevant 
here, and two of these factors are strongly featured in the evidence. Party ideology which 
influenced the design included a strong commitment to an accessible, equitable health 
service, concern over privatisation and profit-making from health care, deep concern over 
inappropriate and inequitable capture of public funds by IPAs, grievances about the history 
of relationships with general practitioner representatives and concern over disparity of 
health outcomes. There was a strong commitment to services appropriate for Māori and 
Pacific peoples. There was also a preference for a strong patient and community voice in 
health service design and concern about medical dominance of health policy. The national 
mood showed no particular public concerns related to this specific issue but growing public 
concerns about disparate mortality and morbidity rates for New Zealanders of different 
ethnicity. Administrative or legislative turnover was a key driver incentivising rapid 
policymaking for Labour, recently elected to a three year term after nine years out of office 
and governing in a strong coalition. Labour politicians were determined to restore the 
integrity of a national health service whose establishment was one of the proudest 
achievements in Party history. But this also acts as a factor incentivising opposition to the 
policymaking by other interests. The evidence shows that a major feature in this stream was 
the strong allegiances between particular political parties, their academic advisors and types 
of general practice organisations. Kingdon suggests that when there is conflict rather than 
consensus between interest groups, politicians must determine the balance of support and 
opposition, indicating the price that will be paid for pushing the idea forward .51 p.150 This 
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important calculation is not explicitly included in the sub-elements of the Zahariadis Model 
of the politics stream.   
Policy stream 
 
The value acceptability and technical feasibility of the policy idea and these features as well 
as the integration of the policy community are all considered by Zahariadis to be important 
sub-elements in the policy stream. 
Policy idea: Pay-for-performance was a controversial idea in the policy stream, attracting 
some strong negative opinion and academic analysis from some quarters. Improving the 
quality of general practice was, however, readily accepted as a policy idea. As in England, 
there were existing budget management and clinical governance initiatives which could be 
used as templates to develop a national programme for incentivising quality improvement 
and clinical governance in general practice. But unlike in England these were not nationally 
consistent or centrally driven, nor underpinned by the new values of equitable 
redistribution of resources. The existing initiatives formed a heterogeneous collection of 
regional initiatives and many distributed their savings to privately-owned companies. The 
policymaking process needed to deliver a nationally consistent framework oriented to 
equity and population health goals from this heterogenous mix. There was strong academic 
interest and support from general practice consortia including the IPAs for continuation of 
existing approaches (who depended upon it for an income stream). Many participants in the 
design process had direct experience of such programmes.  
Value acceptability included strong state support for population-based and preventive 
health practices. Officials were open to new contractual approaches, payment methods and 
other technical approaches to public sector performance management in order to achieve 
equity goals. But the scepticism about the merits of pay-for-performance within the 
bureaucracy, academia and the medical profession was enhanced by the fact that its 
technical feasibility was a major problem. The state had a new mechanism for enrolling 
patients with a PHO and these organisations were newly established, with differing capacity 
and capability to develop or influence existing clinical governance systems, few existing 
national practice or quality frameworks, minimal availability of national data bases suitable 
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for a performance programme and a regionalised structure for implementation of the 
policy.  
Policy community: The evidence reveals that there were low levels of integration of the 
general practice policy community, especially on the subject of quality systems and 
governance arrangements. There were differing levels of access to politicians and civil 
service decision-makers held by different types of organisations. Access often depended on 
political allegiances of the organisations. Competitive modes of discourse and adversarial 
decision-making processes were often used between stakeholders in the policy community 
and there were variable levels of organisational and administrative capacity amongst 
organisations. There was a limited history or track record of policymaking partnerships 
between the general practice profession and state actors.  To reiterate, a partisan pattern 
existed, which broadly saw community-based groups working with Labour and private 
general practice interests working with the National Party.  
Policy window 
 
The policy window included a coupling logic which was consequential on a need arising as 
part of implementation of the PHCS as well as doctrinal. District Health Boards urgently 
required a process to assist them to redistribute prescribing and laboratory referral funding 
more equitably and achieve more equitable use of the funds and the Labour Party had a 
doctrinal commitment to equitable distribution of resources and services. The decision style 
was bold for the larger overarching policymaking but very cautious for its implementation 
and for the policymaking which arose from its implementation. 
The set of sub-elements in the Zahariadis Model are useful for analysing these features of 
the policy stream in this case study.   
Policy entrepreneurs  
 
According to Kingdon’s MS Framework, conditions were optimal for a policy entrepreneur to 
emerge and manipulate this policymaking situation. No visible policy entrepreneur was 
identified in the classic Kingdon sense of ‘power brokers who manipulate problematic 
preferences and unclear technology and exploit the system’s fluid participation rates to 
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push forth their pet solutions’ 177 p.520. Civil servants set the agenda for the policy, with 
advice from academics, as they implemented the manifesto commitments of the Labour 
government. This process was one which was overseen by traditional Cabinet government 
processes more clearly than was the policymaking process in England, where the ‘sofa 
cabinet’ style of policymaking was practised.  
As in England, the issues of access, resources and strategies are not relevant to this case 
study because the policy making was officially mandated. This case study is an example of 
strong civil service leadership and management of the policymaking process. Few observed 
strategies such as framing, affect priming or symbols were used but salami tactics or piece 
by piece tactics was deliberately employed during the implementation phase to minimise 
disruption, test the model and build support.  
However in the alternative selection phase, entrepreneurial actors were deliberately 
recruited, fitting the description of institutional entrepreneurs as developed by Crouch 75, 
and these actors help to develop new forms of governance, including clinical governance, 
for the new PHOs. One of the major policy challenges from these health reforms was to 
build capacity within primary health care organisations to understand and work within a 
capitated funding allocation and deliver population-based preventive health care services. 
Actors who had been involved in their own regional initiatives to introduce capitation 
funding and quality improvement systems in the 1990s were institutional entrepreneurs, 
able to draw on their own experiences of innovations in such approaches. Another 
challenge was how to ensure more equitable access to primary health care services for 
Māori and Pacific communities more effectively. Actors who could draw on insights and 
experience from delivering health care in these communities were able to bring this into the 
debate about priorities for the doctor-patient relationship within primary health care.  
General practitioners who had these experiences of working in capitated funding 
environments or Māori and Pacific communities were particularly important in the debate 
over the design of the scheme, effectively placing their professional expertise and credibility 
as clinicians at the service of both funders and their profession. They exhibited attributes of 
social acuity, team building and leadership by example described in the public entrepreneur 
literature. Because of the small, incremental, regionalised, low profile and voluntary nature 
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of the scheme they consequently faced fewer reputational or public support risks than the 
English policy-makers and the policy design process generally held few political risks. 
However leaders of the policymaking process recruited from within general practice faced 
reputational risks such as loss of professional standing and influence within those parts of 
the professional community which opposed the pay-for-performance policy and its 
policymaking process and with politicians from opposing parties who did not support a 
community-led approach to governance of primary health care services. As in England, 
therefore, the greatest risks faced by the institutional entrepreneurs arose from those 
which might arise in the event of a change in government and the conditions upon which 
they had based their strategy  
Motivation of entrepreneurs 
 
The case study evidence provides some insight into the motivations and strategies of the 
institutional entrepreneurs who led the design of the PP in its alternative selection stage. 
They wished to balance strong personal commitments to reducing inequalities with the 
desire to reward quality and support clinical governance (having a track record of 
championing a capitation-based approach to primary health care funding as the most 
appropriate vehicle to do this). They were very committed to achieving a balanced 
consultative forum, to build consensus for the features of the PP and to get ownership for 
the new pay-for-performance policy. They wished to manage or reduce the divisions within 
the general practice community and reduce the tensions between Labour politicians and 
some sections of the general practice community. They were strongly committed to 
broadening the multi-disciplinary approaches to primary care service delivery through team-
based and not doctor-dominated practices.  
The evidence suggests they were willing to risk professional standing and influence arising 
from their policymaking activities for the social purpose which animated them, in particular 
taking forward the inequalities agenda to ensure that Māori and poorer communities had 
improved access to higher quality primary health care. The same motivation though not the 
same risk was observed in the civil servants charged with the initial design, who made 
comments that disadvantaged populations were ‘missing out’ as a rationale for putting 
‘much more focus on equity’.   
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Explanatory comprehensiveness of Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
To recap, non-incremental change, in Kingdon’s definition, was achieved in the New Zealand 
health reforms. The scale and pace of change was determined by the Executive. The case 
study displays the differences between the two policymaking activities during this period: 
the overarching health system policy making, which was significant non-incremental change, 
was rapidly implemented and had closely managed participation and clear technology for 
implementation (it was straightforward to introduce governance changes such as restoring 
the District Health Boards for instance); and the pay-for-performance policy making episode 
which was also non-incremental policy change but has more signs of ambiguity, fluid 
participation and unclear technology, had a phased, more consultative, regionalised and 
slower implementation process. This reflected pragmatic realities of policymaking in the 
general practice sub-system with its multiple forms of governance and ownership of primary 
care services, many contending interests and few integrating information systems or 
antecedent quality improvement policies, such as existed in England, which could be built 
upon. Although conditions were suitable for a classic Kingdon exogenous policy 
entrepreneur to operate as part of the pay-for-performance policymaking episode (given 
the ambiguity of preferences and the clear policy window), this did not happen. Endogenous 
actors with entrepreneurial skills, as in England, were recruited to help develop new 
decision-making and governance systems to support the new policies designed by civil 
servants and politicians, assisting in changes of institutions as well as policies to support 
greater public accountability in general practices.  
Other drivers of policymaking processes 
 
Based on the analysis above, there are some major gaps in the way the model captures and 
encourages us to look for key drivers and features of the policymaking process which were, 
in the empirical research undertaken for this study, shown to be critical to the process and 
outcome of the policymaking episode. These are now set out below.  
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Institutional and structural features 
 
The institutional sub-system for general practice in New Zealand which structured the 
relationship between the state and interest group actors, as in England, is a critical variable 
in this policy making episode. The history of health policymaking in New Zealand had led to 
the following features: 
 A heterogeneous set of ownership and governance arrangements for general 
practice service delivery  
 Disengagement between Labour politicians and the largest organisations 
representing general practitioners 
 Multiple payer financing arrangements for general practice so no monopsony 
 New arms-length contractual arrangements for primary care funding which needed 
to be developed by a large number of newly formed primary care organisations 
 A re-centralised structure for health policymaking, with preferences for regional 
implementation 
 No representative body for general practice 
 A risk of short term administrations, from 1996 needing to form coalitions to govern. 
Although the governments elected in 1990, 1999 and 2008 in fact each won three 
successive terms in office, these terms were punctuated by three-yearly elections 
and, for the Labour Party, three successive terms in office was unusual.  
 
There was a preference amongst politicians for top-down, rationalist and technically-driven 
approaches for initial policy design and this delivered the initial civil-service-designed, 
rapidly-developed and comprehensive pay-for-performance proposal. Then a cautious, 
consultative and stakeholder-oriented approach to alternative selection and policy 
implementation of the pay-for-performance framework was taken.  
This pattern, described by Tuohy as ‘big bang’ change characteristic of Westminster 
adversarial systems reflects the different facilitators, barriers and trajectories for 
policymaking from those seen in governing systems with federal structures or a separation 
of powers. In the former, policy in needs to be enacted quickly and hard-wired against 
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subsequent reversal by its rapid casting into law but leaving time for coalitions of 
beneficiaries, enabled to exercise administrative discretion, to be built around the details of 
implementation so that these in turn are harder to change by successor administrations. 
Tuohy suggests that politicians  need to make decisions about the scale and pace of change 
and that politicians in Westminster systems are more likely to choose ‘big bang’ change 
which fundamentally reshapes relationships and institutional frameworks quickly and in a 
single comprehensive sweep. In these conditions, institutional entrepreneurs can assist 
politicians and civil servants to facilitate the rapid enactment of new institutional 
frameworks. In governing systems with federal structures or a separation of powers, 
consensus must be built before legislation is enacted but thereis less risk of later policy 
reversal. 67 p.12.   
Finlayson’s characterisation of the implementation phase in New Zealand as not a ‘neutral 
non-political stage of the policymaking process...especially where key groups have not been 
involved in the formulation of policy’ 33 describes the risks of these dynamics in this country. 
The evidence shows that the new Labour government had learned from the troubles of the 
previous administration in the implementation phase for its primary health care policies and 
sought to minimise these by some more extended use of strategic alliances and stakeholder 
management strategies, albeit within the terms of an uncompromising policy stance on a 
community-led governance model.    
The structural features of the general practice sub-system and the recent history of failed 
attempts to implement major health policy change vindicated this cautious approach to 
implementation of the pay-for-performance policy developed by the RSAG, which slowed 
and regionalised the process of implementation so that it extended over four more years. 
Even so the process of alternative selection and implementation was not able to solve key 
design challenges such as general practitioners’ buy-in to a broader and more relevant set of 
population health targets for the scheme or to develop solutions to the information 
management deficits which limited the scheme to a small set of targets. 
Although the intention of the PP was to establish leverage for the new PHOs to influence 
and support clinical governance frameworks amongst their general practices, evaluations 
show that the performance incentives did not always act as drivers of practice change but, 
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as in England, often reflected existing behaviours. Implementation patterns were as 
heterogenous as the environment into which they were introduced. Clinical governance 
activities in some primary health organisations remained sequestered within the existing 
peer-led and collegial systems which New Zealand general practitioners had developed over 
the years.  Some PHO management staff had limited knowledge of or involvement in these 
processes, at least initially. These institutional features, and the barriers which they placed 
in the way of the design and implementation of a single large national scheme, delayed and 
limited the achievement of a new focus on population health and preventive practices and 
any potential for improvements in health outcomes.      
Heterogeneity of the institutional landscape 
 
Considering the two case study analyses together, the differences between the impact of a 
heterogenous institutional and structural landscape in the general practice sub-system in 
New Zealand and the more homogenous, centrally coordinated landscape in England 
become clearer. This is makes the nature of the institutional and structural landscape a 
strong candidate as a driver of difference in the size, scope and speed of policy design.  
This heterogeneous environment in New Zealand, with large elements disaffected in some 
ways form the government’s policies for primary health care, meant that the process of 
alternative selection and implementation of the new policy had to be carefully approached 
if it was not to falter as had been the case with earlier health policy implementation 
attempts in the 1990s. It also affected technical feasibility of implementation. A practical 
consequence of the widespread lack of collaboration or engagement with the new policy 
was the problem of data adequacy. Existing national databases held information on a small 
number of activities which could be suitable for development as pay-for-performance 
targets. Processes designed for the selection of new indicators were unwieldy and time-
consuming and participants withdrew from these processes. It was not considered feasible 
to implement an information management system to support a real time feedback 
mechanism on practice activity and performance such as the QMAS. A feature of the New 
Zealand scheme was that the calculation of results and payment of incentives was delayed 
by 6-12 months after each achievement period. This further deterred general practitioner 
engagement.  
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Devolved implementation also slowed the progress of implementation. PHOs were variable 
in their capacity and capability to implement the PP. Whereas in England implementation 
occurred at the practice level by practices eager to demonstrate performance and release 
new income, in New Zealand implementation depended upon the readiness of both District 
Health Boards and PHOs and the central PP team. These organisations had many other 
pressing priorities for their resources and attention between 2006-8 (including 
implementation of major immunization and other population health-related campaigns). 
Some features such as the variation in amounts of payments for performance and the ease 
and speed with which practices obtained feedback about their performance under the 
scheme differed widely. Where these were perceived as unfair or inadequate, practices 
were less interested in participating in the PP 165. However, devolved implementation 
permitted the building of local or regional coalitions around the new policy to reflect local 
conditions, needs and preferences and contributed to its longevity through successive 
administrations. 
Historical antecedents 
 
The evidence shows that historical events, relationships and policies influenced 
policymaking processes. The history of the genesis of the national health system and the 
relationship between the Labour Party, in and out of office, and parts of the medical 
profession in New Zealand is an ever-present theme in the minds of most participants 
interviewed about the process of policy design. Because of this history, feelings ran high 
amongst some participants. Opposition politicians were subsequently cultivated by the 
Independent Practitioners’ Association Council to champion different approaches to clinical 
leadership. The evidence points to some participants deciding to bide their time until a 
change of government would enable them to exercise greater influence and redress the 
policy design in their favour.   
The existence of antecedents of the quality improvement and budget management schemes 
developed by general practice consortia including IPAs a decade earlier were critical to 
facilitating the design of this scheme. Personnel involved in these earlier schemes were 
heavily involved in designing the new one and utilised their experience from these schemes 
in their work. Evidence about the need for and effectiveness of such policies in academic 
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studies of the impacts of the early budget management schemes was used in making the 
case for and designing the scheme.  
Does the Zahariadis Model encourage consideration of these 
factors? 
 
While the model is very helpful in providing five structural elements which display key 
features of the policymaking process in New Zealand it does not go far enough to highlight 
certain elements which have been found to be important influencers of the process. The set 
of sub-elements in the Zahariadis Model does not invite specifically consideration of interest 
group strengths, values or political loyalties. It does not invite consideration of underpinning 
ownership and governance features which may influence or explain these interest group 
attributes. It does not invite consideration of the type of policymaking which is incentivised 
by different electoral and governing systems. It does not consider forms of institutional 
entrepreneurial behaviour which are focused upon the building of new governance or 
decision-making systems rather than on new policies.  
Summary 
 
This Chapter has analysed the fit between the evidence of the design of the PP and the MS 
Framework in describing and explaining what happened. It then considered the relevance of 
other historical, structural and institutional drivers in the policymaking process. In the next 
Chapter, an overarching analysis of the theory and evidence set out in this research is 
presented, beginning with a summary of key findings, followed by a detailed analysis of how 
well Kingdon’s MS Framework fits the process of policymaking in the two Westminster 
jurisdictions.   
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Part Three 
CHAPTER NINE 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE: DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction  
 
In the previous four chapters, the two case studies of pay-for-performance policymaking 
have been described, barriers and enablers of the policymaking process discussed and a 
summary of evaluations and assessments of the outcomes of each policymaking process 
provided. Then Kingdon’s MS Framework was applied to each case study and its utility in 
describing and explaining each process of policymaking was assessed.  
In this Chapter, the research questions are answered:  
 In what aspects and why did two similar episodes of policy formulation and 
implementation in two similar jurisdictions follow different processes and have 
different outcomes?  
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process in the two case studies? 
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from these analyses 
which might enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
This Chapter will focus upon the comparative approach to the case study evidence and seek 
to draw out findings from the case studies which identify ‘particular features in which these 
otherwise very similar nations differ...[which might be ] attributable to one of the few other 
factors distinguishing them ‘ 62. Arguments to support the following findings will be set out 
and discussed: 
 The use of bargaining and negotiation processes enabled the large size, scale and 
speed of design and implementation of the QOF in England and therefore the level 
of health outcomes attributable to the scheme. It is in this aspect that the two 
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episodes of policy formulation and implementation in two similar jurisdictions differ 
most strikingly and it is also because of this feature that the outcomes of each 
scheme differ.  
 Differences in the institutional framework within the general practice sub-system in 
each country are the primary driver of policy variation. In particular the mandate 
held by the BMA in England to be sole bargaining agent for general practitioners 
holding general medical services contracts and the single-payer financing and 
singular ownership model for general practice services in that country structured the 
relationships and incentives between state actors and those in the general practice 
sub-system in a different way from the New Zealand general practice sub-system. 
The multiple payers and heterogeneous set of interest groups and ownership 
structures which existed in New Zealand, combined with the absence of any 
mandated single interest group entity for negotiating general practice public policy 
and funding matters with state actors, created limiting conditions for pay-for-
performance policymaking and reduced incentives collectively and individually for 
rapid take-up by all general practitioners of the new policy.  
 Institutional explanations of policy change are most useful in the two case studies. 
The ownership and governance structures within the general practice sub-system 
created a set of supportive conditions and incentives in England and limiting 
conditions and incentives in New Zealand for the design and implementation of a 
large-scale pay-for-performance scheme.  
 In both countries, actors resembling policy and institutional entrepreneurs assisted 
the state to scale up local innovations for national utilisation. In England, one of 
these actors led negotiations based on a pay-for-performance framework they had 
implemented at a regional level. Another drew academics into the design process, 
creating an environment ‘like a practice meeting’ to facilitate the negotiation of 
targets and indicators between the state and the profession. In New Zealand, actors 
who had held entrepreneurial roles in the previous decade at the regional level, 
introducing capitated funding and improving quality of clinical practice and 
population-based outcomes, now placed this experience at the service of the state. 
They ensured that voices from Māori and Pacific and low income communities and 
other primary care professionals were a vocal part of the debates over clinical 
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priorities within the design process. These actors resemble institutional rather than 
policy entrepreneurs because they are developing new frameworks which will shift 
the balance of influence between the state, the medical profession and private 
financial actors. They are assisting the state to introduce a new mix of governance 
mechanisms with an increased role for hierarchical forms of influence for state 
actors.     
 There is contrary evidence to Kingdon’s prediction that non-incremental change is 
associated with a policymaking environment of ambiguity of preference, fluidity of 
participation and unclear technology. In England the pay-for-performance 
policymaking was non-incremental and occurred in an environment of unambiguous 
preferences, closed participation and clear technology for implementation.  
 Kingdon’s MS Framework, as enhanced by Zahariadis, requires further 
enhancements including explicit consideration of the sub-elements of ownership and 
governance arrangements of public services (particularly financing arrangements) 
and of network  features of the relevant policy sector in the Politics stream, of the 
nature and type of policy antecedents in the Policy stream, addition of other types of 
entrepreneurs, particularly institutional entrepreneurs and the addition of a 
longitudinal focus by consideration of policy outcomes.   
 The need for a synthesised, multi-theoretic approach, utilising multiple drivers, to 
describe and explain policy change is validated. Kingdon’s MS Framework is found to 
provide an excellent organising tool for diagnostic and prescriptive enquiry but 
requires a stronger focus upon  the importance of institutions, rational choice 
explanations for how actors’ incentives operate individually and collectively and of 
historical antecedents  as factors in policy change and variation. Without taking 
these additional factors into account, the ability of the MS Framework to display the 
full complexity of these two processes and to attain greater relevance for 
policymaking in Westminster jurisdictions is limited. 
 There is an evolutionary pattern of policymaking in both case studies. In both 
England and New Zealand, policymakers are shown to be actively avoiding the risks 
and pitfalls of earlier similar episodes and learning from mistakes made in the past.    
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 The two case studies lend support to the theory that policymaking follows national 
styles rather than sectoral ones.  
 
The two case studies compared 
 
In this section, a table is presented which compares the two policymaking processes 
according to the five main drivers of policy change and their policy outputs and outcomes. A 
discussion of the administrative and health outcomes of each case study is then presented 
in more detail.    
Table 2: The two case studies compared: drivers analysis for pay-for-performance 
policymaking 
 
Driver England New Zealand 
Institutional Majoritarian, unitary political system 
National health system 
Single payer GP financing (primarily 
capitation) 
Single NHS/GP ownership/governance 
model 
Strong hierarchical corporatist features 
of decision-making in GP sub-system 
Majoritarian, unitary political system 
National health system 
Multiple payer GP financing (primarily fee 
for service) 
Multiple GP ownership/governance 
models 
Collegial/market features of decision-
making in GP sub-system    
Networks Integrated GP policy community  
Single representative GP body 
BMA holds mandated bargaining rights 
BMA has high level of access to state 
actors 
Heterogeneous GP policy community 
Multiple representative GP bodies 
No mandated bargaining rights for GPs 
Partisan patterns of access to state actors 
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‘Politics of the double bed’ history 
Active well established medico-
academic research community   
Adversarial history between some GPs 
and Labour Party 
Smaller medico-academic research 
community  
 
Actors Prime Minister involved in health policy 
Reforming Secretary of State for Health 
Executive led policy agenda-setting 
 Civil servants side-lined in policy 
development 
Policy design dominated by GPs 
GP negotiators accountable to 
GPC/BMA 
All GPs held vote on final 
scheme/contract 
 
Policy design led by appointed 
negotiators. Academics mediated policy 
design process 
Insider knowledge/ relationship 
management skills, ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ experience of practice-
based pay-for-performance scheme 
used.   
Prime Minister involved in health policy 
Reforming Minister of Health 
Executive endorsed pay-for-performance 
policy 
Civil servants led policy agenda-setting  
GPs minority in policy design teams 
No GP accountability framework for 
policy  
Community-based and other primary care 
professionals involved in design 
 
Policy design led by appointed leaders to 
develop new governance mechanisms.  
 
Insider knowledge/ relationship 
management skills and ‘institutional 
entrepreneur’ experience of quality 
improvement in capitated funding 
environments used  
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Ideas NPM-intensive history of public policy  
 
Government keen to empower primary 
care 
 
Concerned about health inequalities 
P for P trialled in several precursor 
schemes 
Strong GP support for fund-holding for 
hospital services 
GP scepticism about population-based 
health 
GP scepticism about customer service 
Strong commitment to free primary 
care 
Supportive of centralised quality 
standards 
Majority GP support P for P and 
monitoring of practice data in exchange 
for more income 
NPM-intensive history of public policy  
 
Government keen to empower primary 
care, community voices and Māori and 
Pacific communities 
Concerned about health inequalities 
P for P trialled in several precursor 
schemes 
 
Strong GP support for budget-holding for 
referred services 
GP scepticism about population-based 
health 
Strong GP focus on customer service 
Strong commitment to patient co-
payment amongst most GPs 
Limited exposure to central standards 
Support for peer-led utilisation review but 
many GPs opposed  to funder access to 
data 
 
Socio-
economic  
High predicted burden of chronic 
conditions 
 
High predicted burden of chronic 
conditions 
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Willing to invest more money in 
primary care  
Willing to invest more money in primary 
care 
Policy 
output 
Voluntary national pay- for-
performance  scheme 
146 indicators 
Clinical/service domains incentivised 
25-30 percent of income conditional 
1-yr implementation period 
Provision for review of indicators 
Voluntary national pay-for-performance  
scheme 
13 indicators 
Clinical domains incentivised 
2 percent of income conditional 
3-yr implementation period 
Provision for review of indicators 
Policy 
outcome 
95 percent compliance with targets in 
first year 
Ambulatory sensitive admissions 
impact on:  
 Coronary heart disease 
 Hypertension 
 Congestive heart failure 
 Diabetes 
 COPD 
Choice of indicators in subsequent 
years undertaken by National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence 
By 2014 reduction to 10 percent of pay 
conditional on achievement of targets 
81 percent compliance with targets in 
first year 
Ambulatory sensitive admissions impact 
on:  
 Vaccination-related admissions 
 
 
Choice of indicators in subsequent years 
undertaken by governance group with 
larger number of GPs 
By 2014 proposal to review scheme, 
providing  quality building grants to PHOs 
and direct incentives to practices for 
achievement of targets 
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What outcomes were achieved by these policymaking processes? 
 
In the two case studies the policy outcomes can be viewed as administrative or health 
outcomes. Administrative (or stewardship) outcomes describe the ability of the state to 
better hold general practice to account for its health actions. Health outcomes describe 
improved health status derived from incentivised changes in general practice-based 
activities. Both types of outcomes differed in each jurisdiction.  
Administrative outcomes 
 
 With respect to administrative outcomes, both policymaking episodes delivered 
enhancements to each government’s ability to set priorities, monitor performance and hold 
to account providers in the general practice sector. In New Zealand the policymaking 
episode is nested in policymaking which sought to achieve, in Tuohy’s terms67 p.11 , a large-
scale change in the ‘balance of interests, mix of institutional forms (governance 
mechanisms) and the legitimating ideas’ about primary health care funding and services 
through the PHCS. Though more rapid progress towards improved health outcomes through 
the QOF was made in England than through New Zealand’s PP, arguably the greater shift in 
stewardship capability occurred in the New Zealand policymaking episode, given the very 
low base from which the state needed to develop improved accountability frameworks for 
general practice. This broader programme included introduction of contracts for primary 
health care services, capitated funding allocations, enrolment of patients with PHOs, 
restoration of universal subsidies and initiatives to redistribute levels of primary care 
resources according to health need.    
English achievements - The introduction of the QOF by England contributed major 
enhancements to the state’s ability to exercise its purchasing functions by incentivising 146 
targets for general practitioners to improve population health. Through the QOF 
policymaking episode, the commissioning function of the state was enhanced to deliver 
better information systems to record patient health status (through the QMAS) and to 
monitor what activities were directed, within general practices, to addressing these health 
needs. The contract was redesigned to place over 25 percent of general practice income at 
risk if the required activities were not performed, while preserving the core viability of 
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practice income. These are strong new levers to influence health actions of general 
practitioners.  
There were many features of these commissioning, purchasing and contracting 
arrangements which were able to be improved 128. There were clear benefits for primary 
care in England from the introduction of the QOF and other features of the new General 
Medical Services contract, which improved the retention of general practitioners and 
increased its attractiveness as a choice of practice within medicine, at least in the years 
immediately following implementation of the new contract. However this was at the 
expense of resources in health services generally, both fiscal and human, as the contract 
caused over-spending and excessive recruitment in to the general practice sector for some 
years. Productivity did not increase as a result of the contract, given the higher-than-
expected earnings and reduced working hours for general practitioners 133. 
Evaluations of the overall effect of the English contract show mixed results, with general 
practices in poorer areas lifting their performance more rapidly than in better-off areas in 
the first years after implementation of the contract 134. More general practitioners were 
attracted to work in all areas increasing service capacity. But needs-adjusted redistribution 
of funding generally moved at a slower pace than intended and there were many criticisms 
of the widespread withdrawal of general practices from after-hours services, with those 
services replaced by new service providers contracted by Primary Care Trusts. Some of 
these issues have been addressed in subsequent negotiations between the government and 
the profession. Equity risks relating to access barriers (geographic or service-related such as 
cultural appropriateness, rather than cost-based) and differential health outcomes remain 
but evaluators consider that these have been reduced by the QOF.  
New Zealand achievements - In New Zealand the small number of targets and the low level 
of engagement of key general practice leaders in the design process initially delivered a 
smaller enhancement to administrative ability to monitor and influence general practice. 
While implementation was well managed within the network of PHOs and especially by the 
central team managing the PP itself, an ‘implementation gap’ occurred, with many general 
practitioners not engaging with the PP initially. However, new national information 
management systems have developed around the PP, showing the relative performance of 
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regions in reaching the PP targets. There is no shared national database of practice activity 
on the QMAS model though there are services which offer sampling of a representative 
national practice information data set for research purposes. After some years the 
governance of the PP was restructured to incorporate more representatives from general 
practice, though this slowed the development of targets and indicators for a time. The 
number of indicators has remained relatively static though the types of indicators have 
moved towards those more obviously associated with health status such as cardiovascular 
disease risk assessment, diabetes detection and follow up and smoking cessation advice. 
The policy emphasis on population health and inequalities is seen to have receded with the 
election of a new government in 200817 p.252. There have been  subsequent reductions made 
in the funds for the PP; total funding falling from $33 million in 2010 to $21 million in 2011 
178 179 and there is currently a plan to dismantle the PP in its current form  and disperse 
some of its resources to PHOs for capacity building initiatives relating to quality and a new 
Integrated Performance and Incentive Framework176.  The funding position of the state 
within general practice has also eroded as levels of co-payments have increased once again 
over time. In February 2014 the average fee for an adult to attend a general practice was 
$31.93 and for a child over 6 was $22.70.10.  
There are also some shifts in the nature of governance and accountability dynamics 
between state actors and the profession detected by commentators in the years following 
the election of a National government in 2008. Greater clinician involvement, or ‘sideways’ 
accountability, particularly in the running of hospitals, was advocated by the new Minister 
of Health in preference to ‘downwards’ accountability to the community 17. New ‘Alliance 
Agreements’ have been put into place between funders and providers which aim to reflect a 
high trust, low bureaucracy environment with high quality and accountability and which are 
designed to provide a mechanism for clinical leadership in the development of health 
services.  
Health outcomes  
 
There was high potential for health system impact in incentivising more preventive, 
population-based activities in primary care in each country. The English scheme 
                                                             
10 http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/health-statistics-and-data-sets/primary-care-data-and-stats 
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implemented a broad range of agreed targets with, potentially, major positive impacts upon 
health outcomes over time 180 p.17. The New Zealand scheme achieved a more limited 
scheme with few indicators clearly associated with strategic benefits in prevention of 
chronic disease. These were to be reported publicly at the level of the PHO, based on the 
analysis of practice data within the PHO.   
The case studies report the recent evaluations of each scheme showing the levels of 
statistically significant associations between the pay-for-performance scheme and measures 
of health outcomes such as rates of ambulatory care admissions. Although the results are 
somewhat equivocal, and it should be noted that the reduction of ambulatory sensitive 
admissions was not an agreed measure of success of these schemes, these show that 
England achieved gains in five of the key chronic illnesses (coronary heart disease, 
hypertension, congestive heart failure, diabetes and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) 
while New Zealand achieved this solely for vaccination-related admissions 135 175. 
Studies of the impact of financial incentives on health care rarely report the outcomes of 
incentive schemes. 43 The evaluations of the outcomes of these two schemes provide 
important feedback for policy-makers about the effectiveness of the two schemes and have 
enabled this comparative research to include an assessment of not only the process and 
outputs but also the outcomes of both schemes.     
The strength of the comparative case 
 
The comparative approach can give greater methodological assurance that the differences 
between the two case studies did not occur by chance if it can be shown that, for the 
purposes of this research, the two countries are alike in all respects but one or two 
variables. A ‘most similar’ or ‘concomitant variation’ strategy 85 p.32-33 has been used in this 
research. This most-similar systems case study design, studying matched policymaking 
processes, has allowed many features to be controlled for, which could be expected to be 
drivers of policy variation.  
According to the logic of the ‘most similar’ strategies, if some important differences are 
found among these otherwise similar countries then ‘the number of factors attributed to 
these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those 
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differences alone...Common systemic characteristics are conceived as controlled for and 
inter-systemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables.’ Statements of explanatory 
variables can be formulated at the sub-systemic level such as each country’s general 
practice sector. Deductive logic is then applied to make the case for these explanatory 
variables.  
In a framework suggested by John, 4 p.89 this research has treated the policy outcome as the 
dependent variable and included all other variables in the analysis, including those relating 
to institutions, rational choice explanations, group structure and resources, socio-economic 
drivers and ideas. It is contended here that the comparative analysis of the New Zealand 
and English governing systems and their overarching national health systems demonstrates 
extensive common systemic characteristics. These are therefore controlled for and the 
inter-systemic differences – namely the general practice institutional features (financing 
arrangements and ownership and governance structures as well as the relative strength of 
general practitioner representative associations) which permitted bargaining in one case 
study - are the explanatory variables.     
Similarities which are relevant to the case studies 
 
The case for the common systemic characteristics includes the contemporaneous and 
synchronous era of health reform commencing in the late 1990s which provided a similar 
window of opportunity in England and New Zealand in the sense that Kingdon defines such 
windows. The policy context and goals, including the pay-for-performance policy as 
designed in the alternative selection phase in New Zealand, were very similar. Regarding 
context, at that time, both new governments held large popular mandates to seek 
improvements to their health systems. In both New Zealand and England this window 
opened at the same time with the election of a new administration in New Zealand and re-
election of the government in England. These two governments shared similar ideas and 
constellations of interest and had similar political agendas, including on health matters. The 
Minister of Health for New Zealand and the Junior Minister for Health in England met 
regularly to compare notes and hold discussions about health policy during the time period 
in which the case studies are set. The case studies reveal remarkable similarities between 
the two countries in many respects: 
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 timing – occurring contemporaneously at the end of a period of neo-liberal 
government 
 ideology - initiated by social democratic governments with a strong public mandate 
for investment in health services  
 setting - in similar Westminster model parliamentary systems (though New Zealand 
had introduced proportional representation, the Labour/Alliance government of 
1999 had a large majority) 
 similar health reform history - both governments faced a change-weary community 
of health stakeholders who had succeeded in the past in opposing the 
implementation of legislation, so were equally cautious about the proposed nature 
and extent of health policy change 
 a broad current of public opinion supported improvements in health service delivery 
 both pay-for-performance policies had strong continuity with policies from the 
previous era, especially general practice fund-holding and budget management 
 both are nested within larger health policy reform efforts 
 the medical profession were highly influential in each country  
 good reasons (relating to efficiency, equity and cost-containment) to justify 
implementing greater accountability within general practice for the delivery of 
medical services 
 new money was available. 
 
So the policy-makers in each country therefore faced many similar conditions as they 
embarked upon a process to change accountability frameworks for general practice 
provision. Pollitt suggests that the history of nationally established performance indicators 
in England from 1983, facilitated by structural and institutional features, supported 
readiness for further reform and explains its broad pattern 181 p.15. He therefore anticipated 
similar patterns in other majoritarian, centralized states such as New Zealand, and in the 
arena of health care.  
The same goals for primary health care underpinned the purpose of the two policy pay-for -
performance initiatives.  These include intentions to: 
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 incentivise general practice-based health actions which prevent or improve the 
management of chronic health conditions 
 shift resources to under-doctored or under-serviced areas 
 encourage new approaches to workforce utilisation  
 maintain the momentum for greater accountability of health providers to funders 
created by the health reforms of the 1990s 
 avoid open conflict or imposition of settlements on unwilling parties 
 avoid the risks of pay-for-performance policies by building-in of provisions for 
review and refinement of targets, mechanisms and funding levels over time. 
 
Both countries built on existing New Public Management-generated policies post 2000 in a 
way described by Pollit as a ‘logic of escalation’ 181 or a dynamic in which an initial tendency 
for ‘a few simple measures to become a more comprehensive package’ exists. Career civil 
servants in both countries carried these approaches from one administration to the next 
and in New Zealand were the primary agenda-setters of the pay for performance policy.   
Differences which are relevant to the case studies 
 
 These are: 
 use of bargaining and negotiation mechanism for developing the pay-for-
performance policy 
 institutional/structural framework for general practice sub-system  
 history of relationships between the state and general practice interest group 
 
The framework for sole bargaining rights in England is a product of history and of the 
singular ownership and governance structures within the general practice sub-system in 
that country. It has given rise to a more integrated general practice interest group in 
England and creates the opportunity and incentive for general practitioners to exercise their 
bargaining power collectively, through a single democratic representative channel. It is 
reasonable to conclude that the bargaining framework is an artefact of the institutional and 
structural arrangements for general practice services, particularly the financing 
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arrangements, in England. Similar institutional and financing arrangements were originally 
legislated for in New Zealand at the time of health system establishment but then diverged 
markedly over time to produce a multi-payer and heterogeneous context for policymaking 
without a legitimated bargaining agent. In England the single payer/single contract 
arrangement had been uninterrupted since 1948 and has encouraged the development of a 
single point of interface for the general practice profession with the state, the BMA.   
This leads to the conclusion that the response of each government to the conditions in its 
general practice sub-system was in fact a rational approach which accorded with the 
instruments of governance and influence available to them. Whereas in England more direct 
forms of incentives, focused on the unit of the general practice itself, could be bargained for 
nationally and achieved more rapidly, in New Zealand a population-based approach to 
improving primary health care needed to be developed first within its new community-
governed  PHOs.  
Utility of MS Framework 
 
Kingdon’s MS Framework primarily provides an explanation for non-incremental policy 
change in a set of circumstances of problematic preferences, fluid participation and unclear 
technology. It emphasises the role of human agency or actors (the policy entrepreneur) in 
cutting through this lack of clarity and seizing the chance to offer manageable solutions to 
decision-makers 79. This section compares the utility of this model for both case studies. Its 
ability to predict and explain the two policymaking processes is assessed.   
Incremental or non-incremental change?  
 
The analysis has shown that the English case study exhibits non-incremental change without 
the expected features of ambiguity, fluidity of participation and unclear technology. By 
contrast the New Zealand case study exhibits much of this ambiguity, fluidity of 
participation and unclear technology. It delivers change which meets Kingdon’s definition of 
non-incremental change but is smaller in size, scope and speed of implementation.   
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What is non-incremental change?  
 
To recap, Kingdon’s own definition of non-incremental change is that a policy idea reaches 
the agenda and dominates it in a visibly significant way over a four-year period. In England 
the pay-for-performance idea became the centrepiece of a new financing arrangement for 
general practice within a period of two years from the focusing event of the BMA ballot of 
general practitioners about resignation from the NHS, held during the election campaign in 
2001. Most participants confirmed that pay-for-performance (‘something for something’) 
was a pervasive concept which was understood and accepted by participants throughout 
the rapid process of policymaking.  
The New Zealand PP is also an example of Kingdon’s definition of non-incremental change 
even though it had low visibility amongst general practitioners and comprised only 2% of 
the budgeted funding for primary care services. It was quickly developed and reported to  
Cabinet. Decision-makers then took a consultative and phased approach, with funding 
approved in July 2004 but implementation occurring in 2006. This process of design took 
twice as long to design and implement as the QOF. However, the policy achieved an 
important change in the level of knowledge about and potential influence over the activities 
of general practitioners which the state now holds, through a central monitoring body and 
the network of local PHOs and District Health Boards.   
Ambiguity, fluidity and unclear technology? 
 
To recap, the three characteristics of the Garbage Can Model borrowed by Kingdon from 
Cohen 51 p.84 are problematic (or ambiguous) preferences, which are ‘discovered through 
action rather than actions being determined by them’, fluid participation (individuals drifting 
in and out of decision-making according to the time and effort required) and unclear 
technology (or failure of individuals to understand how the general processes of the 
organisation really work). In Kingdon’s original research, the ambiguity of preferences and 
fluidity of participation was often exacerbated by temporal constraints and together these 
circumstances militated, according to his evidence, against rational measured incremental 
policymaking. Instead, he often observed dramatic non-incremental policy change, 
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facilitated by exogenous manipulative policy entrepreneurs influencing agenda-setting 
processes.   
Against the criteria of ambiguity, fluidity and unclear technology, the English and New 
Zealand case studies deliver contradictory findings. In England where non-incremental 
change occurred there is planned top-down policymaking featuring clarity of preferences, 
closed participation and clear technology for implementation. The evidence shows that 
these features of ambiguity, fluidity and unclear technology do apply to the New Zealand 
case study, which also delivers non-incremental change, but with a step-by-step process of 
implementation.   
The two case studies reinforce the conclusion that policymaking in Westminster systems can 
be planned, top-down and non-incremental in purposeful and orderly rather than chance-
dominated circumstances, that political leaders do indeed make decisions about the scale 
and pace of change and these strategies reflect the political and institutional settings in 
which they operate 23 p.38. This leads to a question about the importance of the 
entrepreneurial role itself and Kingdon’s theory of political manipulation. The case studies 
show that it was not at the agenda-setting phase that these actors were important. During 
this phase in Westminster systems, political parties and Ministers dominate. At the 
subsequent stages of alternative selection and implementation, however, other actors 
including civil servants and entrepreneurial actors play a much more significant role.  
Importance of policy entrepreneurs  
 
In both case studies, the exogenous manipulative policy entrepreneur is not found but 
actors with a variety of entrepreneurial skills are seen in the evidence to be enlisted by 
governments to bring disparate ideas together to explore common ground and to conciliate 
different interests. Policy change in each case study was facilitated by individual actors 
exhibiting entrepreneurial skills as described in the MS Framework literature. However, this 
evidence does not add up to a theory of political manipulation at the agenda-setting phase. 
These actors are most relevant in the alternative selection phase though were acting 
according to the directions of Ministers.  
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There are two main types of policy entrepreneurs which have been established in the 
literature following Kingdon: the opportunistic ‘brilliant salesman’ with a predetermined 
policy idea and the facilitator of the ‘internal team process’ of policy design. A third kind, 
the ‘institutional’ entrepreneur, is a more recent concept in the literature. These actors seek 
to change institutions rather than policies, looking for opportune moments to innovate and 
introduce new forms of governance. The risks they take include, for instance, engaging their 
endowments of knowledge with current political encumbents (which may place them at risk 
with successor administrations or deliver them greater benefits). Two examples of 
entrepreneurial actors who were particularly important for the design of the pay-for-policy-
framework in each case study are the Chair of the Quality Sub Group in the English case 
study (a ‘policy entrepreneur’) and the Co-Chair of the Referred Services Expert Advisory 
Group appointed by the Ministry of Health in the New Zealand case study (who resembles 
an ‘institutional entrepreneur’). In New Zealand this Co-Chair had experience of the 
implementation of quality improvement schemes within capitated funding environments in 
a regional primary care network organisation. With the assistance of his colleagues, he was 
able to bring this experience into the heart of the national policymaking process, spanning 
boundaries between general practice and funding organisations to champion quality 
improvement schemes within capitated funding models. He also drew in influencers from 
Māori, Pacific and disadvantaged communities and other primary care professionals into the 
policy design process. Both these actors were general practitioners, each having a particular 
passion for quality improvement in medical practice and had extensive experience of 
relevant policymaking in another adjacent arena which they were able and willing to 
transfer into national policymaking processes. In this sense they can be seen to have ‘laid 
the ground work for the next major episode of change’ 67 p.36. 
However, a distinctive model of public entrepreneur is also offered by the Chair of the 
Confederation team in England who established a new negotiating team to facilitate the 
building of a closer strategic alliance with the BMA through very challenging times. 
Participants for the research in England confirm that he utilised qualities of social acuity, 
problem definition, team building and leading by example, such as are identified by 
Mintrom 83. He maintained the support of his mandate-givers despite the peaks and troughs 
of the policy design process and the pressure of the political dynamics of both the BMA and 
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government administrative processes. He was noted for his active problem-solving skills and 
stakeholder relationship management. The freshness of this approach, in contrast to 
remembered and more traditional adversarial negotiating styles, is remarked upon and 
endorsed by all participants.   
These actors can be seen as entrepreneurial because they ‘gamble that certain resources 
can be combined now to yield greater value at some uncertain future state than they do in 
their current use’ 24 p.614. They assisted state funders to enter into clinical debates with 
general practitioners, without directly challenging the professional autonomy of general 
practitioners, enabling the state to influence the use of health resources by these medical 
professionals. They carried out this public mandate, encouraging change within the primary 
care service landscape,  by combining the authority of the state with their specialised 
knowledge 67 p.3 and their previous experience of such innovations at the regional level.   
So in summary, actors utilising entrepreneurial skills were important to the successful 
conduct of policymaking in both of these case studies, though it cannot be said that these 
policies would not have been implemented without these entrepreneurs. Their contribution 
is made not in agenda-setting but in the alternative selection and implementation phases.  
Poor fit with Westminster jurisdictions  
 
Some of these findings undermine the utility of Kingdon’s MS Framework for majoritarian, 
unitary Westminster systems, as they do not seem to conform with his predictions and 
therefore reduce confidence in the generalisability of his theory to these systems. Critics of 
Kingdon’s MS Framework emphasise their concerns about the serendipitous elements of the 
framework and its lack of attention to collective approaches of individuals coming together 
to achieve a shared end, its United States-centricity, the dependence in the theory upon 
opportunistic policy entrepreneurs as policy enablers to the exclusion of institutional or 
structural drivers or constraints upon policy change and its lack of recognition of the 
importance of historical antecedents. This research supports this wide-ranging critique. In 
particular, many elements of Mucciaroni’s critique as they relate to the under-theorising of 
institutional factors 53 are upheld.    
251 
 
Both case studies show non-serendipitous planned top-down policymaking: each 
government was able to introduce its preferred type of pay-for-performance policy (and its 
overarching reforms of health services) in a planned way, in the way it preferred and at the 
speed it preferred, taking careful account of the institutional arrangements in each 
jurisdiction. This research offers support to the consensus in the literature, almost a truism, 
that policymaking has characteristics of greater autonomy in majoritarian unitary 
Westminster political systems, at least at the agenda-setting stage. The features of these 
political systems facilitate the management of top-down policymaking processes, which 
usually commence within political parties prior to an election and are implemented by an 
apolitical and experienced civil service immediately after an election.  Incoming 
governments can make major changes, at least initially, in the face of opposition from some 
interest groups. The particular risks faced by policy-makers in Westminster jurisdictions are 
the difficulties in managing the implementation stage of policymaking and the risk that 
policies will be often overturned at the next change of administration.    
Identifying other drivers of policy variation and change    
 
Accepting that these two processes of policymaking in these two jurisdictions conform only 
partly with Kingdon’s MS Framework, this section now considers what particular features of 
these policymaking processes seem to explain the nature of policy change in each case and 
the variation between the two cases. A mix of institutional and rational choice approaches 
best explains what happened and why. To isolate these, the key differences revealed in the 
two case studies are now set out.   
Opportunity for bargaining and negotiation  
 
The most important aspect in which the two episodes of policymaking differ is the use of 
formal bargaining and negotiation processes in England and their absence in New Zealand. 
Because this bargaining approach encouraged the development of a larger scheme and 
achieved higher levels of engagement from general practitioners, it is also responsible for 
the difference in health outcomes attributable to the schemes in each case study. 
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England 
 
Bargaining processes used in England occurred in several key aspects of the policy design: 
the setting out of the initial principle that more pay would be conditional upon 
performance; the bargaining over the scheme itself including types of domains, health 
actions suitable to be included, the nature of the indicators, the targets themselves and 
features of thresholds and exemptions within the scheme; and on the share of income 
dependent on performance. The government took many steps to ensure that the risk of self-
interest and opportunism inherent in bargaining and the risk of gaming of pay-for-
performance schemes was managed. Rules were set around the bargaining and negotiation 
approach to temper it through principle-based negotiation strategies. Employers 
knowledgeable about health service delivery, rather than civil servants distant from the 
realities of the front line of health service delivery, were used as state negotiators, reducing 
the information asymmetry which characterises debates about medical practice between 
funders and clinicians. Within the Quality Sub Group, moderation of debates on clinical best 
practice by independent academic interlocutors was a key innovation by the Confederation 
team to ensure even-handed consideration of the merits and value of targets and to speed 
up processes which had become unconstructively disputatious.  
All participants agree that there was something palpably different and more constructive 
about the process of negotiation of this particular contract than had been experienced in 
previous years. Participants in both parties described how they, themselves, and others 
strove for a constructive negotiation which balanced socially optimal outcomes with 
improved terms and conditions for general practitioners. Participants describe explicit 
attempts to improve the levels of shared goals and mutual trust in the negotiation process 
through principle-based bargaining over levels achieved in previous negotiations.  This 
provides some evidence that lessons have been learned by governments from past 
experience and there is an increase in their skills to manage the risks of self-interest and 
opportunism of the parties in such bargaining situations. 
The fact that the QOF was part of the pay negotiation for general practices was a factor in 
its size and the speed of its implementation and comprehensiveness of take up. The BMA 
and its members were impatient for an improvement in their terms and conditions of work 
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and ready to concede increased oversight of the quality of their clinical practice to achieve a 
substantial lift in pay. This agreement was achieved through regular reporting back to the 
membership and formal processes of stage-by-stage voting, allowing members to 
participate directly in decisions about these new terms and conditions. General practitioners 
as members of the BMA were therefore well prepared for change arising from the 
settlement and thus for the implementation of the QOF itself.  
Although there was division within the membership about the scheme, it was able to be 
adopted by a majority vote of the membership. This process achieved a high degree of 
awareness of and engagement with the scheme amongst general practitioners and 
consequently it delivered more improved health outcomes more speedily.   
The greater-than-expected cost of the new General Medical Services contract, as well as its 
speedy implementation, is a by-product of the strong incentives and drivers within the pay 
negotiation process at the heart of the new contract. Some fierce interest-based bargaining 
is certainly uncovered in the English case study evidence despite the attempts to minimise it 
through principle-based bargaining. This drove the generous out-of-hours settlement which, 
when the reduction of weekend surgery hours was apparent, had immediate negative 
repercussions for politicians. Within the QOF negotiation there was also some positional 
bargaining on the degree of challenge of the targets, with one side wanting these to be ‘for 
work already being done’ and the other  wanting ‘to make it stretchy’ but for several  
participants, comments such as it ‘felt like a practice meeting’, which is a consensus-based 
process, were most common.  
New Zealand  
 
In New Zealand there was no existing framework for the interests of general practitioners to 
be formally bargained for or negotiated through a nationally representative forum. There 
was some use of bargaining-like tactics by Ministers and policymaking officials as part of the 
overarching PHCS implementation; for instance the availability of the highest levels of new 
general practice fee subsidies for regions with high socio-economic need level were made 
conditional upon certain actions such as general practices keeping patient co-payments at 
an agreed level. This required the development of a process for fees review which was 
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negotiated between individual leaders of general practice and the Minister of Health. Some 
informal ‘bargaining’ occurred between members of the RSEAG who competed with one 
another to install aspects of their preferred policies in the design of the pay-for-
performance scheme (such as the requirement to collect ethnicity information as a 
condition of participation or whether high-performing PHOs should be able to obtain 
greater rewards through the scheme). But there was no requirement to finally achieve 
consensus. General practitioners closely associated with IPAs felt that this was, in the end, a 
zero-sum game of winners and losers which was seen by some participants as a ‘state-
directed program’. This conforms with Zahariadis’ description of competitive networks 
which ‘appease certain critics...and...blatantly disregard the grievances of others’ 80 p.81. The 
result of this approach was disengagement and some bitterness about the process felt by 
some leaders of general practice and a reluctance to champion the scheme amongst their 
peers. It also reinforced the lack of a willingness by some general practice leaders to 
champion a project to develop a national database of practice performance in New Zealand 
whereas the need for this was supported in England. If a database had been developed in 
New Zealand, this might have extended the range of indicators and therefore the value of 
the scheme to general practices and sped up processes of feedback to general practitioners 
themselves about their practice. In New Zealand the lack of timely feedback about 
performance exacerbated the low levels of engagement in its implementation. This 
contributed to the lower and slower levels of achievement of attributable health outcome 
gains (although the scheme was deliberately designed to be small and incremental because 
of caution about the mechanism of pay-for-performance).    
It is impossible to know whether, in New Zealand, a mechanism for bargaining might have 
enabled resolution of the arguments over clinical leadership of the process and adequate 
access to patient treatment data. However, these issues were successfully resolved in 
England.  
What theories best explain this evidence? 
 
The major differences in the two case studies arise from institutional differences. Although 
the overarching health institutions and policies in these two case studies may seem to be 
similar, differences in the systems for resourcing and remuneration of general practice 
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services created a unique combination of institutional, rational choice and network drivers 
in each country which affected each policymaking process and the power of each state to 
strengthen its influence over providers of these services.    
In England these include the mechanism of the General Medical Services contract and also 
the relationship between the association representing the interests of general practitioners, 
the BMA, and the state. Both of these features enabled the state to increase its leverage 
over the individual general practitioner’s clinical behaviour through negotiating a 
conditional pay settlement. In this institutional framework bargaining was a rule of the 
game and general practitioners could negotiate a reduction in autonomy for a more valued 
improvement in their terms and conditions of work.  
The policy makers were able to build the pay-for-performance framework of the QOF on a 
substantial body of existing central guidelines and national service frameworks introduced 
by the new government after 1997 which were accepted by the medical profession and 
were in widespread use.    
Given the high level of political determination for a large share of new investment to be 
conditional upon performance and the desire of the BMA to negotiate as generous a 
contract for its members as possible, the incentives for both parties were aligned in support 
of the design of a large pay-for-performance scheme. The mechanisms for its negotiation 
through collective bargaining were ready to hand. The incentives for individual general 
practitioners to adopt the new policy were similarly strong. They had little choice but to 
engage with the contract negotiation process if they wished to influence their terms and 
conditions of pay. They had to implement the pay-for-performance scheme if they wished 
to increase their income. 
In New Zealand, the state was able to implement new mechanisms to give it greater ability 
to influence health care providers by legislating for a new contractual relationship with 
general practitioners, requiring the introduction of patient registers and creating a 
governance framework through PHOs which were, in theory, led by community 
representatives. But the state still had relatively little leverage over the individual general 
practitioner’s behaviour. In this institutional framework there was no opportunity for 
bargaining between the state and the general practice profession. General practitioners did 
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not have to implement the pay-for-performance scheme if they wished to increase their 
income, especially since the scheme was dependent upon PHOs and practices locally 
negotiating terms for general practitioners which did not always provide for rewards to be 
paid directly to practices. Where this was the case there was less incentive for practices to 
implement the pay-for-performance scheme.  
 New Zealand had very few existing central quality guidelines to build on and it was difficult 
to obtain clinical agreement on suitable targets for the pay-for-performance scheme. 
Because New Zealand policymakers were sceptical about pay-for-performance and 
individual general practitioners did not need pay-for-performance to increase their income, 
the incentives for both parties were against the design of a large scheme.   
Theories which combine institutional and rational actor approaches 22-24 75 emphasise the 
role of individual actors in health policymaking. In both the case studies for this research, 
actors from within the general practice profession are seen to be taking an innovative 
approach to designing new governance mechanisms for clinical practice, enabling funders 
and patient representatives to be included in debates over clinical practice which were 
usually conducted within the profession. These actors undoubtedly facilitated the 
policymaking process.  There are significant differences in the general practice networks in 
each country. In general terms the English network can be described as having greater unity, 
fewer and stronger structural forms, a more consensual mode which facilitated 
communication between members, higher capacity and more restricted access to 
membership, and guaranteed access to decision-makers. Such networks, in Zahariadis’ 
terms, have a trajectory of incremental and emergent development of a policy idea or ‘rapid 
propulsion to salience of a persistently softened idea’ 80 p.73. The New Zealand network is at 
the other end of the continuum with considerable heterogeneity, multiple, loosely 
organised structures, more competitive modes which retarded communication between 
members, lower administrative capacity and less restricted access to membership, and had 
patchy access to decision-makers. In such networks a more ‘quantum’ pattern of initial 
change may occur but then a more gradualist pathway towards unified adoption will be 
observed. Each country displays a different trajectory. The English sub-system displays 
‘rapid propulsion’ to pay-for-performance after a period of ‘softening up’ in the fund-
holding era. The New Zealand sub-system displays initial quantum change in take up of local 
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budget management contracts but then gradual progress towards adoption of a national 
pay-for-performance scheme.  
The history of relationships between the government and the interest groups also exerted 
influence and provided important context for the policymaking differently in each case. In 
England the ‘politics of the double bed’ had been reinstated by the Labour government in 
1997. In such a working relationship  the ‘logic of exchange stresses common interests and a 
search for unanimity’ 80 p.74. In New Zealand the relationship is identified as ‘a fundamentally 
conflicted one’ 91 p.33 in the evaluation of the primary health care reforms, which also 
identified that ‘the government had no formal contractual means for meeting some of its 
objectives [and that] trust is a key informal arrangement in this type of environment - so if it 
is missing...a vital component of the informal institutional arrangements is also missing’ 91 
p.36. 
Two drivers of change and variation had relatively similar effects in both case studies.  
Socio-economic factors - Both countries were in a period of strong economic growth and 
politicians had resolved to invest more resources in health care. So both schemes were able 
to be funded from new appropriations rather than making retention of existing levels of 
funding conditional upon new quality standards. This is undoubtedly an important feature 
which encouraged the design of both schemes. It can be assumed that the process of 
scheme design would have been more challenging and controversial in both countries if it 
had sought to make the use of existing income for general practitioners conditional upon 
new quality standards.   
However, the evidence shows that policymakers in both countries were driven by concerns 
about significant socio-economic risks and pressures in the future if chronic health 
conditions were not better managed through population-based approaches to health 
outcomes.    
Ideas - Consistent with the view that  ‘purchasing systems are still very much path 
dependent – that is today’s choices are limited by what has gone before’ 45 p.45, the content 
of the new policy in each case study draws heavily on existing models or familiar systems 
and that these in turn were based on New Public Management ideas.  
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The evidence shows that the Ministers in both jurisdictions supported the idea of pay-for-
performance within general practice and championed its use. Civil servants and general 
practitioners in both jurisdictions had mixed views, some believing strongly in its merits and 
seeking actively to implement it and others concerned about its risks or morally opposed to 
it. Participants reported that this mixture of attitudes to the idea of pay-for-performance 
was widespread. There was a greater degree of scepticism for the idea reflected in the New 
Zealand policy, policymakers choosing an incremental approach deliberately to minimise 
risk.    
Together with the similar existing and predicted socio-economic environment shared by the 
two countries, the importance of the idea of pay-for-performance is a factor which, broadly 
speaking, affects both case studies equally.  The evidence also illustrates the tenacity of 
politically partisan ideological preferences over time. In New Zealand these were very 
explicit and included the championing by the incoming Labour government of primary 
health care team approaches over general practice leadership approaches and community-
governed services over clinically-led services. Starke has assessed the 25-year period of 
health reform in New Zealand as being driven by multi-causal factors but dominated by the 
tendency, when a moment of political opportunity presents itself, to turn to ideas already in 
the primeval policy soup but importantly, those that accord closely with partisan or party 
ideology 27. In New Zealand’s case this results in a pattern of reform and counter-reform in 
health policy. The establishment, abolition and re-instatement of regional health boards, 
initiated by successive governments, is a good example of this pattern. This pattern of 
reform and counter-reform is made more vivid by the shorter electoral term for 
administrations in New Zealand (three years as opposed to five years in England).    
 
 
 
Implications for Kingdon’s MS Framework 
 
It is not possible to make sense of the two case studies without taking into account the 
institutional, rational choice and network factors which impinged so strongly on both 
policymaking processes described in this research.Kingdon’s multi-theoretic approach, as 
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enhanced by Zahariadis, does not encourage sufficient consideration of these factors, 
particularly  institutional ones.  It emphasises chance and individual actors as policy 
entrepreneurs in agenda-setting and these are factors which did not ultimately drive change 
or explain variation in these two policymaking episodes. The MS Framework  under-
emphasises the role played by members of policy communities organised collectively as 
interest groups within the politics stream (including political parties). The MS Framework 
also focuses upon single events of policy agenda-setting and adoption and their outputs, 
rather than seeing policymaking processes in a longitudinal context, which is especially 
important in Westminster systems where policies can be short-lived or long-lived depending 
upon policy-makers’ choice of process. Neither does the MS Framework consider policy 
outcomes, in this way neglecting opportunities to observe policy evolution over time.    
Taken together, these shortcomings under-theorise aspects of the policy change and 
variation observed in the case studies and do not accurately predict the circumstances 
under which purposeful and orderly policymaking can occur or how policymaking occurs in 
settings of goal and policy clarity.  
Enhancing the MS Framework 
 
This section considers how the analysis of this case study evidence can assist in developing 
policy-oriented approaches in the field of health policymaking research. The case studies 
have shown that institutional, rational actor and interest group or network approaches are 
all necessary in understanding what happened and why and, potentially, how to manage 
policymaking more effectively in each jurisdiction in this health sub-system in future. If the 
model of Kingdon’s MS Framework as set out by Zahariadis were adapted to include new 
sub-elements of the policymaking process in addition to those originally found by Kingdon 
and Zahariadis to be important, this would increase its utility, especially for Westminster 
jurisdictions and for future policymaking generally. These enhancements are proposed as  
sub-elements capturing network and institutional variables to be added to Zahariadis’ 
model:  
Interest group structure and resources - The MS Framework Model as Zahariadis has 
enhanced it subsumes interest or pressure group views about policies within its sub-
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element of ‘national mood’ in the Politics stream (though the value acceptability of ideas to 
interest groups is regarded as important in the Policy stream). These interest group factors 
loom large in the two case studies in its ‘politics’ stream and are key elements for 
policymaking in Westminster jurisdictions. National mood is often a separate influence from 
that of pressure groups or interest groups, with quite different interests. This is particularly 
the case in health policymaking where professional interests are powerful and resourceful 
and consumer or public concerns typically more muted and sometimes in opposition to 
medical power and interests. It is suggested that the sub-element of Interest group 
structure is added as a separate sub-element in the Politics stream of the model so that 
there is encouragement to analysts to consider the degree of power (concentrated or 
shared) and access to decision makers (high or low) held by interest groups if they are 
involved in policymaking.  
The form of ownership and governance of public services (in particular the form pertaining 
to the system or sub-system related to the policy making) may also be a key factor in 
policymaking. If consideration of this is encouraged within the Politics stream, it would 
enable an assessment of the degree of autonomy the state, through its elected 
representatives, has to develop policy. This would not only  enable options such as 
bargaining approaches to be assessed for feasibility in the policymaking process and also 
enable consideration of which types of entrepreneur in which institutional positions may 
best be able to facilitate policy making. More broadly it would invite questions about 
whether party ideology is important in agenda-setting. If so it will elevate consideration by 
policy-makers of windows of opportunity arising from administrative turnover. In such an 
environment, greater consideration would be given to doctrinally-driven policy ideas arising 
through political parties.These changes  would strengthen the relevance of the theory to a 
wider range of jurisdictions. It is suggested that this is added as a sub-element to the Politics 
stream.  
Schlager also recommends that Kingdon’s MS Framework is amended to incorporate 
institutional structure within the politics stream 79 p.306. This would in turn lead to 
consideration of whether institutional entrepreneurs are observed in any policymaking 
process. Different types of entrepreneurs should be envisaged in the model.  
261 
 
Antecedent policies or the policymaking history are an important feature of the two case 
studies and the literature suggests they are likely to be so in other policymaking situations. 
Kingdon acknowledges their importance in his written work. The presence or absence of 
antecedent policies as a sub-element of the Policy stream is suggested as an enhancement 
to the model.  In addition, consideration of its outcome is an element which is absent from 
Kingdon’s policy making framework as elaborated by Zahariadis. While the policy output is a 
focus in Zahariadis’ model, it is incomplete without consideration of the variable of the 
policy outcome. Analysis of the outcome of a policymaking process would assist successive 
policy makers to make judgements about the costs and benefits of different approaches. It 
would inform subsequent cycles of policymaking, of which there may be many, repeated 
over many decades, as this case study has shown.  Outcomes will not be able to be known 
and understood at the time of policymaking but the desired outcome should be 
documented and achievements measured to provide a full picture of the policymaking 
process. This research has made a case for inclusion of a new variable in the model – that of 
policy outcome - which would enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework for policy 
analysis. Together these sub-elements reflect the key institutional factors which are under-
represented in the model. It could be enhanced as shown in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: The MS Framework: Proposed additions  
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Relevance for related empirical work 
 
The evidence offers support to Freeman’s contention that it is the politics which determines 
policy and that national styles are the drivers of policy outcomes rather than the alternative 
view: that the nature of the problem is fundamentally connected to the kind of politics and 
outcomes that emerge (or that policy determines the politics). In a similar vein, Glaser in his 
classic comparative study of methods for paying doctors suggests that ‘the adoption of a 
particular payment mechanism results from ‘national tradition and political manoeuvres’ 60 
p.25 in which doctors’ ‘powerful clinical traditions’ and their ‘concern with prosperity and 
independence’ make the medical market ‘an exception to the simple rule that monopsonists 
can use their bargaining power to obtain advantageous procedures and minimum prices.’ 
The differences in policies adopted in identical sectors in each case study tend to indicate 
that it is the politics of the sector, not the sector itself which is the independent variable in 
policy choice.    
The case studies offer partial theoretical replication of research by Pollitt which seeks to 
explain why pay-for-performance is  ‘a prominent part of NHS management, along with a 
proliferation of regulatory instruments’ 182 p.4. Pollitt offers a ‘nested’ explanation that the 
institutional features of a centralised majoritarian political system and tax-funded single 
payer financial structures have enabled a long period of development of a coherent and 
standardised system of pay-for-performance, initially within the hospital sector. This has led 
to training of users and building of trust. He specifically predicts this will also be the case in a 
majoritarian centralised system such as New Zealand. The case of New Zealand’s general 
practice sector is in a sense the exception which offers some proof of the rule. New Zealand 
has not had centralised management of general practice funding and performance, nor 
single payer contractual funding arrangements in this sector during the period. It also lost its 
majoritarian political status in 1996 though for most of the period of review of the 
development of the English performance indicator system it had this feature. So the 
development of pay-for-performance has been late and tentative in the general practice 
sector because two key variables are different from the situation in the NHS in England: the 
interest group systems (pluralist) and financing structures (multi-payer and private 
providers) which affect general practice.    
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The two case studies also add evidence which is of relevance to other research by Pollitt 6. In 
his study of drivers of performance improvement/increased accountability approaches for 
professionals in health care he suggests that the operation of majoritarian and adversarial 
political systems is closely associated with the development of performance improvement 
systems as exhibited in England. He suggests that New Zealand as a similar political system 
should be studied to validate this finding. He found that different political systems such as in 
the Netherlands did not develop performance improvement systems as quickly or as 
willingly and identified the political system as the key driver of a preference for performance 
improvement approaches. In fact the New Zealand case study provides an example of slow 
and unwilling development of performance improvement in its general practice services 
despite its majoritarian and adversarial political system.  This offers support to the idea that 
it is the nature of the decision-making approaches and institutional features such as 
financing structures within a particular policy sector or sub-system which seems to be more 
important than the nature of the overarching political system. While the overarching 
systems are different in New Zealand and the Netherlands, each sub-system has features in 
the relevant policy communities which impede speedy consensus building and policy 
change. 
Recommendations for enhancement of typologies of health 
systems  
 
Typologies for health systems, health system reforms and political systems and public 
management approaches usually group the United Kingdom and New Zealand together. This 
research has shown that the sub-system differences between the general practice sectors in 
each country were profound and affected the ability of the state in each case to make 
system wide changes and improve equity. These differences were not readily exposed in the 
typologies available at the time. Indeed, the typologies may give a false sense of similarity 
and deter or distract researchers from the exploration of points of difference which may 
turn out to be critical. In the case of health system typologies, although there was some 
acknowledgement of differing levels of private financing in the two systems, these 
differences were not presented in a way which was particularly useful for either English or 
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New Zealand policymakers, or those from other countries, to understand how this might 
affect the operation of each system or the process of change to systems.  
Taking health system typologies as an example, some new indicators of difference between 
outwardly similar systems could be considered for addition and have been important factors 
in assisting this research and its analysis: 
 New indicators by sector such as  
o the degree of monopsony by sector 
o number of funders by sector 
o modes of governance overall and by sector 
o modes of decision-making overall and by sector  
o structure of policy community by sector.  
 
 Differences for existing indicators at the sub-system or sectoral level 
(in financing or stewardship approaches for instance) such as; 
o the proportion of out-of-pocket payments for medical services 
by sector  
o the type of physician payment by sector 
o the proportions of public/private finance by sector 
 
Where these can be identified and incorporated into typologies, the comparative and 
explanatory power of the typology would be greatly enhanced. Typologies encourage 
variable-driven explanations which have ‘an automaticity that largely removes human 
agency from view...leaving a huge unexplained residual’50 p.274. The task of identifying these 
indicators will itself focus attention on a larger range of mechanisms in each health system. 
Where these features could be mapped against the performance or outcomes of health 
systems generally, which Health 2000 54sought somewhat controversially to do, this would 
give impetus to efforts to analyse drivers of difference and isolate key variables which are 
associated with improved health outcomes.   
In the first section of this Chapter, the research questions set out in the Introduction are 
answered, with reference to the literature on drivers of the policymaking process and 
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comparative approaches to such study and to the evidence obtained in two case studies of 
contemporaneous pay-for-performance policymaking in similar jurisdictions. A set of 
findings has been presented and the arguments which support these findings have been 
explored in depth, taking a comparative approach. In the next section, ideas for the use of 
these findings in the New Zealand policymaking context are set out.      
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Summing up: research findings and looking forward 
 
This research has studied pay-for-performance health policymaking in two countries in 2001 
when pay-for-performance schemes in national health systems were relatively untried. With 
the passage of time, much new research about pay-for-performance has been completed 
and has drawn upon the experience of the QOF development in England. Researchers have 
commented that the research question today is not whether to use pay-for-performance 
but how best to incorporate it in financing arrangements for general practice services 49, 
bearing in mind Saltman’s warning that ‘the experience of one country with payment 
systems and financial incentives cannot easily be reproduced in another country - even if 
there is a high degree of cultural and institutional similarities’ 43 p. 195. Given the passage of 
time there can also be an assessment of whether improved population-based health 
outcomes have been achieved by the initiatives in both countries. 
As a final contribution from this research, some next steps are proposed for consideration 
by policymakers in these two countries which might improve their ability to achieve 
population-based health outcomes through primary health care services.    
The first comment relates to the opportunity for a stronger collaboration between the two 
countries which are the subject of this research on health policy. Despite the different 
results and the differences in the general practice sub-system in each country (which have 
grown in recent years with the decision to implement general practice-based commissioning 
in England) there remain many similarities in the institutional, structural and cultural 
features of the two health systems. There are well developed linkages between England and 
New Zealand for policy making dialogue in both the political and the policy streams. In 
developments since 2004, English policymakers have made step by step improvements in 
their pay-for-performance scheme, including removing the design of the QOF from the 
collective bargaining environment. England has recently decided to reduce the component 
of income which is dependent upon it within the General Medical Services contract. Taking 
all these factors into consideration, there is much benefit to be gained from continuing a 
strong and collaborative dialogue over future developments of pay-for-performance 
policymaking in the two countries. 
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The second set of comments is directed at policymaking in New Zealand. As was the case in 
the policymaking for the Primary Health Care Strategy in 1999, New Zealand policy-makers 
can choose the appropriate scale and pace of change to reflect the nature of the window of 
opportunity for such change. Some ideas for future research and policy development, set 
out in two alternative scenarios of incremental or non-incremental styles of policymaking, 
are offered below:  
Incremental style: New Zealand policymakers could support the evolution of both its 
current general practice institutional forms and interest group structures towards different 
types of political exchange over time, building on the achievements described in this 
research and setting a stronger institutional context for the building of trust and 
collaboration within this sub-system. This would entail, for instance,developing a more 
consensual and receptive institutional context for the introduction of improved 
accountability frameworks. Steps to take to provide for the development of such a 
framework might include: 
  Mandating a single national representative body for general practice, perhaps 
consisting of a forum of representatives from the various segments of the general 
practice professional community. Such a body would have unrestricted access to 
government decision-makers regarding policymaking which affected general 
practice, utilising principle-based bargaining and negotiation processes. This could 
be expected to lead to the slow building of greater mutual trust, between general 
practitioners and the representative body and between that body and the state, 
through repeated examples of consensus-based policymaking that was seen to 
balance the interest of both parties.  
 Supporting the enhancement of policy community resources for primary health care 
(including general practice) to inform policy ideas and develop information and 
knowledge infrastructure based on evidence. This could include investment of 
adequate resources to build a comprehensive shared database for primary care 
service delivery on the model of the QMAS and rapid development of an evidence 
base, shared national service frameworks and quality standards and targets on the 
model of the domains developed within the QOF. 
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 Negotiating greater alignment between both interest groups and policy specialists 
and the two major political parties on key aspects of population-based health policy. 
A bi-partisan agreement to support the key elements of agreed infrastructure-
building steps over a ten-year period, avoiding the regular cycle of policy windows at 
election time which can bring policy reversals, could be a first step towards 
achieving longer periods of time for policy changes to embed.  
 extending the engagement with an international policy community, particularly of 
countries with similar governing systems, to support these developments.   A more 
extensive network and community of practice in this field of knowledge, which 
draws on other policy community resources, would enhance the resources of the 
New Zealand policy community for general practice and primary care policymaking.   
 
Non-incremental style: Policymakers could commence further reforms of the ownership 
and governance frameworks for general practice services by negotiating with the profession 
for the implementation of major structural change (such as a single payer financing 
arrangement within general practice). Costly in terms of meeting the full and reasonable 
costs of general practice services through public funding, a business case for such 
investment could perhaps be built based on potential improvements in metrics such as 
reductions in the health care costs of chronic conditions and reduction in ambulatory 
sensitive admissions which would arise from improved access to high quality general 
practice services.  Introduction of a broader-based pay-for-performance scheme has 
demonstrated in England the potential to deliver savings arising from anticipated reductions 
in ambulatory sensitive admissions to more costly hospital-based care.  
Another comparative case 
 
Canada offers an example of a jurisdiction which successfully achieved a major policy 
change in general practice governance when it introduced a single payer framework late in 
the development of its health system. Canada shares a Westminster-style adversarial 
political system though with a federal structure. Its universal comprehensive government-
sponsored medical care insurance scheme was legislated for in 1966 and finally fully 
implemented in 1971 22 p.93-95. With respect to both constitutional structure and timing, 
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Canada does not offer so close a match to the New Zealand case study as England does, 
except for a key feature.  
During implementation, and in a replay of the accommodation reached between the state 
and medical profession in New Zealand in 1948, several Canadian provinces allowed doctors 
to ‘extra-bill’ patients in exchange for accepting the state as the sole funder of medical and 
hospital services. The practice was not extensively adopted, with only 10 percent of 
physicians utilising it. The amount was estimated to constitute only 1.3 percent of total 
physician billings, unlike the widespread use of co-payments in New Zealand. However, 
concern about financial barriers to care arose during the 1980s in Canada as it did in New 
Zealand. Symbolically important to the medical profession as a cherished hallmark of private 
medical practice, the practice of extra-billing was nevertheless outlawed in 1984 in Canada 
as a result of a campaign by a Liberal government with declining popularity, seeking the 
‘product differentiation’ typical in an adversarial electoral system. This campaign promise to 
end extra-billing was seized upon and joined by the opposition party for its own electoral 
advantage. All provinces had to comply with the proscribing of  extra-billing and provincial 
battles were then fought to implement the legislation, the most protracted being in Ontario 
where a bitter strike ensued.  In the event the profession has preserved considerable clinical 
autonomy but surrendered some entrepreneurial autonomy to the state in its role of 
funder.   
A non-incremental change of this nature in New Zealand would require bi-partisan political 
support based on public interest principles. It may take many years to design and implement 
in a constructive way, drawing on the experience and advice of governments and general 
practice organisations in England (and Scotland) and Canada to give a complete picture of 
the costs and benefits for both parties to the arrangements. It would also be an appropriate 
environment for the activities of institutional entrepreneurs to be recruited by the state. 
New institutional arrangements would be the key output of such policymaking. New 
collaborative working relationships between the state and general practitioners and 
improved population health would be the sought-after outcomes.   
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In both scenarios, skilful engagement by the state of entrepreneurial actors with a particular 
brief to pursue continuing institutional innovation is likely to be a facilitating factor in the 
speed, nature and extent of policymaking change.   
The third set of comments relates to policymaking in the English general practice sub-
system. This has followed a further cycle of reform began in 2010, which gave general 
practitioners, in consortias, greater powers as commissioners of hospital and community 
services 67, and has therefore diverged in some important ways from the shared path 
hitherto followed with New Zealand. However, a more heterogeneous environment for 
general practice now exists in England and in this regard, New Zealand policymakers may 
have some relevant experience to offer their English colleagues about the challenges of 
health policymaking under conditions of heterogeneity.   
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this research was to identify what enabled or impeded two Westminster states 
to increase incentives for improved population-based health outcomes in the general 
practice sub-system of their health system, taking a policy-oriented approach. An 
opportunity presented by a quasi-natural experiment in these two countries has been 
utilised to explore, understand and develop generalisations from empirical data collected in 
two case studies of the design of a pay-for-performance scheme. The research has applied 
theories of policy change and variation and a rigorous comparative analysis in seeking to 
answer the research questions: 
 In what aspects and why did two similar episodes of policy formulation and 
implementation in two similar jurisdictions follow different processes and have 
different outcomes? 
 How well do the elements of Kingdon’s MS Framework describe and/or explain what 
happened at each stage of the policymaking process? 
 What new relationships between variables can be identified from the analysis which 
may enhance or extend Kingdon’s MS Framework? 
 
The research has utilised qualitative methods to gather evidence in 26 elite interviews and 
has analysed documentary evidence in the two countries to build thick descriptive case 
studies of each episode of pay-for-performance policymaking. The exploration of the 
process of policymaking in England has opened a window on ‘private negotiations between 
tight networks’ 100 p.196 and rare views of public policymaking in that country. The 
comparative approach considered the policy goal and policy instrument, timing, governing 
systems, type of health system, history of health sector reform and general practice sub-
system institutional and network features in each country. This process has established that 
many explanatory variables can be considered to be controlled for in the analysis of 
findings. A ‘most similar’ case study methodology has been used and the inter-systemic 
differences have been viewed as independent explanatory variables. The policy output and 
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outcome and nature of policy change achieved (incremental or non-incremental) has been 
used as the dependent variable. 
Specifically, the research has provided an in-depth study of the process of agenda-setting 
and alternative selection, with some focus upon implementation processes, in the two pay-
for-performance policymaking case studies. Limitations affecting the research include that it 
has captured, predominantly, the views of elites, leaders and entrepreneurs some years 
after the events in which they participated, that documentary evidence and access to some 
policymakers was not able to be obtained, and that the process of interpretation of 
evidence is inevitably mediated by the researcher’s judgement. The research should be read 
and the findings assessed in the context of these limitations. However, a process of careful 
corroboration and triangulation of evidence was followed to minimise these risks and 
limitations and this is described more fully in Chapter Four. 
The key finding of this research is that key institutional enablers assisted England to engage 
general practitioners successfully in policymaking. This created a context for rational choice 
drivers to lead to policymaking which increased the influence of the state over general 
practice activities. While New Zealand has taken important steps towards achieving its 
policymaking goals, its institutional features within the general practice sector acted as 
constraints on pay-for-performance policymaking. These differences include the multiple 
forms of ownership and governance of general practice services, the systems for resourcing 
and remuneration, multiplicity of interest groups and low levels of integration of the policy 
community in the general practice sector in New Zealand. These differences, especially in 
the systems for resourcing and remuneration, reduced the power of politicians to achieve a 
significant shift in their influence over general practice services. This in turn affects the 
ability of the state to exercise effective stewardship over all the public investment in its 
health system. In the New Zealand case study there is evidence that the degree of genuine 
engagement with a large segment of the general practice sector in the policymaking process 
was low. Without such engagement, the risk of lack of adoption of the policy and the 
delivery of its benefits by that section of general practitioners was high.  With greater 
engagement, the opportunity to design a larger pay-for-performance scheme with greater 
influence on health inequalities might have been achieved. However, new forms of 
governance have been developed, with the assistance of entrepreneurial actors, which 
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recombine successful mechanisms from adjacent areas including IPAs and community-led 
primary health care services and Māori and Pacific institutional approaches to equity-based 
service delivery.  
Both case studies shows that non-incremental change in primary care health policy can be 
achieved by governments wanting to improve health outcomes for citizens and that  general 
practitioners can be  incentivised to take a population-based approach to their work. 
However, politicians need to carefully assess the scale, pace, and scope of change of such 
change in light of the institutional features of their general practice sub-system. 
The utility of Kingdon’s MS Framework in describing and explaining these two episodes of 
policymaking in Westminster jurisdictions has been explored to establish whether this multi-
theoretic approach or other single-driver approaches in the policymaking literature are 
more helpful in achieving an understanding of what happened and why and how this 
knowledge may be useful to policymakers in future. The patterns of change found in the 
research run counter to those predicted in Kingdon’s MS Framework for the conditions 
associated with non-incremental change. However, the research has found that Kingdon’s 
multi-theoretic approach has great value in enabling a systemic approach to be taken to the 
analysis of each policymaking episode, demonstrating the interactivity of streams, elements 
and sub-elements and acknowledging human agency. Kingdon’s MS Framework captures 
the complexity of the policymaking in the two case studies better than a single approach 
would have done. It confirms that Kingdon’s work has been helpfully enhanced by the work 
of Zahariadis, which has deconstructed elements of agenda-setting and alternative selection 
processes, setting these out in an analytical framework and extending it to reflect on 
network factors such as the effects of policy community integration on the type of policy 
change.  
The entrepreneurs in the two case studies were appointed by state actors, to assist with 
activities in the alternative selection and implementation stages. They used their social 
acuity, problem definition and problem-solving skills, team-building and leadership skills to 
facilitate the design of these two schemes. The role of entrepreneurs during these phases 
was one of continual problem-solving and team management within a clearly-set political 
agenda. The value of entrepreneurs with ‘insider sensibilities’, who can command trust and 
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respect in key stakeholders, is demonstrated in both case studies. Actors resembling both 
policy and institutional entrepreneurs are observed, with the latter actively seeking out new 
governance mechanisms from adjacent institutional areas to recombine in new modes of 
governance about clinical practice for this general practice sector.   
However, the research has confirmed the critiques in the literature that the MS Framework 
continues to underestimate the importance of institutional features in policymaking in 
Westminster jurisdictions. The research has found that these jurisdictions permit more 
purposeful and orderly policymaking while still achieving non-incremental change. This 
research suggests enhancements to the MS Framework to heighten its consideration of 
institutional and network-based factors. Further, the suggestion is made that outcomes of 
policymaking as well as outputs are considered in the Framework so that it is able to show 
what has and has not worked, and why, providing improved guidance for future 
policymaking.     
This research has found that additional insights from the New Institutionalist, institutional 
rational choice and network literature enabled fuller exploration of the policymaking 
processes observed in the two case studies. In future, application of both institutional and 
rational choice methods and approaches may be helpful to explore policymaking.  
The research has also highlighted the high degree of continuity of policies and processes 
between apparently different eras of health system reform. Both case studies demonstrate 
the closeness of connection between policies instituted in the era of market-based reform in 
each country and those adopted in the subsequent era.  Pay-for-performance is such a 
policy and its small-scale application to general practice funding in the 1990s created the 
foundation for much larger scale national utilisation of this policy in both countries after the 
turn of the century. This continuity is reinforced through the continued involvement of 
individual policy-makers whose activities span successive eras.    
The research makes a contribution to the literature on typologies for health systems and 
health system decision-making. In particular, it has provided empirical evidence which 
contributes to the literature challenging the utility of the whole-system level approach and 
the tendency for over-simplification generally in these typologies. The research has 
highlighted the risks of masking or submerging important sub-systemic features. Although 
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these two countries are often placed in the same categories in typologies of health systems 
and public management systems, the evidence has shown that there are considerable 
differences between these countries’ general practice sub-systems and their relationship 
with state funders. The research has shown that these differences affected the ability of 
state funders to undertake strategic public policy interventions within their health systems.  
It is a recommendation arising from this research that models of health systems need to 
allow for sub-systemic variation more explicitly. The implications of these submerged sub-
system features have been evidenced through the exploration of their affect on health 
system stewardship in each country.   
Despite differences in the scope and effectiveness  of the pay-for-performance policies 
achieved in each jurisdiction, both states are shown to have held and exercised considerable 
powers to design and drive through health system reform of a wide-ranging kind in planned 
top-down processes. They both sought to use non-confrontational methods of engagement 
with key interest groups where possible, in order to distinguish themselves from attempts 
of previous administrations to impose unwanted change.  
How states can achieve major change to improve health outcomes for citizens is part of 
their challenge of health system stewardship. That has been the underlying theme of this 
research. Both governments held high hopes, on behalf of citizens, for system-wide health 
reform when they came into office. Through the detailed examination of these reform 
efforts, it is hoped that there is a greater understanding about how these policy changes 
were achieved and why these pay-for-performance policies varied between the two 
countries. Through such studies it may be easier for future governments to improve their 
policymaking processes and through this, their ability to fulfil their hopes for improved 
health outcomes for citizens.  
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Health Services Research Centre, School of Government 
 
Implementing Pay-for-Performance in primary health care 
 
In-depth Interviews 
July  2007 
 
 
Name: 
 
 
Job: 
 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
Date of interview: 
 
 
Location of interview: 
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Interviewer: 
 
 
This PhD research study is seeking to improve our understanding of how the design and 
implementation of two financial incentives schemes for general practitioners in 2004, one in 
England and one in New Zealand, measured up to current theory on best practice in the 
design and implementation of health policy, what this had to do with the level of success or 
failure to date, why this happened and how current theory could be changed to reflect 
these findings if necessary. The research will assist public policy makers to improve the 
design and implementation of similar initiatives in the future and enhance the likelihood 
that future initiatives will be more successful. 
 
The interview is completely confidential in nature, and in our reporting, we will ensure that 
all findings are anonymised with nothing being able to be tracked back to an individual.  A 
report of the findings of this research will be made available to all who are interviewed as 
part of this review, in advance of any publication of research findings in a PhD thesis or in 
other academic or professional publications. 
 
Before proceeding with the interview, I would welcome any questions that you have about 
this research and this interview. 
 
I would like to make a tape recording of this interview, as well as taking contemporaneous 
notes.  The tape recording and notes will be stored securely in line with Victoria University 
of Wellington/University of Birmingham data protection procedures and only I and my PhD 
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supervisor will have access to the data.  Are you prepared to give consent to the recording 
of the interview? 
 
Name……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
I confirm that I give consent to the recording of this interview: 
 
Signature…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Date………………………………………………………………………………… 
1. Could you give me an overview of your role in the design and/or implementation of the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in England between 2001-3/Performance 
Programme (PP) in New Zealand primary care between 2001-5? 
 
Prompt for why chosen for this role ie: what skills, influence, experience, information held 
which were relevant to the process and how were they used/not used  
 
 
2. Thinking back to that process, what in your view was the QOF/PP intended to achieve? 
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3. Do you understand there to have been a research or theoretical framework which 
undergirded the proposed scheme and if so what was it? 
 
 
Prompt for use of evidence-based policy; role of advisors; how team operated; roles of 
participants; process for making decisions/resolving debates 
 
4. What do you understand to have been the policy advice/situation analysis process which 
informed programme design or implementation planning? Who was involved in that? 
How did they go about this? 
 
Prompt for influences such as use of previous experience, expectations of politicians; 
availability of resources of time, expertise and money 
 
 
5. Who was responsible for deciding on these aspects of policy design and implementation 
planning? Why them? How did they approach this task? 
 
Prompt for which issues caused debate and how this was resolved; ability to subject decision 
making to critique; who held which sorts of roles in the process of decision-making 
 
 
 
 
6. Who in your view had a stake in these decisions and how were these various interests 
reflected in the design or implementation planning? 
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Prompt for how interests were declared or identified; how they influenced the final shape of 
design or implementation 
 
 
7. What do you believe is working as expected or not working as expected? What 
challenges and barriers emerged and how were these responded to?  
 
 
8.  
What changed from the original design, why and who approved this? Is change 
continuing and how and by whom is this being decided? 
 
Prompt for who the key stakeholders for each set of interests/issues  were and how they 
influenced/are influencing  the outcome of the process 
 
 
9. What elements of the scheme, the process of its design and implementation do you 
believe are relevant for similar initiatives to improve quality through financial use of pay 
for performance ie; are not situational to this scheme? What can policy 
managers/academics learn from this experience? 
 
 
10. What other comments do you have about the process of design and or implementation 
of this scheme and its results?  Who else should I speak to about the design and 
implementation of the scheme? 
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